

**Informal Institutions and Governance: Examining the  
Impact of Clientelism on Electoral Accountability in  
Rural Punjab, Pakistan**

**By**

**Zahid Aqil**

BS (Hon's) in Politics & International Relations  
M. Phil in Development Studies (Candidate)

**Under the Supervision of**

**Dr. Idrees Khawaja**

Senior Research Economist

Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad

A thesis submitted to the Department of Development Studies of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Development Studies, 2015.

**Pakistan Institute of Development Economics  
Islamabad, Pakistan**

## **ABSTRACT**

Elections are instruments of democratic good governance. These empower citizens to formally express their will by choosing between policy alternatives presented by contending candidates and political parties, and hold them accountable through their vote. Nonetheless, poverty and dependence of the voters has the potential to undermine the choices of the electorates through patron-client networks.

This study examines the extent to which electoral politics in rural Pakistan is dominated by clientelism and measures its impact on electoral accountability in the country. Quantitative and qualitative evidence from district Kasur of the Punjab province suggests that electoral politics in rural Pakistan is dominated by clientelism which undermines electoral accountability in the country. Correlational analysis of the three indices of; dependence, clientelistic voting choices and electoral accountability capacity suggests that more dependent a household is the more clientelistic it is in its voting choices and is less able to hold accountable her vote bloc leader or candidate for legislative assembly.

## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to my beloved mother and esteemed father, Sardar Muhammad Asdullah. Their great care, encouragement and generosity provided the strongest foundation for my life. I owe all of my accomplishments to their love and sacrifices.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to all the people who have helped and supported me in accomplishing this task, through the course of this study.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my esteemed supervisor Dr. Idrees Khawaja, Associate Professor and Head of the School of Public Policy at Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, for his generous support, valued advice and encouragement to accomplish this piece of work. He has been more than generous with his time and has always been available for his worthy guidance. I can never forget the great memories of having tea while at discussion with my supervisor and traveling to the Malpur bus stop with him. He has been a great source of inspiration, encouragement and learning for me. His sincere efforts and hard work to review and edit my work time and again are much appreciated. Sir, I am grateful to you for your generosity, kind support, valued advice, encouragement and worthy guidance.

I am grateful to Dr. G. M. Arif, Joint Director PIDE, for guiding me in developing research design and instruments of data collection for the study. I am obliged to Dr. Manzoor Ahmad Afridi, Head of the Department of Politics & International Relations at International Islamic University, and Dr. Islam, Dean Faculty of Social Sciences at Iqra University Islamabad, for guiding me in selection of the topic of research. I am thankful to Dr. Junaid Alam Memon, Head of the Department of Environmental Economics, PIDE, for his valued comments and worthy guidance while preparing proposal of the study. I am thankful to Dr. Feriyal Amal Aslam, Head of the Department of Development Studies, PIDE, and staff of the department for their facilitation. I am also thankful to my learned friend Asif Iqbal for his valued advice during the course of the study. I would also like to acknowledge the great companionship of all my friends.

I cannot forget to acknowledge the generous support of Dr. Zubair Ahmad, Assistant Professor, Gomal University, D.I. Khan, for taking great pain and sparing his precious time to evaluate proposal and data collection tools of the study and provide his valued

comments and guidance for improvement. His valued comments and worthy guidance helped me a great deal in designing and conducting this study. I feel obliged to him.

I wish to extend my sincere gratitude to Muhammad Anees Qureshi (MPA 2013), Sardar Waqas Hassan Mokal (MPA 2013), Sardar Tufail Khan (MNA 2002), Chaudhry Ahsan Raza Khan (MPA 2008), and other candidates for legislative assemblies who were generous to spare their time for Interview. I also wish to thank vote bloc leaders of the sample villages and heads of the sample households for extending their support and taking time for interview. Respondents of the study, be they candidates for legislative assemblies, vote bloc leaders or heads of the households, deserve special thanks not only for their time but also for their hospitality. I would also like to acknowledge and appreciate the hard work of my field work team.

I am thankful to my beloved brother Nabeel Asad, student of Diplomacy & Strategic Studies at Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Lahore, for encouragement and support through the course of my study. He has always been there for me to offer his generous support. I am also grateful to him for accompanying me during the field work of the study.

Finally, my deepest and heartiest gratitude goes to my family for their love, sacrifices and hard work in order to provide me with the best of everything to excel in life. I admire my father, Sardar Muhammad Asdullah, for his kindness, generosity, encouragement and support through the course of my academic career. His confidence in my abilities has always been a great source of motivation for me. I could have been nothing without this. I owe my accomplishments to the confidence he gave me. Thank you “*papa*”, for everything!

*Zahid Azil*

# Table of Contents

Chapter 1 - Introduction.....	1
1.1. Statement of the Problem .....	1
1.2. Background of the Study.....	2
1.3. Research Objectives .....	5
1.4. Assumption.....	5
1.5. Significance of the Study .....	5
1.6. Contribution of the Study.....	6
1.7. Organization of the Study .....	7
Chapter 2 - Literature Review.....	8
2.1. Modes of Citizen-Politician Linkages .....	8
2.1.1. Feudalism or Dependence based Linkages.....	8
2.1.2. Class based Linkages.....	9
2.1.3. Biradri based Linkages .....	9
2.1.4. Clientelistic Mode of Linkages.....	11
2.2. Electoral Accountability .....	15
2.2.1. Structures and Electoral Accountability .....	16
2.2.2. Service Delivery and Electoral Accountability .....	19
Chapter 3 - Conceptual Framework.....	22
3.1. Theoretical Background .....	22
3.1.1. Theoretical Models of Voting Behaviour .....	22
3.1.2. Theoretical Model of Electoral Accountability .....	29
3.2. Framework of the Study.....	30
Chapter 4 - Research Methodology .....	34
4.1. Introduction .....	34
4.2. Study Design .....	34
4.3. Research Questions .....	35
4.4. Variables of the Study .....	35
4.4.1. Conceptualization .....	35
4.4.2. Operationalization.....	37
4.5. Data Collection Tools.....	41
4.5.1. Quantitative Data Collection Tools .....	41
4.5.2. Qualitative Data Collection Tools .....	42

4.6.	Justification for Locale of the Study .....	43
4.7.	Sampling.....	44
4.7.1.	Survey Sampling.....	45
4.7.2.	Interview Sampling.....	49
4.8.	Data Collection Procedures.....	50
4.9.	Data Processing.....	51
4.9.1.	Quantitative Data Processing.....	52
4.9.2.	Qualitative Data Processing.....	52
4.10.	Data Analysis.....	52
4.10.1.	Quantitative Data Analysis.....	52
4.10.2.	Qualitative Data Analysis.....	53
Chapter 5 -	Results of the Study .....	54
5.1.	Results of the Household Survey .....	54
5.1.1.	Demographic Profile of Rural Kasur .....	54
5.1.2.	Economic Profile of Rural Kasur.....	56
5.1.3.	Social Service Delivery Networks in Rural Kasur .....	58
5.1.4.	Public Service Delivery Networks in Rural Kasur .....	58
5.1.5.	Preferences of Households in Rural Kasur for Provision of Public Services in the Village.....	60
5.1.6.	Voting Behaviour in Rural Kasur .....	61
5.1.7.	Electoral Accountability in Rural Kasur.....	71
5.2.	Results of the Key Informant Interviews .....	78
5.2.1.	Profile of the Villages of District Kasur .....	78
5.2.2.	Political Organization in the Villages of District Kasur .....	81
5.2.3.	Electoral Behaviour in Rural Kasur.....	83
5.3.	Results of the Interviews of Vote Bloc Leaders.....	83
5.3.1.	Electoral Behaviour of Vote Bloc Leaders .....	84
5.3.2.	Vote Bloc Leaders as Informal Local Government Institutions .....	87
5.3.3.	Electoral Accountability from VBL Perspective .....	88
5.4.	Results of the Interviews of Candidates for Legislative Assemblies.....	91
5.4.1.	Accountability Pressures CLAs Face.....	91
5.4.2.	Responses of CLAs to the Accountability Pressures They Face .....	92
Chapter 6 -	Discussion and Analysis .....	94
6.1.	Political Organization in a Punjabi Village .....	94
6.2.	Typology of Voters in a Punjabi Village.....	95

6.3. Dependence and Mediation in a Punjabi Village .....	98
6.4. Clientelistic Voting Behaviour in a Rural Context.....	103
6.5. Perverse Electoral Accountability in Rural Punjab .....	106
Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Recommendations.....	110
7.1. Introduction.....	110
7.2. Theoretical Implications .....	113
7.3. Policy Implications .....	114
7.4. Policy Recommendations.....	115
7.5. The Way Forward .....	116
References.....	117
ANNEXES .....	122
ANNEX-I: INDICES CONSTRUCTION METHODOLOGY .....	122
Composite Dependence Index .....	122
Clientelistic Voting Choices Index .....	126
Electoral Accountability Index .....	133
ANNEX-II: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HOUSEHOLD SURVEY (ENGLISH) .....	136
ANNEX-III: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HOUSEHOLD SURVEY (URDU).....	152
ANNEX-IV: CHECK LIST FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS.....	166
ANNEX-V: CHECK LIST FOR INTERVIEWS OF VOTE BLOC LEADERS.....	175
ANNEX-VI: CHECK LIST OF INTERVIEWS OF CANDIDATES FOR LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES .....	182

## **List of Tables**

Table 4.1: Dimensions of Clientelism and their Brief Description .....	37
Table 4.2: Indicators for Each Dimension of Clientelism .....	38
Table 4.3: Dimensions of Electoral Accountability and their Brief Description.....	39
Table 4.4: Indicators for Each Dimension of Electoral Accountability.....	40
Table 4.5: Stratification of Clusters .....	46
Table 4.6: Selection of Sample UCs from Each Cluster of Rural UCs .....	47
Table 5.1: Demographic Characteristics of Sample Households.....	55
Table 5.2: Economic Characteristics of Sample Households .....	56
Table 5.3: Economic Characteristics of Sample Households .....	57
Table 5.4: Social Service Delivery Networks.....	58
Table 5.5: Public Service Delivery Networks.....	59
Table 5.6: Conditional Delivery of Public Goods and Services .....	60
Table 5.7: Public Service Delivery Preferences of Households .....	61
Table 5.8: Voting Choices of Households in 2008 & 2013 General Elections .....	62
Table 5.9: Individual vs. Collective Voting Choices .....	63
Table 5.10: Basis of Participation in the Vote Bloc.....	64
Table 5.11: Basis for Being Head of the Vote Bloc .....	65
Table 5.12: Basis of Alliance of Vote Bloc with Candidates in General Elections of 2008 & 2013 .....	66
Table 5.13: Basis on Which Vote Blocs Vote to the Same Candidate in Next Election ..	67
Table 5.14: Basis on Which Vote Blocs do not Vote the Same Candidate in Next Election .....	68
Table 5.15: The Basis on Which Non-bloc Member Households Voted in 2008 & 2013 Election .....	69
Table 5.16: Cash Payments or Payoffs for Vote Buying and their Impact on Voting Choices.....	71
Table 5.17: Expectations of Bloc Households from VBL and their Perceptions of his Responsibility .....	72
Table 5.18: Electoral Promises Made by Vote Bloc Leader with Bloc Member Households.....	72
Table 5.19: Participation of Bloc Households in Decision Making of Vote Bloc.....	73
Table 5.20: Accountability of Vote Bloc Leaders by Vote Bloc Members.....	73
Table 5.21: Expectations of Non-bloc Households from MLA and their Perception of his Responsibility .....	75
Table 5.22: Electoral Promises Made by Electoral Candidates to the Non-bloc Member Households.....	76
Table 5.23: Accountability of Electoral Candidates by Non-bloc Member Households ..	77
Table 5.24: Classification of the Sample Villages.....	80
Table 5.25: Connectivity of the Villages to the Urban Centres .....	81
Table 5.26: Political Organization in Rural Kasur.....	82
Table 6.1: Dependence of Households in Rural Punjab .....	97

Table 6.2: Correlation of Dependence with Land Ownership and Monthly Income.....	98
Table 6.3: Clientelistic Voting Choices of Households in Rural Punjab.....	103
Table 6.4: Correlation of Clientelistic Voting Choices Index with Socio-economic Variables .....	104
Table 6.5: Electoral Accountability Capacity of Households in Rural Punjab.....	106
Table 6.6: Correlation of Electoral Accountability Index with Socio-economic Variables .....	107
Table 6.7: Correlation between Dependence, Clientelistic Voting Choices and Accountability.....	108

## **List of Figures**

Figure 3.1: Institutions and Electoral Accountability .....	31
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Framework of the Study .....	33
Figure 4.1: Stages of Sample Selection .....	48

# **Chapter 1 - Introduction**

## **1.1. Statement of the Problem**

Elections are considered to be central to the functioning of a democratic political system (Jones, 2007; Turska-Kawa & Wojtasik, 2013). They provide a vital means of empowering citizens to elect their representatives, convey them their policy preferences and hold them accountable for their performance and misconduct, through their vote (Jones, 2007). Through elections they participate in the policy making process and hold policy makers accountable. Thus elections are an important tool to ensure the participation of the citizens in the policy making process and make policy makers serve in the public interest (Jones, 2007). In this way, elections are instrumental to ensure good governance and thus improve development outcomes (Toka, 2008).

A fundamental tenet of democratic theory is that voters should be able to make their choices freely. And yet a nagging worry is that poverty and dependence distort the choices that many citizens make. The term clientelism crystallizes these concerns (Bruso, Nazareno, & Stokes, 2001). In other words, poverty and dependence lead towards the establishment of patron-client relationships and result in clientelism which distorts the choices that the citizens make in elections and thus make elections ineffective in holding politicians accountable. In this study, I seek to investigate the impact of clientelism on electoral accountability with reference to Pakistan.

## **1.2. Background of the Study**

“Good governance and sustainable development are indivisible. This is the lesson of all our effort and experiences, from Africa to Asia to Latin America. Without good governance ... no amount of funding, no amount of charity will set us on the path to prosperity”, says UN secretary general Kofi Annan at conference on *Governance for Sustainable Growth and Equity 1997* (Joy, 2000).

Relationship between good governance and development is well documented both by the academia and international development agencies. For instance, World Bank (1992) states that sustainable development can only take place if a predictable and transparent framework of rules and institutions exists for the conduct of private and public business. Asian Development Bank (2004) states that good governance is central to creating and sustaining an enabling environment for development. UNDP (1997) believes that building the capacity for governance is central to sustainable human development. There appears to be a consensus in the international donor community that the existence of enabling policies and effective institutions (good governance) goes to the heart of the development process and thus to the effectiveness of development assistance (IFAD, 1999).

The importance of good governance for sustainable development emphasized by international development community brings governance to the spotlight. It attracts researchers from all over the world to pay more attention to the conceptualization of

governance, processes involved in it, issues of governance and how governance can be improved for better and sustainable development outcomes.

International development agencies such as UNDP, World Bank and Asian Development Bank define governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (A. D. Bank, 2004; W. Bank, 1992; UNDP, 1997). Schedler & Plattner (1999) define governance as the processes and institutions that guide the functioning of the government. UNESCAP (2006) describes governance as the process through which decisions are made and implemented. Since governance is the process of decision making and implementation, an analysis of governance focuses on the formal and informal actors involved in decision making and their implementation and the formal and informal structures that have been set in place to arrive at and implement the decision (UNESCAP, 2006).

Transparency, accountability, participation, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, equity and inclusiveness, consensus orientation, and the rule of law are identified as the key attributes of good governance by international development agencies (Anello, 2008; CIDA, 2008; IFAD, 1999; UNDP, 1997; UNESCAP, 2006).

Accountability is pivotal to good governance. The lack of accountability mechanisms impedes any effort to counter corruption or ineffective resource distribution (Volintiru, 2010). Accountability is considered to be a function of voters’ capacity to reward or sanction actions of politicians. Politicians’ responsiveness may be based on the ability of

the voters to effectively hold them accountable for their actions, such as replacing them with competing politicians, when one set of politicians fail to be responsive, provided that there is some minimal level of civil liberties, periodic elections, and rule of law (Kitschelt, Freeze, Kolev, & Wang, 2009). Competitive elections create a relationship of formal accountability between policy makers and citizens (Ashworth, 2012). Electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politicians' corrupt behaviour (Ferraz & Finan, 2009). Thus, the quality of governance depends upon voters' capacity to hold their political representatives accountable for their actions (Adsera, Boix, & Payne, 2003).

Nonetheless, clientelism distorts the voting choices that many citizens make and undermines their capacity to hold their political representatives accountable for their actions (Bruso et al., 2001). As countries attempt the difficult transition to democracy and open markets, numerous reforms are necessary in the realm of governance. Such reform efforts have tended to concentrate on formal institutions, rules and procedures. In many cases, informal systems of clientelism and patrimonialism are key contributors to stifling popular participation, subversion of the rule of law, fostering corruption, distorting the delivery of public services, discouraging investment and undermining economic progress. Since clientelistic networks are deeply entrenched, seldom authorized or openly acknowledged, and take different forms depending on their context, they can be both difficult to detect and to remove (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). Thus, clientelism is a useful tool to understand the politics and issues of governance and development in underdeveloped societies (Fatton, 1986).

### **1.3. Research Objectives**

The primary objective of this study is to examine the impact of clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages on electoral accountability in Pakistan. For this purpose, the study examines the Punjab province of Pakistan<sup>1</sup>. The specific objectives of the study are:

- I. To assess the extent to which electoral politics in rural Punjab is dominated by clientelism.
- II. To examine the accountability pressures candidates for legislative assemblies (CLAs) face in rural Punjab.
- III. To examine the strategies the CLAs employ to respond to accountability pressures that they face.
- IV. To assess the accountability capacity of rural electorates in Punjab.
- V. To measure the impact of clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages on electoral accountability in rural Punjab.

### **1.4. Assumption**

Electoral politics in rural Pakistan is dominated by clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages which undermines electoral accountability in the country.

### **1.5. Significance of the Study**

In a democratic political system, electoral accountability is instrumental to ensure good governance and improve development outcomes. A fundamental tenant of democratic

---

<sup>1</sup> For justification of locale of the study see section 4.6 at page number 43.

theory is that voters should be able to make their choices freely. However, clientelism distorts the electoral choices of citizens and thus makes elections ineffective in holding politicians accountable. Given the importance of clientelism in understanding dynamics of underdeveloped societies, empirical investigation of the impact of clientelism on electoral accountability may give us useful insights to understand and propose solutions to the problems of governance and development in Pakistan.

### **1.6. Contribution of the Study**

Despite the importance of clientelism in understanding politics of developing countries, the subject remains under researched. There are hardly few empirical studies worldwide which explain the relationship between clientelism and electoral accountability. The studies done on this phenomenon rely on expert interviews and proxies. Critics have posed serious questions to the reliability of their data collections tools and measures. There is a general consensus among political scientists that the best way to study and measure the phenomenon of clientelism is survey method with data collected directly from the electorate. In Pakistan, there have been a number of studies on voting behaviour. Only few of these studies have paid some attention to the clientelistic voting behaviour. However, there has not been any study in Pakistan which specifically investigates clientelism and measures its impact on electoral accountability. Given this gap in view, the present study makes several contributions. First, it reconceptualises and provides operational measures for clientelism and electoral accountability. Second, based on the revised conceptualization and operationalization of these concepts, the study develops research design and data collection tools which could be most suitable for such studies. Third, it develops three indices which are dependence, clientelistic voting choices and

electoral accountability capacity. These indices facilitate measurement and correlational analysis of the phenomenon. Fourth, it develops a conceptual framework to explain the relationship between clientelism and electoral accountability in the context of developing countries. Thus, by making these contributions it seeks to fill the gap.

### **1.7. Organization of the Study**

This study is organized into seven chapters. Besides this chapter, rest of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents review of literature on the given research problem. In this chapter, empirical studies on electoral behaviour or modes of citizen-politician linkages and electoral accountability are reviewed and the research gap is identified. Thus, this chapter provides the context of the study. Chapter 3 presents theoretical background of the study. It reviews the dominant models of voting behaviour or modes of citizen-politician linkages and electoral accountability. Based on the review of these models the chapter presents conceptual framework of the study. Chapter 4 deals with the detailed methodology of the study. It outlines the research design, data collection methods and data analysis tools of the study. Chapter 5 presents results of the study. Chapter 6 builds upon the results of the study presented in chapter 5 and presents discussion and analysis. Chapter 7 concludes the study and makes recommendations for policy reforms.

## **Chapter 2 - Literature Review**

In this chapter, I present a review of selected literature that is relevant to the understanding of electoral behaviour or citizen-politician linkage strategies and electoral accountability in rural Punjab. It is organized into two sections. Section 2.1 provides a review of selected studies on citizen-politician linkages whereas section 2.2 presents a review of selected studies on electoral accountability in the context of rural Punjab.

### **2.1. Modes of Citizen-Politician Linkages**

How politicians or political parties connect to the voters have implications for the accountability relationship between the electors and the electorates in a democratic polity. Literature on electoral behaviour of rural Punjab provides various explanations for how political parties in rural Punjab aggregate votes and connect to the voters. Most explanations of voting behaviour or citizen-politicians linkages in rural Punjab can be grouped into four broad categories which are outlined as under.

#### **2.1.1. Feudalism or Dependence based Linkages**

According to this explanation, rural Punjab is ruled by large landlords and political parties function there by recruiting these powerful local landlords, on whom voters are socio-economically dependent. These landlords may be electoral candidates themselves, or they may be local power holders who are able to use their control over land and people's livelihoods to tell them whom to vote for. According to this explanation, voters

in rural Punjab vote not as they would like to instead as they are told to (Ahmad, 1977; Alavi, 1983; Waseem, 1994).

### **2.1.2. Class based Linkages**

For rural Punjab, this explanation marks more of a historical watershed rather than providing an explanation of electoral behaviour and citizen-politician linkages. It refers to a particular period in Punjab's history when its countryside was swept by class based political ideology. The two elections of 1970 and 1977 were contested on these lines. These elections set labourers and sharecroppers against their landlords. This view holds that citizens in rural Punjab voted in these elections according to their occupational and class interests and connected directly to workers of a political party that provided them external support to counter their landlords. According to this view, voters in rural Punjab had not voted as they were told to rather as they had wanted to in order to further the collective interests of their class (Ahmad, 1973; Alavi, 1973). However, this type of electoral behaviour and linkages in rural Punjab did not last past the 1970s. Class and party identification explanations are now used only within an urban context (Mohmand, 2011).

### **2.1.3. Biradri based Linkages**

This explanation views voters of rural Punjab as over-socialized members of kinship groups, or biradris. According to this view, biradris function as corporate groups that determine the behaviour of group members. Individuals are expected to be part of and lend their support to their particular biradri to strengthen it politically vis-à-vis other

biradris in order to gain access to limited state resources. The leaders of the group, or the group as a whole, may decide who to vote for and members are expected to behave in accordance with the decision. This explanation argues that biradri groups will mostly support members of their kin as electoral candidates without taking into account other considerations about the candidate or political party. Therefore, according to this view, voters in rural Punjab vote not as they would like to rather as they are told to by the collective decision of their kin group (A. Ahmed, Fatima, Hussain, & Farooq, 2014; M. Ahmed, 2007, 2009; M. Ahmed & Naseem, 2011; Alavi, 1972; Asim, 2012; Chaudhry, Ahmed, Khan, & Hussain, 2014; Inayatullah, 1963; Javaid & Elahi, 2014; F. K. Khan & Musarrat, 2014; Tariq & Alamgir, 2013; Waseem, 2006)

Kinship or *biradri* is the most important institution in Pakistan's social structure and also its main form of political organization (Alavi, 1971). It is very much active and playing its participatory role in all kinds of socio-political and community matters and issues ranging from very minor issues to big social disputes (Chaudhry et al., 2014). It is the main component of voting behaviour and it has very deep impact on political alignments of the electorate in Punjab (M. Ahmed, 2008). Kinship groups mostly support members of their kin as electoral candidates without taking into account other considerations about the candidate or political party (Alavi, 1972).

A number of studies by other scholars also support this view. For instance, Inayatullah (1963) argues that biradri-ism was the major principle of political organization in villages of West Pakistan during local government elections held under the military regime of

Ayub. Waseem (2006) supports this view by claiming that even in 2002 election held under the regime of General Musharaf, rural Punjabi citizens voted predominantly on the basis of caste and biradri. Ahmed (2008) argues that individualism in voting behaviour does not exist. Voters do not vote as they would like to but as they are told to by their biradris. He finds this trend more prevalent in rural than in urban areas of Punjab. He considers voting behaviour in rural Punjab as static and argues that it will remain so as long as political parties are under the sheer influence of non-political powers. Khan (2014) finds that biradri based voting continues to dominate the electoral behaviour of rural Punjabi voters even in 2013 general elections. She reports that in 2013 general elections 42% people voted under the influence of biradri/family. Ahmed (2014) finds that in Punjab women are inclined to vote in favour of their biradri and also vote for the sake to improve the socio-political power of their biradri within local and national level politics. Javaid (2014) supports this view by arguing that majority of the rural electorates in Punjab vote on the basis of personality and biradri. Asim (2012) concludes that biradri-ism seems to be stronger than political loyalty these days as far as motivations for voting behaviour are concerned.

#### **2.1.4. Clientelistic Mode of Linkages**

According to this view, voters in rural Punjab exchange their vote for goods and services. They are not tied to either landlords or kinship groups, and are instead, able to offer their electoral support to whichever candidate promises to deliver the most. They evaluate delivery record of a candidate at each election and then vote accordingly. For this reason, most candidates spend their time in office providing targeted goods to supporters. This

view argues that voters in rural Punjab vote not as they are told to but as they would like to in order to maximize their access to limited state resources (Callen, Gulzar, Hasanain, & Khan, 2013; Cheema & Mohmand, 2006; Easterly, 2003; Gazdar, 2000; Gulzar, 2014; Hasnain, 2008, 2010; Husain, 1999; P. Keefer, Narayan, & Vishwanath, 2003; P. E. Keefer, Narayan, & Vishwanath, 2006; Shehryar Khan, 2012; Shehryar Khan, Yasin, Kakakhel, & Sohaib, 2013; Kitschelt, 2010; Kitschelt & Palmer, 2009; Mohmand, 2011; Mohmand & Cheema, 2007; Shami, 2010; Tariq & Alamgir, 2013; Unsworth, 2010; Wilder, 1999; Zaidi, 2005).

Political parties in Pakistan issue manifestos and have some noticeable leaning towards the left or the right of the political spectrum in terms of their programmatic packages. However, this is not the basis on which they recruit members or organize their vote banks (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Pakistani parties rely quite heavily upon clientelistic inducements while offering few programmatic inducements to voters and average voters respond more readily to targeted material inducements than to programmatic policy appeals (Kitschelt, 2010; Kitschelt & Palmer, 2009). Majority of rural Punjabi electorates are benefit seeking political actors who organize within their kinship networks to strengthen their bargaining position and then give their collective votes to vote bloc leaders who act as broker-patrons and provide access to state officials and services (Mohmand, 2011). By pulling in such local leaders, political parties organize extensive networks of patronage (Zaidi, 2005). Rural Punjabi voters exchange their vote for goods and services, and at each election, evaluate either a candidate's delivery record or their potential for delivering during the next term, and then vote accordingly. For this reason,

most candidates spend their time in office providing targeted goods to supporters (Wilder, 1999).

Political system in Pakistan is the domain of historically entrenched interests with powerful politicians and landlords acting as patrons to selected local level clients because of unequal control and ownership in economic, political and social domains (Easterly, 2003). Clientelism enables landlords to use votes of peasants and labourers as bargaining chips with politicians to appropriate public resources for their own private benefit. However, when peasants and labourers are given outside options, the landlord has to provide them with public goods in order to maintain his economic, social and political standing in the village (Shami, 2010).

A number of other studies conducted by eminent scholars not only support but also further elaborate this view. For instance, Keefer et al. (2005) states that central government politicians in Pakistan have incentives to provide narrowly targeted services rather than broadly available public goods. He finds this broad policy record consistent with political incentives more concerned with targeted than with broad public goods provision. Hasnain (2010) argues that local government sectoral priorities are heavily tilted towards the provision of physical infrastructure, and within physical infrastructure to small schemes that can be targeted to specific localities and even households. He attributes this sectoral prioritization of local governments as a dutiful response to relatively greater citizen demands for it. Cheema & Mohmand (2006) argue post-reform targeting of provision between households is conditional upon political geography and

membership to dominant village level patron-client factions (called vote blocs or *dharas* in the local context). Khan et. al. (2013) find that electoral politics, administrative practices and service delivery in Punjab and KPK is dominated by clientelism. They argue that patronage-based political system is a major obstacle in getting access to public services there. Callen et. al. (2013) examines the case of health sector public employee absence through experimental evidence from Punjab and argues that doctors in Punjab may be absent and unavailable to provide health care because their position is a sinecure provided in return for political support. Hasnain (2008) examines the impact of the political party structure on the incentives for politicians to focus on patronage versus service delivery improvements in Pakistan. He finds that fragmentation and factionalism both exacerbate the information problems for voters and create incentives for politicians to focus on targeted benefits in Pakistan. He argues that the more fragmented, factionalized, and polarized the party systems, the greater are the incentives for patronage, weakening service delivery improvements. Tariq & Alamgir (2013) conclude that the candidate of a particular political party does count to some extent but the main factor in the success of a candidate still goes back to the patron-client relationship maintained by the chiefs of the big biradris and the politicians.

Punjabi voters are, therefore, described as dependent and coerced, actors who seek to further the collective interests of their class, as over-socialized members of their kin groups and as vote-selling clients of political patrons all at the same time. Mohmand (2014) attempts to explain how varied explanations of party-voter (or citizen-politician) linkages found in literature can not only co-exist but often even work together. She

argues that the link between political parties and their voters is rarely direct. Instead, it is mediated by different types of autonomous local actors, ranging from landlords and tribal leaders, to clientelistic exchanges through brokers, kin groups and local party leaders. As the national political arena changes, different actors gain precedence, leading to multiple explanations of what is really going on in rural Punjab between political parties and their voters.

Recent psephology literature, with in-depth and quantitative accounts, on electoral behaviour in rural Punjab establishes that electoral politics and mode of citizen-politician linkages in rural Punjab is dominated by clientelism. These studies are based on empirical evidence from Sargodha, Hafizabad and Khanewal districts of the Punjab province. There is dearth of empirical data in this regard. These studies generalize the findings on rural Punjab based on limited empirical evidence available. In this study, I attempt to test this view of citizen-politician linkages in rural Punjab with empirical evidence from another district of the Punjab province. With empirical evidence from Kasur district, I test this view and make a comparative case to explain that how far my findings relate to or vary from the previous studies of other districts.

## **2.2. Electoral Accountability**

“A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct” (Schedler, 1999).

Accountability is based on the set of right kind of incentives and disincentives to discourage certain conduct and induce certain behaviour in agent, who has been delegated authority by principal to fulfil certain responsibility. In this way, the function of accountability is to regulate the conduct of agent and make him/her responsive to the principal with regard to the domain of responsibility for which he/she was delegated or given authority.

Keeping in view the function of accountability, I find that studies on electoral accountability in Pakistan either examine the structures which are responsible to produce this function or study the output of this function, responsiveness, studied in terms of service delivery improvements (Callen et al., 2013; Cheema & Mohmand, 2006; Gulzar, 2014; Hasnain, 2008, 2010; P. Keefer et al., 2003; P. E. Keefer et al., 2005; Shehryar Khan, 2012; Shehryar Khan et al., 2013; Kitschelt, 2010; Mohmand, 2014; Mohmand & Cheema, 2007; Patnam, 2009; Unsworth, 2010).

### **2.2.1. Structures and Electoral Accountability**

Recent literature sees Pakistan's poor social development outcomes as a consequence of the political and administrative structures that weakened political and bureaucratic accountability to citizens and resulted in political economy and governance failures (Easterly, 2003; Husain, 1999). The exercise of formal accountability depends upon the political structure and exchange relationship between political leaders and citizens (Shehryar Khan et al., 2013).

There are few studies which examine electoral accountability structures in rural Punjab. For instance, Khan et. al. (2013) study accountability structures and examine their impact on provision of public goods in Khyber Pakhtun Khawa (KPK) and Punjab. They argue that patronage-based political system is a major obstacle in getting access to public services and it undermines formal long route to accountability. Callen et. al. (2013) study accountability structures and measure the impact of patronage politics on service provision in public health sector in Punjab. They assert that patronage politics often leads to the selection of inefficient policies because, in clientelistic systems, politicians win office by providing targeted benefits to supporters instead of by effectively providing public goods. They argue that doctors may be absent and unavailable to provide health care because their position is a sinecure provided in return for political support. Hasnain (2008) examines the impact of the political party structures on the incentives for politicians to focus on patronage versus service delivery improvements in Pakistan. He finds that fragmentation and factionalism both exacerbate the information problems that voters have in assigning credit (blame) for service delivery improvements (deterioration), and thus create the incentives for politicians to focus on targeted benefits. He argues that the more fragmented, factionalized and polarized the party systems, the greater are the incentives for patronage, weakening service delivery improvements. Mohmand (2014) explores the electoral accountability structures through the framework of party-voters linkages in rural Punjab. She argues that the link between political parties and their voters is rarely direct. Instead, it is mediated by different types of autonomous local actors, kin groups and local party leaders. These autonomous local actors function as informal local governance institutions (ILGIs). They mediate relationships between villagers and the

state, facilitating access to services, government departments, police and courts. They can provide public goods and services, and connect the rural poor to the formal state. But they can also entrench the interests of dominant groups and perpetuate poverty (Unsworth, 2010).

Similarly, Gulzar (2014) examines the impact of electoral incentives on bureaucratic performance and service delivery in Punjab. Stating that electoral accountability in democracies has been credited with providing better services to voters he contends this view and makes an assertion that re-election incentives for ruling party politicians can have perverse effects on bureaucratic performance and service delivery. He finds that doctors report knowing the politicians personally more often, enjoy higher tenure at the clinics, they are posted at, and serve in areas closer to their hometowns. Patnam & College (2009) examine the long run impact of institutions, collective action and elite power on public good outcomes in rural Punjab. They find that areas that were settled with a more equal distribution of land holding have better access to services. Whereas, in areas that were settled with unequal land distributions the power and identity of elite continue to persist unchallenged. Khan (2012) examines the impact of informal norms (clientelism, personal relationships and moral attachments) on actual behaviour of state bureaucracy, with evidence from Abbottabad district of Pakistan. He finds that these informal norms deeply affect the actual behaviour of public officials. In the implementation of policies and development interventions, public officials both deploy and are exposed to these informal social norms. He argues that this can result in behaviour or decisions which run counter to official conduct or expected norms.

### **2.2.2. Service Delivery and Electoral Accountability**

Central government exhibited significant, politically driven policy failure, particularly in the provision of social services. One key manifestation of this failure was the extent to which central government politicians had incentives to provide narrowly targeted services rather than broadly available public goods. This policy record was consistent with political incentives more concerned with targeted than with broad public goods provision (P. E. Keefer et al., 2006). Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 2001 explicitly sought to address these accountability failures and improve service delivery (Mohmand & Cheema, 2007). Following this political development, few studies were conducted in Pakistan to examine the impact of decentralization on service delivery (Cheema & Mohmand, 2006; Hasnain, 2010; P. Keefer et al., 2003; P. E. Keefer et al., 2006; Mohmand & Cheema, 2007).

These studies attempt to examine whether decentralization has increased accountability of service providers and resulted in service delivery improvements or not. For instance, Hasnain (2010) examines the impact of devolution on accountability and service delivery in Pakistan and finds that although the accessibility of policy makers to citizens in Pakistan is unequivocally greater after devolution yet this greater accessibility has not translated into incentives for improved social service delivery. Local government sectoral priorities are heavily tilted towards the provision of physical infrastructure, and within physical infrastructure to small schemes that can be targeted to specific localities and even households. He attributes it as a dutiful response to the relatively greater citizen demands for it. Mohmand (2007) finds that decentralization has not led to any real

improvement in the provision or the quality of health and education services whereas there has been an impressive change in government provided sanitation and sewerage to households. She argues that parochial targeting has been exacerbated in post-reform. Nazims cater essentially to their own faction and that these are village-specific and do not transcend the boundaries of their own villages to encompass factions in other villages of the union. She argues that while the delivery of targeted services has increased under the new decentralized system, delivery of universal services has not increased because electoral accountability of the local influential has not increased. Cheema & Mohmand (2006) argue that post-reform targeting of provision between households is conditional upon political geography and membership to dominant village level patron-client factions (called vote blocs or *dharas*). Keefer et al. (2006) argue that decentralization may alleviate some political market imperfections in Pakistan but it may exacerbate others. They suggest that the efficacy of decentralization as a remedy for distortion in public policy is contingent on numerous factors, ranging from electoral rules to the credibility of pre-electoral promises.

In my literature review, I find that there have been two kinds of studies on electoral accountability in Pakistan. First, those studies which examine the structures which are responsible to produce this accountability function. Second, those studies which study the output of this function, responsiveness, studied in terms of service delivery improvements. I find that there is dearth of literature on electoral accountability in Pakistan. Although available literature examines accountability structures and government responsiveness in terms of service delivery but it does not explore how

different modes of citizen-politician linkages affect the accountability relationship between electors and electorates. To fill this research gap, I introduce a third type of study on electoral accountability. This approach is based on the mechanism of accountability. I study how far actual electoral practices in developing countries like Pakistan relate to or vary from the mechanism of accountability suggested by principal-agent model of normative democratic theory. By making such comparisons, I attempt to explore the complex dynamics of electoral politics and accountability in democratic polities of developing countries. I also attempt to analyse the implications of these dynamics of electoral politics and accountability in developing countries with regard to responsiveness and service delivery. I explain the implications of these electoral accountability dynamics with the help of a theoretical framework.

## **Chapter 3 - Conceptual Framework**

This chapter is organized into two sections. Section 3.1 discusses theories relevant to the study such as theories of voting behaviour and electoral accountability. In section 3.2, I present conceptual framework of the study based on the theories discussed in section 1.

### **3.1. Theoretical Background**

In this section, I discuss the theoretical underpinning of the voting behaviour and electoral accountability. Theories relating to voting behaviour and electoral accountability are discussed as under.

#### **3.1.1. Theoretical Models of Voting Behaviour**

##### ***Sociological Model of Voting Behaviour***

Sociological theory, also called Columbia school model, of voting behaviour emphasizes the group basis of voting. According to this theory, although voters make individual decisions but they cannot be entirely isolated from the adherence to certain collective characteristics, such as social status, friends and the interactions of other sorts that are contact point with politics. Particularly the role of family and political socialization is emphasized in this regard.

According to the advocates of this theory, the adherence of the citizens to a certain social layer significantly determines their political preferences. The reason is that particular political subjects declare themselves as advocates of certain interests, which citizens

belonging to the same social group conceive as their own. This declaration is a good foundation for the citizens who are addressed by a particular political subject in order to get more attention.

This theory emphasizes certain social characteristics of voters such as: class, religion, race and establish a connection between them and the voting for a certain political party. Its proponents advocate that voting for some party may be predicted with a certain probability, depending on the social origin of the voters. They argue that citizens cannot be abstracted from their social origin while deciding to vote for a certain political party. Thus the proponents of the theory suggest that social adherence is a decisive force and thereby determines the political adherence of citizens.

According to this theory, politics is based on the social cleavage through which political subjects are mobilized and social groups protect their interests. In this manner, the advocates of this school consider politics as a matter of group interests. This model has its roots in “the conflict theory”.

With regard to social cleavages or conflict, the theory argues that there exist important material and symbolic differences between large social groups that tend to manage social matters. These differences are transferred into politics from generation to generation by means of socially-conditioned socialization. Every social group has interests of its own, which depend on their needs and which are significantly different from other social groups. Friends, family, and social relations of citizens rarely pass the boundary of their

social position. Taking into account the personal interests and the interests of their own social networks, it is natural that the citizens feel adherence to a political party which is protecting and promoting those interests (Antunes, 2010; Sarlamanov & Jovanoski, 2014).

This theory has attracted criticism mainly due to its inability to explain exceptions to the rule and for ignoring the active role of political parties in attracting the voters. The Psychological model of voting claims to overcome these shortcomings of Sociological model. I discuss it below.

### ***Psychological Model of Voting Behaviour***

Psychological or Michigan model of voting behaviour, sometimes also called as the theory of party identification, considers politics as an expressive phenomenon, in which members of the group share the same values, which are compatible with the group interests. According to the advocates of the theory, the voters observe voting act as a manifestation of the adherence to a certain political option. They claim that citizens are not actually determined for a certain political subject selecting between few alternatives, but they tend to irrationally incline towards this subject. To them, citizens have the innate instinct to belong to some major social group. Political parties with their political ideology, values and rituals attract the citizens, giving them a meaning to their lives. They define the term “party identification” as a tendency for long term determination of the voter to select candidates who are advocates of a certain political party. The identification with a certain party means having adherence to a certain party, with a

feeling of responsibility for the same, and not only temporarily voting for the party. Additionally, party identification is a psychological force by means of which social actors interpret the events that are relevant for politics. According to the advocates of this model, the feelings of the social actors with regard to political issues are directed and shaped by their identification with a given political party.

The sources of party identification include the parents and the social environment. The identification is strengthened through the refusal of the counter-impacts. Through the family, the citizens acquire the adherence to a certain political ideology. The political determination since the youthful years often continues during the entire life. Many families have members who are determined for a given political option for generations. However, there are also rational reasons why one could assume that many generations in the same family vote for the same political subject, and namely the younger members who obtain the right to vote, due to lack of experience, have their parents as a reference during the selection of the political subject. Advocates of this theory give less importance to short-term factors, such as the current political state, the political campaign, the current party management and the candidate at the elections, in determining the electoral decision of citizens. To them, long term factor of loyalty to a certain political party (*party identification*) has decisive force in determining electoral decision of the citizens.

The party identification is part of the identity of the citizens. After developing feeling of identification with a certain political party, they gain loyalty in this party same as the

loyalty to a certain brand of products. This is primarily because of their perception that it is something that has already been tested, and then acquired as a habit.

The party identification model of voting behaviour is exposed to criticism because of being ideologically founded. It explains stability of voting behaviour in a two party system but in polities with multiparty system and significant variations in voting behaviour, it is not able to explain these variations in voting behaviour. The model does not explain that if voters have certain values and political ideology and identify themselves with the party being close to these values and share their ideology then why they vote other parties in the successive elections (Antunes, 2010; Sarlamanov & Jovanoski, 2014).

### ***Rational Choice Model of Voting Behaviour***

Rational choice model of voting behaviour, also called economic theory of voting, argues that the citizens who are identified with a particular political subject for which they are ready to vote in many occasions is the behaviour only of citizens who do not have significant experience with voting. The remaining citizens who identify themselves with a particular political subject have certain expectations from the voting for the same.

The advocates of this model consider the citizens as active subject, and not as passive subjects being addressed by political parties. They claim that when making the decision about giving their vote, the citizens are motivated by their personal interest. The citizens weigh between the price that they are paying in terms of voting for some political subject

and the gain they expect from such investment. During this process they always try to maximize the gain, meaning that they vote for the political party that they believe would provide this gain. Namely, in an ideal situation, the voter weighs between the gains he has from a certain governing political party and expected gains from the parties in opposition. Hence, the voter votes for the party that he expects to provide him the biggest and most secure gain. It implies that voters do not vote for some candidate because they want to, but because they have instrumental motives. Hence, the voting in the election has rational-psychological foundation. And the motivation for the rational choice of voters is rooted in their material personal interests.

To address voters' dilemma of information asymmetries, the model explains that in the face of limited information that voters have on the performance and conduct of the political subject or party and to save their cost of evaluation they tend to rely on certain short cuts. They set few indicators and make few sample observations to evaluate the proposals they are presented by the contending candidates. This saves them time and cost to collect large amount of information on the performance and conduct of political subjects and to evaluate expected gains in case voting for them.

The limitations of this model are that information asymmetries undermine the rational evaluations of voters. It does not apply in case when citizen is cooperative because he has altruistic mood and he is not guided according to the measurements of personal interest mode. It is also not able to explain that if voters want to maximize their gain from vote

then why they vote to punish a candidate (Antunes, 2010; Sarlamanov & Jovanoski, 2014).

### ***Institutional Model of Voting Behaviour***

Unlike the previous models, institutional model of voting behaviour does not consider voters as autonomous individuals but embedded in the structures of the society they live in. According to this model, voters do not live in a vacuum. They form attitudes and make choices in variable environments, which come in the form of formal and informal institutional rules that govern people's behaviour. In a very basic way, then, context and behaviour are intimately connected and this connection is at the heart of political life. Formal and informal rules affect people's political behaviour, and people's preferences, attitudes, and the behaviour affect the establishment and functioning of such rules.

This model attempts to explain voting behaviour in terms of how interaction of the electorate with the institutional constraints shapes their preferences and voting choices. This model considers institution as any socially imposed constraints upon human behaviour. In this way, it defines that institutions are the "rules of the game for human interaction" that do not have to be formal or written rules but can also include informal constraints, such as widely accepted norms of behaviour.

This model presumes several things from the interaction between institutions and behaviour. First, that politics is about the interaction of people's values and the rules and conditions that govern the implementation of those values; second, that the rules and realities in which citizens make choices are themselves a function of people's values. It

implies that contexts are critical for understanding the decisions people make because they affect different people differently, and people's decisions, in turn, shape the nature, shape and stability of these contexts.

Proponents of this model state that there is ample evidence to suggest that individuals are constrained actors within particular, and variable, political environments. They argue that institutions can affect voters' preferences and behaviour by generating incentives and disincentives. They also find that institutions either facilitate or hamper citizens' ability to reward or punish governments (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007).

### **3.1.2. Theoretical Model of Electoral Accountability**

#### ***Principal-Agent Model of Electoral Accountability***


According to this model, electorate are the principals. They delegate decision making power over a particular domain to the electoral candidates, as their agents. Their agents then act in this capacity and principal can thereafter require agent to provide information and justification for their actions. If agent fails to do so principal has the right and it exercises this right to sanction or punish the agent in case of poor performance or eventual misconduct. This principal-agent mechanism between electorate and electoral candidates is ensured by continuous elections in democratic political systems (Lindberg, 2009; Schedler, 1999).

### **3.2. Framework of the Study**

Based on the theoretical underpinnings discussed in section 3.1, I develop and present a conceptual framework of the study in this section. This conceptual framework explains the relationship between concepts and variables of the study. By explaining the relationships between concepts and variables of the study, it tends to analyse the given research problem.

In any electoral system there exist formal as well as informal institutional constraints. These institutional constraints affect the choices of the electorates. Voting choices of the electorates generate incentives and disincentives for candidates of legislative assemblies (CLAs). These electoral incentives and disincentives for CLAs determine linkage strategies employed by candidates and political parties to connect to the voters and also affect the accountability relationship between electors and the electorates. These linkage strategies and accountability relationship between electors and electorates re-enforce and perpetuate institutional constraints present in an electoral system. This leads to the institutional path dependence. This institutional path dependence continues to prevail unless the right kinds of reforms are introduced and the institutions are forced to change in a certain direction (*see figure 3.1*).

Figure 3.1: Institutions and Electoral Accountability




Clientelism is an informal political institution under which targeted goods and services are exchanged for electoral support. Under clientelism a society has patron-client networks. There patrons (electoral candidates) grant and promise to provide patronage and private targeted goods to their voters and brokers (local influential or vote bloc leaders) provided that they get elected. They also engage in vote buying to ensure their success in elections. On the other hand brokers use votes of their peasants/clients as bargaining chips to obtain these targeted goods and services from patrons. These push and pull factors of clientelism urge the clients (voters) to vote in reciprocity or in expectation of the provision of patronage and private targeted goods by the candidates or

local influential. This kind of voting pattern, in which voters vote for targeted material inducements instead of collective goods and electoral candidates have to rely on patron-client networks and vote-buying to get themselves elected, sets the incentives for members of legislative assemblies (MLAs) to provide patronage, private targeted goods, channel public resources through brokers and indulge in vote buying in order to get themselves re-elected. Meanwhile, it also sets disincentives for MLAs to provide public goods, perform executive oversight, constituency representation, constituency service and their legislative functions and pursue policies of growth and development.

Given the provision of targeted goods and services to a small group of brokers and voters MLAs are not held accountable for their responsibilities like constituency service, constituency representation, legislative and executive oversight. This undermines electoral accountability of MLAs and induces reliance on clientelism for re-election. The reliance on clientelism for re-election and lack of electoral accountability reinforce and perpetuate clientelism. This is how clientelism undermines electoral accountability and the lack of electoral accountability perpetuates Clientelism (*see figure 3.2*).

Figure 3.2: Conceptual Framework of the Study



## **Chapter 4 - Research Methodology**

### **4.1. Introduction**

The study employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to assess the impact of clientelism on electoral accountability. The data is collected from primary sources. This chapter describes the methodology of the research for collection, processing and analysis of quantitative as well as qualitative data.

### **4.2. Study Design**

Keeping in view the nature of the research problem, the study employs concurrent embedded mixed methods research design with the aim to produce the most robust results. There are several benefits of using integrated (combining quantitative and qualitative methods) approaches in research as discussed by Bamberger (2000) to have in depth, rich and meaningful research findings. The strength of the survey method lies in its potential for quantification, replication and generalization of the findings to a larger population within known limits of error (Warwick & Lininger, 1975, pp. 7-8). Therefore, the study primarily relies on quantitative data collected through household survey to quantify responses of the sample population and generalize the findings to a larger population. The qualitative data is embedded into it to seek information from different levels for a broader perspective and hierarchical analysis.

### **4.3. Research Questions**

To fulfil the objectives of the study mentioned in section 1.3, the study collects empirical evidence from Kasur district<sup>2</sup> of the Punjab province and specifically attempts to seek answers to the following questions:

1. To what extent electoral politics in rural Kasur is dominated by clientelism?
2. What accountability pressures candidates for legislative assemblies (CLAs) face in rural Kasur?
3. What strategies do CLAs employ to respond to the accountability pressures they face in rural Kasur?
4. How much electoral accountability capacity do households have in rural Kasur?
5. How clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages impact electoral accountability in rural Kasur?

### **4.4. Variables of the Study**

There are two main variables of the study. Clientelism is the independent variable whereas electoral accountability is the dependent variable. Following two sections deal with the conceptualization and operationalization of these variables for the purpose of measurement.

#### **4.4.1. Conceptualization**

Independent and dependent variables of the study are conceptualized below.

---

<sup>2</sup> See section 4.6 for justification for selection of the locale of the study.

### ***Clientelism***

There is no general consensus on the conceptualization of clientelism. For the purpose of this study, I follow the conceptualization of Robinson (2008) and Hopkin (2006). Robinson conceptualizes clientelism as “a dyadic relationship in which goods and services are exchanged for electoral support and service”. Hopkin also conceptualizes it in a similar way. He defines it as “the distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support”. Following the conceptualization of clientelism by Robinson and Hopkin I define it as a dyadic but unequal patron-client relationship in which goods and services are selectively distributed to individuals and clearly defined groups in exchange for electoral support or service.

### ***Electoral Accountability***

A general consensus on conceptualization of electoral accountability also does not exist. Schedler (1999) and Lindberg (2009) provide conceptualization of accountability in general. Their conceptualization of accountability is based on the principal agent theory. I find their conceptualization of accountability most useful for electoral accountability in the context of this study. Schedler conceptualizes it as “A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct”. Lindberg defines accountability as “decision making power over a particular domain must first be transferred to agent by principal. Agent then acts in this capacity and principal can thereafter require agent to provide information and justification for these actions. If agent fails to do so, principal has the right to sanction the agent”. Following Schedler and Lindberg’s conceptualization of accountability I define electoral accountability as a principal agent relationship

between electorates and the electors in which electorates, being principal, first transfer the decision making power to the electors, as their agents, over a particular domain. The electors then act in this capacity and electorates can thereafter require them to provide information and justification for their actions and decisions. If electors fail to do so, the electorates have the right to sanction them by voting them out through their votes in next elections.

#### 4.4.2. Operationalization

For the purpose of measurement, I operationalize these variables in the following.

#### *Clientelism*

Table 4.1 below outlines dimensions of clientelism which are found in literature.

Underneath each dimension it also provides brief description of the given dimension.

Table 4.1: Dimensions of Clientelism and their Brief Description

Variable	Dimensions
1. Clientelism	1.1. Tribute Clients exchange their vote due to their socio-economic dependence on the patron
	1.2. Patronage Clients exchange their vote with patron or broker in expectation or reciprocity of access to state resources and services
	1.3. Vote Buying Payoffs to opposing or indifferent voters during election campaign for switching their voting choices
	1.4. Turn-out Buying Turn-out buying rewards un-mobilized supporters for showing up at the polls
	1.5. Abstention Buying Abstention buying rewards indifferent or opposing individuals for not voting
	1.6. Double Persuasion

	Double persuasion provides benefits to citizens to induce their electoral participation and influence their voting choices
	1.7. Rewarding Loyalists Rewarding loyalists provides particularistic benefits to supporters who would vote for them anyway. Parties offer selective benefits to core supporters during elections to prevent the erosion of partisan loyalties over time.

Table 4.2 below outlines indicators for each dimension of clientelism presented in table 4.1 above.

Table 4.2: Indicators for Each Dimension of Clientelism

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
1.1. Tribute	1.1.1. Clients bound through non-political ties to a patron (Clients' socio-economic dependence on the patron)
	1.1.2. Clients exchange their vote due to their socio-economic dependence on the patron
	1.1.3. Patron distributes personal resources for political gains
1.2. Patronage	1.2.1. Client bound through political ties to a patron (Clients are not socio-economically dependent but they are politically dependent on a patron or broker for access to state resources and services)
	1.2.2. Clients strategically exchange their vote for access to certain benefits, which are usually private or club goods and services
	1.2.3. Patron distributes state resources and services selectively to individuals and clearly defined groups in exchange for political gains (votes)
1.3. Vote Buying	1.3.1. Patrons or brokers distribute payoffs among opposing or indifferent voters during election campaign for switching their voting choices
	1.3.2. Opposing voters change their voting choices and reciprocate their vote against payoffs made to them during election campaign
1.4. Turn-out Buying	1.4.1. Patrons or brokers distribute payoffs among un-mobilized supporters to increase their voter turn out
	1.4.2. Payoffs to un-mobilized supporters increase their participation in voting and result in higher vote turn out
1.5. Abstention Buying	1.5.1. Patrons or brokers distribute payoffs among opposing or indifferent voters for not voting
	1.5.2. Opposing voters abstain from voting for any candidate against payoffs made to them during

	election campaign
1.6. Double Persuasion	1.6.1. Voters are not willing to participate in elections
	1.6.2. Patrons or brokers distribute payoffs among voters who are not willing to participate in elections to induce their electoral participation and influence their voting choices
	1.6.3. Non-willing voters not only participate in elections but also vote for the candidate or patron who provided them these payoffs
1.7. Rewarding Loyalists	1.7.1. Voters are hard core supporters of a patron or candidate and they will vote for him anyway
	1.7.2. Patron or candidate distribute payoffs among core supporters during elections in order to prevent the erosion of partisan loyalties over time

### ***Electoral Accountability***

Table 4.3 below outlines dimensions of electoral accountability which are found in literature. Underneath each dimension it also provides brief description of the given dimension.

Table 4.3: Dimensions of Electoral Accountability and their Brief Description

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Dimensions</b>
2. Electoral Accountability	2.1. Responsibility An area, responsibility, or domain subject to accountability
	2.2. Monitoring The right of voters to require information and obligation of members of legislative assemblies (MLAs) to inform voters about their past or future actions decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.3. Justification The right of voters to require justification and obligation of MLAs to explain or justify their actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.4. Enforcement The right of voters to sanction MLAs if they fail to inform and justify their actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability

Table 4.4 below outlines indicators for each dimension of electoral accountability presented in table 4.3 above.

Table 4.4: Indicators for Each Dimension of Electoral Accountability

Dimension	Indicators
2.1. Responsibility	2.1.1. Bloc voters' (BVs) perception of responsibility of their vote bloc leaders (VBLs)
	2.1.2. BVs' expectations from their VBLs
	2.1.3. Non bloc voters' (NBVs') perception of responsibility of their members of legislative assemblies (MLAs)
	2.1.4. NBVs' expectations from their MLAs
	2.1.5. VBLs perception of responsibility of their patrons or MLAs
	2.1.6. VBLs expectations from their patrons or MLAs
	2.1.7. Electoral promises of candidates to VBLs or brokers
	2.1.8. Electoral promises of CLAs to NBVs
	2.1.9. Demands of VBLs form their patrons or CLAs
	2.1.10. Demands of NBVs from their CLAs
2.2. Monitoring	2.2.1. Right of BVs to require their VBLs to inform about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.2.2. Right of VBLs or brokers to require their patrons or CLAs to inform about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.2.3. Right of NBVs to require their CLAs to inform about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.2.4. Obligation of VBLs to inform their VBLs about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.2.5. Obligation of CLAs to inform VBLs or Brokers about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.2.6. Obligation of CLAs to inform their NBVs about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
2.3. Justification	2.3.1. Right of BVs to require their VBLs to justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.3.2. Right of VBLs to require their CLAs to justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.3.3. Right of NBVs to require their MLAs to justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability

	2.3.4. Obligation of VBLs to justify to their VBM's their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.3.5. Obligation of CLAs to justify to VBLs or brokers their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.3.6. Obligation of CLAs to justify to their NBVs their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
2.4. Enforcement	2.4.1. Capacity of BVs to impose sanctions on their VBLs who if they violate their duties or fail to inform or justify their actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.4.2. Capacity of VBLs to impose sanctions on their CLAs if they violate their duties or fail to inform or justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability
	2.4.3. Capacity of NBVs to impose sanctions on their CLAs if they violate their duties or fail to inform or justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability

## 4.5. Data Collection Tools

Keeping in view the research design and the kind of empirical evidence required the study employs two types of tools for data collection. They are discussed below.

### 4.5.1. Quantitative Data Collection Tools

To measure clientelism and its impact on electoral accountability, the study uses survey method for data collection. For this purpose a structured questionnaire with close ended questions is developed for face to face interviews with heads of the households. The questionnaire is developed on the basis of operationalization of variables for the purpose of measurement as discussed in section 4.4.2. This structured questionnaire facilitates data collection and quantification of responses from a large sample of households. It also

enables us to process and analyse large amount of data and make generalizations about larger population.

The questionnaire is originally developed in English but later, keeping in view the language barriers for the respondents, it is translated into Urdu. Nonetheless, the interviews are conducted in their native language Punjabi. Urdu being similar to Punjabi in many ways and given their basic familiarity with Urdu language, I find it easy to make them understand the questions and record their responses on Urdu version of questionnaire. The detailed questionnaire both in English and Urdu can be found in annex-I and annex-II respectively.

#### **4.5.2. Qualitative Data Collection Tools**

Although this study is primarily based on quantitative data collected through household survey to quantify responses of sample population and make generalization of the findings to a larger population nonetheless qualitative data is embedded into it to seek information from different levels for a broader perspective and hierarchical analysis. Three tools are developed for qualitative data collection for this purpose. These qualitative data collection tools are check lists for in depth interviews with key informants and vote bloc leaders in each sample village and interviews of candidates for legislative assemblies from these constituencies (*see annex-III, IV & V for these check lists*).

Key informant interviews aim to provide data on; background or type of the village, native perspective of political organization in the village, number of vote blocs in the

village characteristics of vote bloc leader (VBLs), distance of the village from town, process of electoral decision making in the village, reasons for there being multiple vote blocs in the village, basis of a vote bloc to align with a candidate for legislative assembly (CLA), source of influence of VBL in the village, basis on which people vote in the village, basis on which members are recruited into vote blocs (VBs) in the village and mode of service delivery in the village.

Interviews of VBLs aim to provide data on; characteristics of VBLs, the kind of electoral promises VBLs make to their vote bloc members (VBMs), the kind of demands VBLs face by their VBMs, electoral promises made to VBLs by CLAs, basis on which VBLs recruit members into their VBs, basis on which their VBs align with CLAs, basis on which VBLs hold CLAs accountable, the kind of benefits VBLs receive from their ally CLAs, the kind of benefits VBLs deliver to their VBMs, vote buying by VBLs for CLAs, domain of accountability of CLAs as perceived by VBLs and mode of service delivery by VBLs.

Interviews of CLAs aim to provide data on; the electoral promises CLAs make, the kind of demands CLAs face, the kind of benefits CLAs deliver to retain their electoral support, basis on which CLAs are held accountable, vote buying by CLAs and mode of service delivery by CLAs.

#### **4.6. Justification for Locale of the Study**

As mentioned earlier, the study seeks to examine the impact of clientelism on electoral accountability in Pakistan. As clientelism is more prevalent in rural than urban societies

and (as per population census of 1998) Pakistan's 66.75% population lives in rural areas so it seeks to examine if clientelism in rural Pakistan prevails and how it impacts electoral accountability in the country. Punjab is the most populous and politically most powerful province of Pakistan and majority of rural population of the country also lives in the said province. Therefore, investigation of political and electoral dynamics in rural Punjab may give us useful insights to understand and explain electoral accountability in the country. Given the time and cost constraints, it was not viable to conduct the study at provincial level. Keeping in view these constraints and limitations, I decided to take a case study of one mainly rural district of the Punjab province. For this purpose, I selected district Kasur. Selection of Kasur district as a case study was based on the fact that it was mainly a rural district with 77.17% rural population<sup>3</sup>. Its socio-economic, human capital and health indicators were also typical of rural Punjab. Thus, the study collects evidence from district Kasur and based on it discusses and analyses political and electoral dynamics in rural Punjab.

#### **4.7. Sampling**

Household, village and constituency are the three units of analysis of the study. Household level data is collected through quantitative method of household survey. Village and constituency level data is collected through qualitative method of in depth interviews. Sampling of household survey and in depth interviews is separately discussed in the following two sections in detail.

---

<sup>3</sup> As per population census of 1998

#### **4.7.1. Survey Sampling**

As per the standard practice I use probability sampling for the household survey. Survey data collected through probability sampling has an added advantage that it not only helps us understand the phenomenon with respect to the sample population but its findings can also be generalized to the larger population within known limits of error.

#### ***Population***

Population for the survey of the study consists of all households situated in rural union councils of Kasur district. It is estimated to be 261926 households<sup>4</sup>.

#### ***Sampling Frame***

The union councils and villages/*mouzas* according to population census of 1998 have been used as sampling frame. This frame is comprised of 113 union councils and 637 villages/*mouzas* in district Kasur.

#### ***Sample Size***

For household survey, I calculate the sample size at confidence level 95%, margin of error 5% and response distribution 50%. Calculation with these parameters gives a sample size of 384 households<sup>5</sup>. With small margin of error I get a large sample size which makes the findings of the study statistically significant.

---

<sup>4</sup> It is estimated by the author from "District Census Report (Kasur) 1998".

<sup>5</sup> Originally the calculated sample size was 384 subsequently it was increased to 396. See page number 47 for justification and details.

### ***Sample Selection***

I employ multistage sampling to select sample of the household survey. Multistage sampling is used to get a most representative sample with wide geographical coverage. The stages involve classifying Kasur district into three clusters, stratification of rural and urban union councils (UCs) in these clusters, selecting sample UCs from each cluster of rural UCs, selecting one sample village from each sample rural UC and then selection of sample households from each sample village. I illustrate below the stages I went through for sample selection of the household survey.

A. District Kasur is classified into following three clusters.

- i. Tehsil Kasur
- ii. Tehsil Chunian
- iii. Tehsil Pattoki

I classify the district into these three clusters because (as per population census of 1998) administratively it is classified into these three units by the government of Pakistan.

B. These three tehsils are stratified into rural and urban union councils.

Table 4.5: Stratification of Clusters

<b>Cluster</b>	<b>Rural Union Councils</b>	<b>Urban Union Councils</b>
Kasur	38	17
Chunian	24	3
Pattoki	25	6
	<b>Total = 87</b>	<b>Total = 26</b>

C. Through random sampling out of 87 rural union councils of district Kasur 9 UCs (10% of the total) are selected by taking 1/10<sup>th</sup> of UCs from each cluster of rural UCs. It is done to make the sample proportionate. By following this formula I select following number UCs from each cluster of rural UCs.

Table 4.6: Selection of Sample UCs from Each Cluster of Rural UCs

<b>Cluster</b>	<b>Number of Sample Rural UCs Selected</b>
Kasur	4
Chunian	2
Pattoki	3
<b>Total =</b>	<b>9</b>

D. One village was randomly selected from each of the 9 sample rural UCs<sup>6</sup>. In this way, I got total 9 sample villages which were to be surveyed.

E. For a survey of 384 sample households from 9 sample villages, I had to survey roughly 43 households from each sample village. But I increased the sample size to 44 with one extra household from each sample village. An extra sample household from each sample village was selected to make sure that the sample size did not go below the required sample size if questionnaire from any village returns incomplete or damaged<sup>7</sup>. Following the systematic sampling 44 sample households are selected from each sample village. For this purpose, total number of households in the village is divided by the total number of sample households to be selected. The obtained


<sup>6</sup> Random selections were made using random numbers generator command in SPSS. This was done for each of the nine sample UCs separately.

<sup>7</sup> This increase of one sample household from each of the nine sample villages resulted in increase in our sample size from 384 to 396. So, the actual sample size of the study is 396.

value is the  $n^{\text{th}}$  number of household to be surveyed. From each sample household head of the household is interviewed. If he is not available, any other adult member of the household is interviewed. Moreover, for a household to be selected for the survey it is necessary that any of the household members must have voted in 2008, 2013 or in both general elections and any adult household member preferably head of the household is available and consents for interview in this regard. If any of these conditions is not met then the potential sample household is replaced by the immediate next household.

Figure below illustrates these stages of sample selection.

Figure 4.1: Stages of Sample Selection



#### **4.7.2. Interview Sampling**

I use convenient sampling for interviews of key informants, vote bloc leaders and candidates for legislative assemblies. Here, convenient sampling is used to collect qualitative data because it is convenient as well as appropriate. Moreover, there is no use of probability sampling for interviews because the purpose of this qualitative data is to address qualitative nature of questions and to give a broader perspective to interpret and analyse findings from the survey not to make generalizations.

For key informant interviews, I select one key informant from each sample village. In this way I interview total nine key informants for this study. For key informant interview, I required someone who was well informed of socio-economic and political structure and background of the sample village. Keeping this aspect in view, I set certain selection criterion for key informants from sample villages. According to this criterion, *patwari*, school teacher or *lambardar* of the village can be interviewed as key informant of the sample village as they are considered to be better informed about the village dynamics.

For interviews of vote bloc leaders (VBLs) I select nine VBLs, one from each sample village who was conveniently available in the village. These VBLs are selected based on the information provided by the key informants on the number of vote blocs in the village and details of their leaders.

For interviews of candidates for legislative assemblies, I selected a convenient sample of seven. I tried to interview as many of them as were available and consented for interview.

Out of them four were available and consented for interview. So, I interviewed four candidates of legislative assemblies. Three of them were candidates for provincial legislative assembly while one was candidate for national assembly. All the four had served as member of the legislative assemblies at least once or were serving members of the legislative assemblies at the time of interview.

#### **4.8. Data Collection Procedures**

As mentioned earlier, this study required two types of data (interviews and survey) to be collected for empirical analysis. In-depth interviews of key informants, vote bloc leaders and candidates for legislative assemblies were conducted by the author himself with the help of a facilitator. The role of the facilitator was to take notes during interview. Following interview sampling method, as mentioned in section 4.7.2, respondents were selected and interviewed at their convenient places.

Household survey comprised of a large sample size of 396 households. Given the time constraints, it was not easy to conduct this survey alone. So, I hired a team of four enumerators having master's degree in social sciences. I conducted their training to carry out this survey. They were informed about the purpose of this research activity, data collection procedures, potential problems to be faced in the field, research ethics for data collection, taking consent of the respondents and conducting household interviews efficiently and effectively. All the questions and response categories were explained to them in detail so that there may be no confusion or difference in understanding which could result in differences in recording same responses by different enumerators.

After selection and training of data collection team, they were taken to two different villages having similarities with the sample villages within the same district. There pilot testing of data collection instruments was conducted. The team pointed out the problems where instructions, questions or response categories were not clear. They were explained those problems or ambiguities at site. After pilot testing, the required changes in questionnaire items or instructions were made as per pilot testing experience. A refresher session was held to inform the team about changes made in this regard.

The team was provided pick and drop to the sample villages. I was also there to supervise and guide them if they face any problem. Each enumerator was supposed to interview eleven sample households selected by following the sample selection criterion as mentioned in section 4.7.1. The team collected data from sample households and submitted the required number of questionnaires each day from each sample village. I used to have discussion with them regarding their experience and problems faced in the field on that particular day. This helped us to learn lessons from our field experience and apply these in survey of other sample villages. Each day we conducted survey of one sample village. In this way, we were able to complete our survey in nine days. The survey was conducted in February 2014.

#### **4.9. Data Processing**

Quantitative data from household survey and qualitative data from in-depth interviews were processed separately. Following two sections deal with the process through which quantitative and qualitative data was processed.

#### **4.9.1. Quantitative Data Processing**

To prepare quantitative data for analysis, household survey questionnaires were reviewed. If there were any mistakes, they were corrected and un-coded responses were coded on the questionnaires. Then a data entry module was developed in statistical package for social sciences (SPSS). The responses on these questionnaires were entered into this data entry module. The data was then cleaned and prepared for analysis on the SPSS.

#### **4.9.2. Qualitative Data Processing**

To prepare qualitative data for analysis; check lists of in-depth interviews with key informants, vote bloc leaders and candidates for legislative assemblies were reviewed. Transcripts of interviews were developed separately. These interview transcripts were imported into NVivo software of qualitative data analysis. The data was prepared for qualitative data analysis on NVivo.

### **4.10. Data Analysis**

Following two sections deal with the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data separately.

#### **4.10.1. Quantitative Data Analysis**

For quantitative data analysis, I used descriptive as well as inferential statistical analysis tools. Descriptive statistical tools used in the analysis were frequency analysis, means and cross tabulations. Inferential statistical tools that I used in my analysis were bivariate and

multivariate correlation analysis. I analysed this data using these analysis tools on statistical package for social sciences (SPSS).

The data was reduced to run the tests for correlation and measurement purposes by developing composite measures. I developed three indices for this purpose. These were dependence index, clientelistic voting choices index and electoral accountability capacity index.

To develop these indices, I selected questions related to dependence, clientelistic voting choices and electoral accountability capacity. These questions were put under these headings. Codes for response categories of these questions were assigned weighted values and in SPSS data file these codes were replaced with their assigned weighted values. Then I aggregated each set of questions to develop composite measures. These composite measures are indices with the scale data. I analyse these indices in two ways. First, these variables are converted from scale to ordinal data to classify the respondent households into different categories as per their score on the scale. Then I work out the correlation of each of these indices with the demographic variables to see if their variance is explained by these demographic variables or not. Next, I work out the correlation between these indices to examine their relationship.

#### **4.10.2. Qualitative Data Analysis**

Thematic analysis technique is used to analyse the qualitative data. Accordingly, I organized the qualitative data from in-depth interviews by developing nodes for thematic analysis.

## Chapter 5 - Results of the Study

This chapter presents results of the study. It is organized into four sections. These sections present results of: household survey, key informant interviews, interviews of vote bloc leaders and interviews with candidates of legislative assemblies respectively.

### 5.1. Results of the Household Survey

By using frequency analysis, this section presents results of the household survey. These results are tabulated and discussed as under.

#### 5.1.1. Demographic Profile of Rural Kasur

Demographic characteristics of sample households of the study are tabulated below in table 5.1. The table illustrates that there has been a significant increase in voter turnout of households in rural Kasur between the two elections. In the said table I also find that all the respondents of the household survey were male. Why there were no female respondents of the study? The answer to this question lies in social and political structure of the sample population. In rural Kasur, voters make collective rather than individual voting choices. To make a collective decision the political action is organized into vote blocs (*dhara*) at the village level (*for its detailed illustration see section 5.6 and 6.1*). The lowest level at which voting choices are made is the household. Within the household it is the head of the household who decides which vote bloc to join or whom to vote. Other household members comply with the decision of the head of the household. It is pertinent to note that Kasur is a male dominated patriarchal society. Here socio-economic and political sphere is dominated by men. Particularly when it comes to political life women

enjoy the least agency. Given the socio-political structure of the society, men hold dominant position within the household. There households are headed by male with exception of only few female headed households. Keeping this socio-political structure of sample population in mind, the respondents of the household survey were set to be heads of the households. This study does not discriminate between male and female headed households in selection of the sample. However, I find that all the respondents of the study just happen to be male.

Results tabulated in table 5.1 also demonstrate that a significant majority of heads of the households have not even attained basic (primary) level of education. In a democratic system like Pakistan where these heads of the household make voting choices for the households, their low educational attainment may have significant implications for the political system. The impact of educational attainment of heads of the household on their voting choices and accountability capacity is examined in section 2.4 and 2.5.

Table 5.1: Demographic Characteristics of Sample Households

<b>Response</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Households Voted in Election</b>	
2008 & 2013 both	77.3
2008 only	0.3
2013 only	22.5
<b>Gender of the Respondents</b>	
Male	100
Female	00
<b>Relationship with Head of the Household</b>	
Head (self)	90
Son	7.8
Brother	2.2
<b>Educational Level Attained by Heads of the Households</b>	
Below primary	68.7

Primary & above but less than matric	17.9
Matric & above	13.4
Average Household Size = 6.3	

### 5.1.2. Economic Profile of Rural Kasur

Economic characteristics of sample households of the study are tabulated below in table 5.2 and 5.3.

Table 5.2 illustrates that 35.6% households in rural Kasur live in buildings made of mud. In these villages, type of housing structure of the household is taken as a measure of economic status of the household. People living in mud houses are considered to be poor. The table also shows that only 7.3% households own agricultural land above the subsistence level of 12.5 acres<sup>8</sup>. This suggests that ownership of agricultural land is concentrated in the hands of few households in each village of Kasur.

Table 5.2: Economic Characteristics of Sample Households

Response	Percentage
Ownership Rights of Household Residence	
Proprietary	97.5
Rentee	00
Non rented land of landlord/relative	2.5
Structure of House Building	
Brick	64.4
Mud	35.6
Landholding	
Landless (0 acres)	28
Below subsistence (<12.5 acres)	64.7
Above subsistence (>12.5 acres)	7.3

<sup>8</sup> It has been stipulated as subsistence level by the state of Pakistan and used in both the land reforms. The logic comes from a holding size that can be cultivated by a family with one pair of oxen.

Results tabulated in table 5.3 suggest that a significant majority (74%) of the households in rural Kasur are involved in agriculture for their livelihood meaning thereby that it is mainly an agrarian society. They need access to land for farming or agricultural labour. This makes landless households and small farmers dependent on big landowners for tenant farming and agricultural labour. Given the importance of agricultural land in this context, ownership of agricultural land may be crucial to explain political dynamics. I examine the impact of landownership on voting choices and accountability capacity of households in section 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. The said table also illustrates that the households in rural Kasur are mostly low income. I examine the impact of income level on voting choices and accountability capacity of households in section 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5.

Table 5.3: Economic Characteristics of Sample Households

<b>Response</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Primary Source of Livelihood of the Households</b>	
Agricultural land	43.7
Tenant farming	10.4
Artisan labour	3.5
Domestic or agricultural labour	16.4
Government Job	5.8
Private Job	9.3
Self-employment	5.8
Business	5.1
<b>Monthly Income Level of the Households (in Rupees)</b>	
8000 or less	28.3
> 8000 but < 15000	20.7
15000 to 30000	38.6
> 30000	12.4
<b>Occupational Qoum of the Households</b>	
<i>Zamindar</i> (farmer)	68.7
<i>Kammi</i> (artisan labour)	17.4
<i>Musalli</i> (unskilled domestic or agricultural labour)	13.9

### 5.1.3. Social Service Delivery Networks in Rural Kasur

Households in rural Kasur when faced with financial trouble, social problem, clash, dispute, theft, robbery or deception in transaction seek help from or take the matter to the persons or institutions as tabulated below in table 5.4. The table shows that in such matters, as mentioned earlier, majority of the households seek help of a mediator e.g. vote bloc leader, electoral candidate, influential or some *zamindar* of the village.

Table 5.4: Social Service Delivery Networks

Households Seeking Help (%)			
From	For Financial Matters	For Social Problem, Dispute Resolution	For Matters Such as Theft or Deception
Vote Bloc Leader	13.2	23.6	23.6
Politician or Electoral Candidate	2.5	15.5	14
Influential or Head of the Village	01	2.5	03
<i>Zamindar</i>	12.4	10.2	10.7
<i>Biradri</i>	23.7	12.9	11.2
Friend	10.9	02	2.5
Village <i>Panchayat</i>	00	0.5	0.5
Private Institution	7.9	00	00
Government Institution	2.5	27.9	28.9
Someone Else	0.5	00	00
No One	25.1	4.8	5.6

### 5.1.4. Public Service Delivery Networks in Rural Kasur

The households seek support of variety of institutions when faced with matters involving police station, court or other government organizations and to get public goods such as government jobs, loans and subsidies. The institutions which the households engage with for aforementioned matters are tabulated below in table 5.5.

Results tabulated in the said table indicate that there is substantial reliance on mediated access to state resources and services. In majority of the cases the role of the mediator is played by some *zamindar*, influential of the village, vote bloc leader, or electoral candidate.

Table 5.5: Public Service Delivery Networks

<b>Households Seeking Help (%)</b>			
From	In Matters of Police Station & Court	To Get Work Done in Any Other *GO	To Get **PGs e.g. Jobs, Loans, Subsidy
Vote Bloc Leader	38.3	38.3	38.8
Politician or Electoral Candidate	16.3	17.1	16.3
Influential or Head of the Village	3.1	3.1	2.6
<i>Zamindar</i>	11	11	11
<i>Biradri</i>	9.4	9.7	9.2
Friend	00	3.1	3.1
Self	17.9	17.9	19.1

\*Government organization

\*\*Public goods

Results tabulated in table 5.6 illustrate that if a household does not vote for or according to the preference of these mediators, in majority of cases they never help them to get access to the state resources and services. In few cases if they do, they help them; unconditionally on humanitarian grounds, unconditionally but with implicit intention to get their loyalties and votes, with explicit condition to support and vote them or their favoured candidates in next elections, or being a friend or relative. Nonetheless, in provision of access to state resources and services voters and supporters are always given preference.

Table 5.6: Conditional Delivery of Public Goods and Services

<b>Response</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Candidates or VBLs Help Opponent Voters</b>	
Always	03
Sometimes	9.6
Very rare	13.5
Never	72.3
Don't know	1.5
<b>Basis on Which Opponent Voters are Helped</b>	
Unconditionally on humanitarian grounds	15.2
Unconditionally but with implicit intention to their votes	21.9
With explicit condition of vote	12.4
Being a friend or relative	46.7
Don't know	3.8
<b>Supporters Receive Preferential Treatment in Provision of Benefits</b>	
Always	95.6
Sometimes	0.5
Very rare	0.5
Never	1.6
Don't know	1.8

### **5.1.5. Preferences of Households in Rural Kasur for Provision of Public Services in the Village**

The public services considered by households in rural Kasur to be most needed in their village are tabulated below in table 5.7.

The table illustrates that households in rural Kasur give high preference to provision of education, health and clean drinking water in the village. This suggests that they prefer collective goods which benefit the entire population of the village. Do they also vote on these lines? Do they demand these services from their members of the legislative assemblies? If not, then what explains contradiction in their preferences and the choices they make? I address these questions in section 5.1.6 and 5.1.7.

Table 5.7: Public Service Delivery Preferences of Households

Option	Response	Percentage
A	Health	14.6
B	Education	37.1
C	Water	9.6
D	Sanitation	2.3
E	Pavement of Drainages	2.3
F	Pavement of Roads and Streets	4.8
G	Provision of Electricity	0.8
H	Gas Connection	2.5
I	Option A & B	15.2
J	Other	10.8

#### 5.1.6. Voting Behaviour in Rural Kasur

The basis on which households in rural Kasur voted for the electoral candidates in the general elections of 2008 and 2013 are tabulated below in table 5.8.

Voting choices of the households in rural Kasur, as shown in table 5.8, suggest that there is an insignificant difference in their voting choices for candidate of provincial assembly (CPA) and candidate of national assembly (CNA). They vote for both the candidates along the same lines. The said table also shows that there has been slight improvement in terms of households making independent voting choices from 2008 general elections (25.3%) to 2013 general elections (27.2%). However, a great majority of (72.8%) households continues not to make independent voting choices.

Table 5.8: Voting Choices of Households in 2008 &amp; 2013 General Elections

<b>Households Voted in General Elections (%)</b>				
On the Basis or at the Wish of	*CPA in 2008	**CNA in 2008	CPA in 2013	CNA in 2013
Vote bloc leader	39.2	38.6	37.3	36.8
Electoral candidate	9.5	8.9	10.2	8.1
Influential or head of village	2.2	2.2	1.8	1.8
Some <i>zamindar</i> from village	10.8	10.8	9.6	11.2
Someone from <i>biradri</i>	8.9	8.9	9.6	9.6
Friend	2.2	2.2	02	02
Fear of sanctions	0.6	0.6	00	0.5
Socio-economic dependence	1.3	1.3	2.3	0.3
Ally of our favoured candidate	00	1.3	00	3.6
No One	25.3	25.3	27.2	26.1

\* CPA: Candidate for Provincial Assembly

\*\* CNA: Candidate for National Assembly

Modes of electoral linkages or voting choices adopted by households in rural Kasur are tabulated below in table 5.9. The table illustrates that in rural Kasur voters do not make individual instead collective voting choices. To make collective decision, political action is organized into vote blocs at the village level. The lowest level at which voting choices are made is the household. Within the household it is the head of the household who decides which vote bloc to join or who to vote for and all the voters from a household vote for the same set of candidates as chosen by head of the household. It is very rare that members of the household go against the voting choice of the head of the household. The said table also shows that only a small percentage (20.7%) of households made their voting choices as non-bloc voters in both of the given elections.

Table 5.9: Individual vs. Collective Voting Choices

<b>Did Your Household Vote as Member of a Vote Bloc?</b>	
Response	Percentage
Yes, in 2008 General Elections	0.5
Yes, in 2013 General Elections	16.7
Yes, Both in 2008 and 2013 General Elections	62.1
Neither in 2008 Nor in 2013 General Elections	20.7

**5.1.6.1. Voting Behaviour of Vote Bloc Member Households**

The basis on which households in rural Kasur participated in or voted as members of a vote bloc in general elections of 2008 and 2013 are tabulated below in table 5.10. The table demonstrates that from vote bloc members, a significant majority (78.5%) of households participated in or voted as members of vote bloc on clientelistic basis in general elections of 2008. This clientelistic voting pattern continued in general elections of 2013. There has not been any improvement in this regard.

Table 5.10: Basis of Participation in the Vote Bloc

<b>Basis of Participation in Vote Bloc in 2008 &amp; 2013 Elections (%)</b>		
Response	2008	2013
Access to State Resources and Services	54.5	57.1
Access to Personal Resources of Patron or VBL	19.9	20.1
<i>Biradri</i>	07.7	07.5
<i>Biradri</i> Led Alliance	08.1	07.1
Extended Family	01.6	0.6
Dependence on Landlord	04.9	05.5
Fear of Violence or Sanctions	01.6	0.6
Religion/Faith	0.8	00
Neighbourhood	00	0.6
Don't Know	0.8	0.6

These vote blocs are organized by and around the vote bloc leaders at the village level. In some villages vote blocs are organized around electoral candidates while in others around local influential or largest landlords. Table 5.11 below tabulates the responses of the households for the basis of a particular person as their vote bloc leader. The table shows that having political connections and being active in getting people's work done are major determinants for being head of the vote bloc.

Table 5.11: Basis for Being Head of the Vote Bloc

<b>Basis of A Person Being Head of the Vote Bloc</b>	
Response	Percentage
Chaudhry	14
Largest landlord	11.5
Lambardar of the village	08
Family	1.6
<i>Biradri</i>	8.9
Politically active person	56.1

In the household survey respondents were asked about the basis on which their vote bloc aligned with and voted for the CPA and CNA in general elections of 2008 and 2013. Table 5.12 tabulates these responses. The table shows that the basis of a vote bloc to vote for a CPA and CNA were almost the same. However, there has been slight improvement overtime in terms of the basis of vote blocs to vote for a candidate. There has been a slight shift from interest based voting (66.6% in general elections of 2008 while 64.4% in general elections of 2013) to issue and party based voting (7.3% in general elections of 2008 while 13.8% in general elections of 2013). Despite the slight improvement in this regard, interest based voting (64.4%) continues to dominate the vote blocs. Vote blocs continue to be narrow and self-interest seeking clientelistic networks (*see table 5.12*).

Table 5.12: Basis of Alliance of Vote Bloc with Candidates in General Elections of 2008 &amp; 2013

<b>Alliance of Vote Bloc with Candidates in General Elections (%)</b>				
On the Basis of	*CPA in 2008	**CNA in 2008	CPA in 2013	CNA in 2013
Access to state services	65	62.2	62.5	66.7
Bloc leader himself candidate	12.2	6.5	11.9	00
Access to private resources	1.6	1.6	1.9	1.9
<i>Biradri</i>	5.7	5.3	3.8	4.2
<i>Biradri</i> led alliance	5.7	4.5	5.4	5.1
Political party	4.9	4.9	5.8	5.8
Alliance with candidate supported by vote bloc	1.6	14.2	00	15.8
Provision of public services by candidate from personal resources	2.4	00	08	00
Don't know	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6

\* CPA: Candidate for Provincial Assembly

\*\* CNA: Candidate for National Assembly

Though vote bloc leaders may have multifaceted ties with candidates but which ties do they give preference to while getting them aggregate votes of their vote bloc? In survey 53.2% of the bloc member households, who voted for the same candidate in the two successive general elections of 2008 and 2013, reported that their bloc voted for the same candidate in next election because they had strategic alliance with the candidate for access to state resources. Whereas 28.4% of the bloc member households reported that their bloc voted for the same candidate in next election because vote bloc leader himself was the candidate in both of the said elections. These findings suggest that election time strategic alliance for access to state resources (53.2%) and vote bloc leader himself as candidate (28.4%) are the two major determinants of a vote bloc voting for the same candidate in next elections (*see table 5.13*).

Table 5.13: Basis on Which Vote Blocs Vote to the Same Candidate in Next Election

<b>Reasons for Voting the Same Candidates in 2008 &amp; 2013 Elections (%)</b>		
Reason	*CPA	**CAN
Election time strategic alliance for access to state resources	42.1	53.2
Both times vote bloc leader himself was the candidate	22.1	28.4
Candidate and vote bloc leader are friends/classmates	3.2	6.4
Vote bloc leader is socio-economically dependent on candidate	7.4	0.9
Same <i>biradri</i>	4.2	5.5
Candidate fulfilled his previous electoral promises with vote bloc	2.1	0.9
Candidate came up to the expectations of the vote bloc	5.3	2.8
Provision of public services by candidate from his personal resources	4.2	00
Political party	7.4	1.8
Don't know	2.1	00

\*Candidate for provincial assembly

\*\*Candidate for national assembly

Vote bloc leaders may have multifaceted ties with candidates but majority of them align their vote blocs with candidates and get them aggregate votes of their vote bloc on the basis of access to state resources and services. These vote blocs make these alliances with candidates for access to state resources and services on the principles of reciprocity and expectation. Voting in reciprocity means, vote blocs continue to maintain their alliance, in next elections, with those candidates who fulfilled their previous promises to the vote blocs and provided them access to state resources and services while they deny voting those candidates who did not. Voting in expectation means, they maintain their previous alliance or make new alliance with a candidate based on their perception of the prospects

of the candidate and his party to win, form a government and provide the bloc with access to state resources and services. Majority of the vote blocs give preference to expectations over reciprocity. It means they are more likely to make an alliance with and vote for a candidate who they perceive as more likely to win, become part of the government and more importantly provide the vote bloc with access to state resources and services (*see table 5.14 below*).

Table 5.14: Basis on Which Vote Blocs do not Vote the Same Candidate in Next Election

<b>Reasons for Not Voting the Same Candidates in 2008 &amp; 2013 Elections (%)</b>		
<b>Reason</b>	<b>*CPA</b>	<b>**CAN</b>
Election time strategic alliance changed	31.5	38.3
Previous candidate did not contest in next election	23.8	17.3
In 2013 election, a new candidate was ally of our favoured candidate	18.5	19.5
Previous candidate did not fulfil his electoral promises	14.3	11.3
Some other candidate presented better offer of benefits	3.6	00
Political party gave ticket to another candidate	2.4	06
Candidate changed his political party affiliation	1.2	1.5
Candidate of 2013 election had better relations with vote bloc leader	1.2	00
Poor performance of political party	1.2	2.3
Previous candidate did not come up to the expectations of the vote bloc	0.6	0.5
Previous candidate changed his alliance	00	1.5
Other	0.6	00
Don't know	1.2	2.3

\*Candidate for provincial assembly

\*\*Candidate for national assembly

### 5.1.6.2. Voting Behaviour of Non Vote Bloc Member Households

Non vote bloc member households reported that they did not participate in any vote bloc instead they directly voted for the candidates in general elections of 2008 and 2013. The bases on which these non-bloc member households voted these candidates in both of the two successive general elections are tabulated in table 5.15.

Findings presented in the said table indicate that a significant majority (80.5%) of non-bloc member households are party based and issue based voters. Majority (64.6%) of these non-bloc member households based their decision of voting or not voting for the same candidates in the general elections of 2008 and 2013 on party basis.

Table 5.15: The Basis on Which Non-bloc Member Households Voted in 2008 & 2013 Election

<b>Non-bloc Households Voted Candidates in General Elections of 2008 &amp; 2013 (%)</b>				
On the Basis of	*CPA in 2008	**CNA in 2008	CPA in 2013	CNA in 2013
Political party	62.1	62.1	64.6	64.6
For improvement of public services in village	15.5	15.5	16	16
Access to state services	8.6	8.6	8.5	7.3
Access to private resources	1.7	1.7	3.7	1.2
<i>Biradri</i> /friendship	1.7	00	1.2	00
Alliance with candidate supported by household	1.7	3.4	1.3	6.1
Other	6.9	6.9	2.4	2.4
Don't know	1.7	1.7	2.4	2.4

\* CPA: Candidate for Provincial Assembly

\*\* CNA: Candidate for National Assembly

### **5.1.6.3. *Vote Buying in Rural Kasur***

Only 1.2% households admitted that their household received eatable goods, medicines, clothes, or monetary payment from the candidates or their agents or supporters during election campaigns for general elections of 2008 and 2013 (*see table 5.16 below*). They disclosed that the household wanted to vote for some other candidate but this transfer of goods or monetary payment led them to vote for another candidate (*see table 5.16 below*). There seems to be less reliance on vote buying than on tribute and patronage by electoral candidates in rural Kasur. This may be because it is not cost effective, it is short term and has high defection rate. Therefore candidates do not heavily rely upon it. Candidates go for vote buying only in cases where they think it can get them marginal victory over their competitors. The percentage of such households voting for transfers may be somewhat higher than shown in the table. This is because it goes against the societal norms. Society attaches stigma to it. Societal norms dictate that even if people do this they are less likely to confess to someone. Although, their neighbours and people in their social circle will somehow get to know this after some time but it is least likely that a household will confess it to an outsider asking in this regard. But if you ask them that did any candidate make such transfers to any households in your village or area then they may tell you the kind of transfers made by the candidates in their village or area.

Table 5.16: Cash Payments or Payoffs for Vote Buying and their Impact on Voting Choices

<b>Response</b>	<b>2008 (%)</b>	<b>2013 (%)</b>
<b>Did household receive cash or payoffs during election campaign?</b>		
Yes	1.2	01
No	80.8	99
<b>If yes, then how did it impact your vote choice?</b>		
Wanted to vote some other candidate but voted this candidate	100	100

### **5.1.7. Electoral Accountability in Rural Kasur**

In this section, I look at electoral accountability in rural Kasur from two different perspectives: (i) from the perspective of vote bloc member households and (ii) from the perspective of non-vote bloc member households.

#### ***5.1.7.1. Electoral Accountability from the Perspective of Bloc Member Households***

In the household survey respondents were asked about their expectations from their vote bloc leaders, their conceptualization of the responsibility of their vote bloc leaders and electoral promises made to them by their vote bloc leaders (VBLs) in general elections of 2008 and 2013. Table 5.17 and 5.18 tabulate the responses of bloc member households in this regard.

Table 5.17: Expectations of Bloc Households from VBL and their Perceptions of his Responsibility

<b>Households' Expectations from and Perception of Responsibility of their Bloc Leader (%)</b>		
Responses of Households	Expectations	Perceptions of Responsibility
A. Help you in time of need in financial and social matters	14.6	16.9
B. Help you in matters of police station and court	28.3	26.5
C. Help you in getting work done in other govt. organizations	08	6.1
D. Improve public services in the village	14.6	14.1
E. None	11.5	6.4
F. Option A & B	4.1	4.2
G. Option A & D	1.3	1.3
H. Option B & C	16.9	20.1
I. Option A, B & D	0.6	1.3
J. Other	00	3.1

Table 5.18: Electoral Promises Made by Vote Bloc Leader with Bloc Member Households

<b>Electoral Promises Made by Vote Bloc Leader to Member Households in Elections (%)</b>		
Responses of Households	2008	2013
A. He would help you in time of need in financial and social matters	12.3	11.2
B. He would help you in matters of police station and court	12.3	13.4
C. He would help you in getting work done in other govt. organizations	2.8	2.2
D. Option A, B & C	44.7	45
E. Delivery of development projects in the village	0.4	01
F. Improvement of public services in the village	10.7	8.9
G. He would pursue party policies and deliver as per manifesto	1.2	01
H. None	4.3	6.7

I. Option B & C	8.3	08
J. Other	03	2.6

In household survey, bloc member households were also asked about the structure, organization and accountability mechanisms existing in their vote blocs. Their responses are tabulated below in table 5.19 and 5.20.

Table 5.19: Participation of Bloc Households in Decision Making of Vote Bloc

Response	Percentage
Can members participate in decisions of the vote bloc?	
Yes	39.8
No	60.2

*\*Vote bloc leader*

Table 5.20: Accountability of Vote Bloc Leaders by Vote Bloc Members

Response	Percentage
Do you require your *VBL to inform you about his domain of accountability?	
Yes	46.6
No	53.4
Does your *VBL inform you about his domain of accountability?	
Yes	39
No	61
Do you require your *VBL to justify his actions and decisions?	
Yes	31.3
No	68.7
Does your *VBL justify his actions and decisions to the **VBLMs?	
Yes	25.2
No	74.8

What do you do if your *VBL fails to justify his actions and decisions?	
Quit that vote bloc and join the other	22
Express dissatisfaction against him in front of other **VBLs	23.2
Have no choice except to follow that *VBL	15
Do nothing	39.8

\*Vote bloc leader

\*\*Vote bloc members

Findings presented in the above tables suggest that majority of the vote bloc member households in rural Kasur expect their vote bloc leaders and consider it their responsibility that they deliver them clientelistic goods and services. To them it is the domain of accountability of their vote bloc leaders (*see table 5.17*). On the other hand majority of vote bloc leaders also make such appeals to the households in the village. They recruit the households into their vote blocs by promising them provision of clientelistic goods and services (*see table 18*). However, the capacity of majority of the vote bloc member households remains very limited in terms of holding their respective vote bloc leaders accountable. They cannot require them to inform and justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability. And if their bloc leaders do not deliver what they promised to, majority of these households either do nothing or just express dissatisfaction with them but continue to be member of their respective vote blocs (*see table 5.19 & 5.20*).

**5.1.7.2. Electoral Accountability from the Perspective of Non-bloc Member Households**

In the household survey non-bloc member households were asked about their expectations from their electoral candidates or members of legislative assemblies (MLAs), their conceptualization of the responsibility of their MLAs and the electoral promises made to them by their electoral candidates in the general elections of 2008 and 2013. Table 5.21 and 5.22 tabulate the responses of non-bloc member households in this regard.

Table 5.21: Expectations of Non-bloc Households from MLA and their Perception of his Responsibility

<b>Non-bloc Households' Expectations from and Perception of Responsibility of their *MLA (%)</b>		
<b>Responses of Households</b>	<b>Expectations</b>	<b>Perceptions of Responsibility</b>
A. Help you in time of need in financial and social matters	3.7	00
B. Help you in matters of police station and court	4.9	4.9
C. Help you in getting work done in other govt. organizations	1.2	1.2
D. Improve public services in the village	28	28
E. Deliver development projects in the constituency	00	00
F. Good performance	6.1	6.1
G. Pursue policies of the party	13.4	13.4
H. None	2.4	2.4
I. Option B & C	2.4	2.4
J. Option D & E	6.1	6.1
K. Option D & F	9.8	9.8
L. Option D & G	11	11

M. Option E & F	8.5	8.5
N. Other	2.5	2.5

*\*Member of Legislative Assembly*

Table 5.22: Electoral Promises Made by Electoral Candidates to the Non-bloc Member Households

<b>Electoral Promises Made by *CLAs to Non-bloc Households in Elections (%)</b>		
Responses of Households	2008	2013
A. He would help you in time of need in financial and social matters	2.9	2.4
B. He would help you in matters of police station and court	2.9	2.4
C. He would help you in getting work done in other govt. organizations	1.5	1.2
D. Option A, B & C	13.2	13.4
E. Delivery of development projects in the village	00	00
F. Improvement of public services in the village	36.8	35.4
G. He would pursue party policies and deliver as per manifesto	8.8	13.4
H. Option D & F	4.4	3.4
I. Option D & G	8.8	11
J. Option E & F	17.6	14.6
K. Other	0.2	2.8
L. Don't know	2.9	00

*\*Candidates for Legislative Assemblies*

These findings suggest that majority of the non-bloc households expect their electoral candidates and consider it their responsibility that they improve public services, bring development projects in the constituency, demonstrate good performance and pursue policies of the party. To them these are the basis which constitute domain of

accountability of their electoral candidates or members of legislative assemblies (*see table 5.21 & 5.22 above*).

Majority of them require their electoral candidates to inform them and justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability. If they fail on this account they hold them accountable by not voting for them in next elections (*see table 5.23 below*).

Table 5.23: Accountability of Electoral Candidates by Non-bloc Member Households

<b>Response</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Do you require your *MLA to inform you about his domain of accountability?</b>	
Yes	61
No	39
<b>Does your *MLA inform you about his domain of accountability?</b>	
Yes	59.8
No	40.2
<b>Do you require your *MLA to justify his actions and decisions?</b>	
Yes	51.2
No	48.8
<b>Does your *MLA justify his actions and decisions to his voters?</b>	
Yes	39
No	61
<b>What do you do if your *MLA fails to justify his actions and decisions?</b>	
Quit supporting him	2.4
Do not vote him in next elections	58.5
Express your dissatisfaction to him	7.3
Keep supporting him even in next elections	18.3
Do nothing	11
Other	2.4

*\*Member of legislative assembly*

Comparison between bloc and non-bloc member households reveals that bloc member households are self-interest seeking while non-bloc member households are issue and party based voters. The former seek mediated access to state resources and services whereas the latter do not. Therefore, the former are politically highly dependent while the latter are relatively independent. Dependence of the former undermines their capacity to hold their vote bloc leaders accountable whereas the latter have relatively better capacity to hold their electoral candidates accountable.

## **5.2. Results of the Key Informant Interviews**

By using thematic analysis, this section presents results of the key informant interviews. The results are tabulated and discussed as under.

### **5.2.1. Profile of the Villages of District Kasur**

In this section, I present classification of the villages in district Kasur and their connectivity to the urban centres.

#### **5.2.1.1. *Classification of the Villages***

On the basis of sample, I classify villages in district Kasur on three different bases: colonial land settlement patterns, land distribution and migrant population. Table 5.24 shows classification of the sample villages. Under the British colonial administration in the Sub-continent, there were two types of land settlement patterns. One proprietary land settlements where indigenous population had ownership rights over their land and paid land tax to the administration. The other was crown villages which were the canal colonies. There, land was the property of the British colonial state and cultivators were its

tenants. They were given this land on lease to cultivate. Moreover, colonial rule in proprietary villages was indirect through local landlords loyal to the colonial administration whereas crown villages were directly ruled by the colonial district administration. These land settlement patterns and colonial mode of direct and indirect rule in these villages may give us useful insights to understand political organization and local governance in these villages. I examine the impact of land settlement patterns on political organization in the villages in section 6.1 and on local governance in section 6.3. On the basis of land distribution proprietary villages can be classified into zamindari and pattidari villages whereas crown villages do not have such classification. Zamindari villages are those where land was allotted to one landlord by colonial administration and he cultivated it through his tenants while in pattidari villages kinship groups had ownership rights. In zamindari villages land distribution is highly skewed and the land is owned by a single family. In pattidari villages land distribution is less skewed and land is owned by different kinship groups (*pattis*). In crown villages land distribution is more egalitarian. There is almost no landlessness and all the households have small landholdings. As land plays a crucial role in agrarian society so land distribution patterns in the villages may have significant implications on political organization and governance in these villages. I examine the impact of land distribution patterns on political organization in section 6.1 and on governance in section 6.3. Third basis for classification of the villages is migrant population in the village. I make an assertion that colonial legacy led to the institutional path dependence in the villages. It continues to dominate the political organization and governance in these villages. I evaluate this assertion and also examine the impact of post-independence (1947) migration into the village on

political organization and governance in the village in section 6.1 and section 6.3. I attempt to see if migration into a village breaks institutional path dependence there and how political organization and governance in migrant villages varies from of the non-migrant villages<sup>9</sup>.

Table 5.24: Classification of the Sample Villages

S. No.	Sample Village Name	Proprietary/Crown*	Zamindari/Pattidari*	Migrant/Non-migrant**
1	Qali Sahu	Proprietary	Zamindari	Non-migrant
2	Rasool Nagar	Proprietary	Pattidari	Non-migrant
3	Bulandi Hathar	Proprietary	Pattidari	Non-migrant
4	Murali Utar	Proprietary	Pattidari	Migrant
5	Bhim Ke	Proprietary	Pattidari	Migrant
6	Jabbomail	Proprietary	Pattidari	Migrant
7	Alulakh Bonga	Proprietary	Pattidari	Migrant
8	Chak No. 25	Crown	N/A	Non-migrant
9	Chak No. 46	Crown	N/A	Migrant

Source: \*District Census Report (Kasur) 1998

\*\*Key Informant Interviews

### 5.2.1.2. Connectivity of the Villages to the Urban Centres

I take three indicators to examine the connectivity of the villages to the urban centres. These are the distance (in kilometres) from: main highway, tehsil and district headquarters. The indicators in table 5.25 show how remote or connected a village is to the urban centres. Connectivity of a village to the urban centres enhances mobility of the people, enlarges their choices and lowers their dependence. I examine the impact of connectivity of a village on governance in the village in section 6.3, on voting behaviour in section 6.4 and on electoral accountability in section 6.5.

<sup>9</sup> For detailed account of the classification of villages in rural Punjab see Mohmand (2011)

Table 5.25: Connectivity of the Villages to the Urban Centres

S. No.	Sample Village Name	Distance from Main Highway (KM)	Distance from Tehsil Headquarter (KM)	Distance from District Headquarter (KM)
1	Qali Sahu	30	46.7	65
2	Rasool Nagar	10	17.6	17.6
3	Bulandi Hathar	11	20.6	20.6
4	Murali Utar	02	29.6	29.6
5	Bhim Ke	11	13.7	40.1
6	Jabbomail	3.3	11.5	11.5
7	Alulakh Bonga	8.1	27.8	61.9
8	Chak No. 25	13.6	14.2	83.2
9	Chak No. 46	16.2	16.9	85.9

Source: Key Informant Interviews and Google Maps

### 5.2.2. Political Organization in the Villages of District Kasur

I put various questions to the respondents of the key informant interviews to reflect upon the political organization in their villages. Their responses in this regard are synthesised and discussed below.

Villages in district Kasur are politically organized around *dhara* (vote bloc). Households vote on the basis of *dhara*. There *dhara* is considered to be a *siasi akath* (political group) to make an *ijtimae faisala* (collective decision) to vote for some candidate in elections.

Nonetheless, the structure of the vote bloc varies from village to village. Vote blocs are organized around candidates, local influential, political parties and *biradaris* (castes) in different villages. Vote blocs organized around local influential are organized and led by them while those organized around candidates or parties are organized and led by their local agents at the village. The primary basis for the formation of the vote bloc is reported

to be narrow self-interests and targeted benefits to the households by vote bloc leaders, agents or brokers. In this regard, table 5.26 below tabulates the responses of the key informants from the sample villages.

Table 5.26: Political Organization in Rural Kasur

<b>Sample Village Name</b>	<b>Type of Political Organization</b>	<b>Vote Blocs Organized Around</b>	<b>Basis of Formation of the Vote Blocs</b>
Qali Sahu	Vote Bloc	Candidates	Self-interests
Rasool Nagar	Vote Bloc	Candidates	Self-interests
Bulandi Hathar	Vote Bloc	Local Influential	Self-interests
Murali Utar	Vote Bloc	Party	Self-interests
Bhim Ke	Vote Bloc	Local Influential	Self-interests
Jabbomail	Vote Bloc	Party	Self-interests
Alulakh Bonga	Vote Bloc	<i>Biradari</i> (caste)	Animosity
Chak No. 25	Vote Bloc	Candidates	Self-interests
Chak No. 46	Vote Bloc	Candidates	Self-interests

*Source: Key Informant Interviews*

The electoral candidates mobilize their electoral support and aggregate votes at the village level using host of strategies which include but are not limited to: mobilizing support through their agents, making electoral alliance with local influential or broker, holding public meetings, delivering public speeches, sending their agents for door to door campaign, the candidate himself going for door to door campaign, making promises of service delivery in the village, and making promises of targeted benefits. Candidate may rely on one or more than one of these strategies for electoral support in a village. Combination of strategies for electoral support varies from village to village.

### **5.2.3. Electoral Behaviour in Rural Kasur**

Generally, the villages in rural Kasur are politically organized into two vote blocs. Nonetheless, in rare cases there may be even three or four vote blocs in a village. Local animosity, patronage, grievances, party, and *biradari* are reported to be the main reasons for there being multiple vote blocs in a village. The prominent bases on which people vote in these villages are: patronage (targeted benefits), getting work done, *biradari* alliance, *biradari*, dependence, fear of sanctions, religious or spiritual affiliation, friendship, party, provision of services, improvement of village services and development schemes.

The main bases on which members are recruited into vote blocs include but are not limited to: dependence, fear of sanctions, patronage (targeted benefits), *biradari*, protection from police and court (*thana katchehri*), *biradari* alliance, friendship, party, provision of services, getting work done, and animosity. However, vote blocs change their affiliation or align with a candidate on the bases of: grievances with other candidate, if previous candidate does not fulfil his electoral promises, reciprocity, patronage from ruling party, on party basis, and to seek benefits.

### **5.3. Results of the Interviews of Vote Bloc Leaders**

By using thematic analysis, this section presents results of the interviews with the vote bloc leaders. The results are discussed as under.

### 5.3.1. Electoral Behaviour of Vote Bloc Leaders

In this section, I present electoral behaviour of vote bloc leaders (VBLs) with regard to the electoral promises which candidates for legislative assemblies (CLAs) make to them and they make to their vote bloc members (VBM), the bases on which VBLs recruit members into their vote blocs, and the bases on which VBLs align their vote bloc with CLAs.

Electoral promises which CLAs make to the VBLs and they make to their VBMs can be classified into five categories. These are: private targeted access to state resources and services, private targeted social services, club targeted public goods, club targeted or universal public goods, and universal public goods and services.

Electoral promises of private targeted access to state resources and services include: getting their work done in police station and court (*thana katchehri*), revenue office, WAPDA office, or any other government office, getting their inflated bills corrected, producing reference for them if they need it in any office or organization, and getting their any other individual work done which is in their reach. Electoral promises of private targeted social services include: settlement of their disputes, suppressing their enemies and supporting them in different matters at the local level, and supporting the oppressed. Electoral promises of club targeted public goods include: provision, replacement or up-gradation of transformer in a neighbourhood. Electoral promises of club targeted or universal public goods include: pavement of roads, streets, and provision of drainage and sanitation facilities (*nalian*). These goods and services can either be targeted to a specific

households and neighbourhood, or they can be universally provided to the whole village. Electoral promises of universal public goods and services include: provision of electricity, hospital, better health services, public pond for contaminated water, public safe drinking water supply scheme, provision of school if it is not already in the village, reconstruction, renovation or up-gradation of school if it is already in the village, bringing development projects for the village, and improvement of other public services in the village.

However, vote bloc leaders not only mobilize their support or recruit members into their vote blocs through promises but also through other means. Keeping this in view, I classify the bases on which they recruit members into their vote blocs into two categories; a) promises and provision of private targeted goods, b) means of recruitment other than promises or provision of goods and services.

Promises and provision of targeted goods include: getting their work done in police station and court (*thana katchehri*), or other state institutions, helping them in getting access to state resources and services, producing reference for them if they need it in any office or organization, helping them in settling their disputes, and previous track record of getting people's work done and providing them public services. Means of recruitment other than promises and provision of goods and services are reported to be: *biradari* (caste), friendship, neighbourhood, *talua* (relationship), respect and kind dealing with people, coercion, and whatever fair or unfair means work best in this regard.

Similarly, vote bloc leaders align their vote blocs with CLAs on the basis of host of factors. The bases on which they align their vote blocs with CLAs can be classified into six categories. These are: private targeted goods and services, club targeted goods and services, club targeted or universal public goods and services, universal private services, universal public goods and services, and the basis of alliance other than provision of goods and services.

In this regard, private targeted goods and services are reported to be: getting work done in police station and court, or other state institutions, protection from police and opponents, producing reference in institutions if needed, and in reciprocity of getting work done. Club targeted goods and services are reported to be: provision of bridge, and provision, replacement or up-gradation of transformer in a neighbourhood. Club targeted or universal public goods and services are reported to be: pavement of roads and streets. Universal private services are reported to be: provision of social and health services by the CLA from his personal resources. Universal public goods and services are reported to be: provision of hospital, provision of school, provision of public services in the village, and improvement of public services in the village. Vote blocs making alliances with CLAs for these goods and services, do this in reciprocity, promise or expectation of the provision of these goods and services. Nonetheless, the bases of alliance other than provision of goods and services are reported to be: party, friendship (*taluuq*), personality or character of the CLA, and sympathy.

CLAs and VBLs mobilize their electoral support through host of the electoral strategies mentioned earlier. These electoral strategies vary from neighbourhood to neighbourhood and village to village depending upon the constraints electorates face and what they need or value the most in their given context. Nonetheless, results of the interviews with the vote bloc leaders reveal that electoral strategy of promise or provision of private and club targeted goods and services is most effective for electoral mobilization and support in their context. Therefore, both CLAs and VBLs rely on these quite often.

### **5.3.2. Vote Bloc Leaders as Informal Local Government Institutions**

In this section, I discuss the role of VBLs as informal local government institutions (ILGIs) based on the demands they face by and benefits they deliver to their vote bloc members (VBM) and the benefits they receive from their favoured CLAs.

The demands they face from and benefits they deliver to their VBMs are private targeted goods and services, club targeted goods and services, club targeted or universal public goods and services, and universal public goods and services. Goods and services demanded by and delivered to VBMs are same as mentioned in the previous section with regard to the electoral promises. The kinds of benefits VBLs receive from CLAs are also almost the same. Nonetheless, some private targeted goods and services VBLs receive from their CLAs are only meant for the rural elite not for the ordinary VBMs. These targeted goods and services include jobs, loans, subsidies, and discretionary allocation of public offices. This can be observed through the difference in the electoral promises VBLs make to and benefits they deliver to their VBMs and the benefits they receive from CLAs. The reason is scarcity of those resources. These cannot be given to everyone.

Therefore, based on the principles of economies of scale and rate of return they are strategically exchanged for higher returns. This gives VBLs a chance to use votes of their vote blocs as bargaining chips to get such resources for themselves and for their family and to seek rents.

The demands made and benefits exchanged for electoral support are mostly focussed on missing basic public services. VBLs act as the mediators between state and society. They serve as informal local government institutions (ILGIs) for the rural masses to access these state resources and services. On the other hand they also use these missing services to their own advantage to increase their power, seek benefits for themselves, and to seek rents. However, CLAs use missing institutions and limited state capacity to deliver the basic services to their own advantage to seek electoral support.

### **5.3.3. Electoral Accountability from VBL Perspective**

In this section, I present electoral accountability from the perspective of vote bloc leaders (VBLs). In this regard, I examine and discuss the perceptions of VBLs of the domain of accountability of CLAs, electoral accountability capacity of VBLs, and the bases on which VBLs hold CLAs accountable.

To examine what VBLs consider as the domain of accountability of their CLAs, I asked them of their perceptions of the responsibility of their CLAs and what are their expectations from them. The responses of these two questions are summarized and presented here as the domain of accountability of CLAs from the perspective of VBLs.

Their responses in this regard can be classified into five categories. These are: provision of private targeted goods and services, provision of club targeted goods and services, provision of club targeted or universal public goods and services, provision of universal public goods and services, and their responsibility or domain of accountability other than provision of goods and services.

Provision of private targeted goods and services are reported to be: help their ally VBLs in matters of police station and court, help them in matters of inflated bills, get them gas meters, protection of their ally vote blocs, help their ally VBLs in getting their work done in other state institutions, producing reference for their ally VBLs in any office or organization, help them in settlement of their disputes, and help people in time of need.

Provision of club targeted goods and services are reported to be: provision of transformer and bridge. Provision of club targeted or universal public goods and services are reported to be: provision of drainage and sanitation facilities. Universal public goods and services are reported to be: provision of school, hospital, electricity, public pond for contaminated water, public safe drinking waters supply scheme, and delivery of development projects in the village. Responsibility or domain of accountability other than provision of goods and services is reported to be: serving the public and maintaining the party image.

Here, again the focus of the domain of accountability is on provision of private and club targeted goods and services. These targeted goods and services are given relatively more importance in the domain of accountability of CLAs as perceived by VBLs.

Here, I observe that the domain of accountability of CLAs is considered to be the provision of targeted goods and services. Even in party based vote blocs it is true for the vote bloc members (VBM). VBL may align on party basis whereas most of the VBMs become part of it for these targeted goods and services.

With regard to the electoral accountability capacity of VBLs, I find that majority of vote blocs (6 out of 9) have better electoral accountability capacity. They require information and justification from their CLAs and their CLAs inform and justify to them their actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability. If CLAs aligned with these vote blocs do not fulfil their electoral promises and fail to justify the non-fulfilment of their promises majority of (5 out of 9) vote blocs quit supporting them in next elections or at least they can if they would like to. The remaining four sample vote blocs that cannot quit their support, they actually have limited agency because two of these vote blocs are organized around party, one around candidate, and the other around animosity. They have to keep supporting those CLAs because of lack of agency at their disposal.

With regard to the bases on which VBLs hold CLAs accountable, I find that in cases where VBLs held CLAs accountable were non-fulfilment of electoral promises and expectation from new or contending candidate. In other cases either candidate did not contest or party gave ticket to another candidate.

If electoral support is often gained through private and club targeted goods and services what could be its impact on electoral accountability and governance in the country? I attempt to examine this in section 6.8.

#### **5.4. Results of the Interviews of Candidates for Legislative Assemblies**

By using thematic analysis, this section presents results of the interviews with the candidates for legislative assemblies. The results are discussed as under.

##### **5.4.1. Accountability Pressures CLAs Face**

In this section, I present the accountability pressures CLAs face by their electorates. I examine these accountability pressures with regard to the demands CLAs face by their voters and the bases on which their electorates hold them accountable.

The kind of demands CLAs face from their voters can be classified into four categories. These are: private targeted goods and services, club targeted goods and services, club targeted or universal public goods and services, and universal public goods and services.

Demands of private targeted goods and services are reported to be: jobs for their children, settlement of their disputes, getting them released from police station, to register an FIR against someone, to get their inflated bills corrected, seeking help in other problems at WAPDA office, revenue office, or any other government organization. Demands of club targeted goods are reported to be: provision of drainage and transformer. Demands of club targeted or universal public goods are reported to be: pavement of roads and streets.

Demands of universal public goods are reported to be: provision of school, public pond for contaminated water, public safe drinking water supply scheme, and provision of better health facilities in the village.

Respondent CLAs reported that their voters hold them accountable for the provision of targeted goods and services, as mentioned earlier. They believe that their voters do not value much the provision of universal public goods and services when it comes to the voting choices. They hold the view that if they provide universal public goods and services it does not translate into political capital and does not get them electoral support. Nonetheless, provision of targeted goods and services is very effective in this regard. Voters quit supporting those candidates who do not or are no more able to provide those targeted goods and services. By quitting their electoral support they hold them accountable for not providing targeted goods and services.

#### **5.4.2. Responses of CLAs to the Accountability Pressures They Face**

In this section, I discuss how CLAs respond to the accountability pressures they face. I examine their responses to the accountability pressures with regard to the electoral promises they make and the kind of benefits they deliver to retain their electoral support.

I find that the electoral promises which CLAs make and the kind of benefits they deliver to gain or retain their electoral support are similar to the demands they face and for which they are held accountable. These have already been discussed in the previous section. The only exception I find in their responses to the accountability pressures is that they allocate

discretionary public offices like chairman zakat committee and chairman market committee to the rural elites, their agents or vote bloc leaders to retain their support. These resources are relatively scarce so they are provided selectively for high rate of returns.

I also find that the focus of CLAs in response to the accountability pressures they face is more upon targeted goods and services as they have high rate of return in their context.

If electoral incentives for CLAs and their corresponding electoral strategies are based on provision of targeted goods and services how it affects the accountability relationship between the electors and the electorates and what are its implications for governance in a democratic polity. I attempt to examine these questions in section 6.8.

## Chapter 6 - Discussion and Analysis

In this chapter, I discuss and present an in-depth analysis of voting behaviour and electoral accountability in rural Punjab based on the results of the study presented in chapter 5.

### 6.1. Political Organization in a Punjabi Village

In a typical Punjabi village households make a collective rather than an individual decision in terms of their voting choices. To make a collective decision, political action is organized into vote blocs (*dhara*) at the village level. Normally, the village is organized into two vote blocs but in some villages there may be more than two vote blocs. These vote blocs are organized around local influential, candidate or a political party. Vote blocs organized around local influential are organized and led by them whereas those which are organized around candidate or party are organized and led by their local agents. In case if a vote bloc is headed by a local influential then he connects his vote bloc with a candidate and supports him in elections on the basis of reciprocity and expectation of access to state resources. These local vote bloc leaders and agents recruit households (clients) into their vote blocs on the basis of; socio-economic dependence, access to state resources and services, *biradri* (caste), proximity, personal relations, coercion, fear of sanctions, protection from the opponents, vote buying, rivalry, party and improvement of public services in the village. Candidates in Punjabi villages mobilize their electoral support through their agents or by making a deal or alliance with brokers and local vote bloc leaders on the basis of; patronage, vote buying, service delivery and party affiliation.

Party-voter linkages are not direct rather they are mediated by local influentials, patrons and brokers at the village level. Political parties do not have their gross roots organizational structure at the village level. They rely on these clientelistic networks to connect with voters at the village level. They also channel public resources and services through these networks. In this mode of service delivery clients are given preference while non-clients or opponents are denied the services as far as possible. Therefore, the targeted rather than the universal provision of public goods and services in rural Punjab can be observed. I find that discretionary constituency development funds and public offices are allocated to the agents, brokers, vote bloc leaders and loyal clients. Members of legislative assemblies also reward those who get them large number of clients or spend resources on their election campaign. They reward by getting them jobs or tenders of public works and development projects. They encourage them to seek rents in those projects.

## **6.2. Typology of Voters in a Punjabi Village**

On the basis of political organization of the village, voters in a Punjabi village can be divided into two types; bloc and non-bloc voters. On the basis of motive behind voting voters can be classified into five major categories; identity based, interest based, issue based, party based and personality based voters. Identity based voters are those voting on the basis of *biradri* (kinship) and proximity. Interest based voters are those voting on the basis of; tribute clientelism or socio-economic dependence, patronage or access to state resources and services, fear of sanctions, and animosity. Issue based voters are those voting for improvement of public services and delivery of development projects in the village or constituency. Party based voters are those voting on the party basis. Personality

based voters are those voting on the basis of; friendship with the candidate, personal liking and disliking, *peeri-mureedi*, spiritual affiliation, and same religious sect. A significant majority of voters in rural Punjab are interest based bloc voters.

### **6.3. Dependence and Mediation in a Punjabi Village**

Descriptive statistical analysis of the household survey data presented in section 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 suggests that households in rural Punjab are socio-economically and politically dependent. They are dependent on informal local government institutions for access to social and public resources and services. Findings presented in section 5.1.6 suggest that their dependence on these mediating institutions for access to social and public resources and services constrains and determines their voting behaviour. Given their dependence and mediated access to these resources and services, they vote as member of a vote bloc. So, political action is organized into vote blocs at the village level and collective decision is taken to vote a candidate. Vote bloc leaders take this decision either unilaterally or by consulting with the rural elite members of the vote bloc. The other members of the vote bloc are rarely consulted. They are informed about the decision of the vote bloc. And they vote a candidate following the decision of the vote bloc leader. These vote bloc leaders align with candidates on the basis of expectation of access to state resources and services. This is how households in rural Punjab are dependent on these mediating institutions and they not only provide them access to social and public resources and services but also link them to candidates and political parties.

To explain the degree of dependence and its variation across households and villages in rural Punjab, I have developed a composite measure which I call “composite dependence index”. It provides scale data with dependence score range between 0 and 16. 0 on the scale means the household is least or not dependent whereas 16 means the household is highly dependent. So, more the score on the scale more dependent is the household. I convert this scale data into ordinal to classify households into five categories based on their score on the scale (*see table 6.1*). Following this classification of households, the study finds that only small percentage of households is non-dependent or extremely dependent. Significant majority of households lies in between these two types of households. They are slightly dependent, moderately dependent and highly dependent (*see table 6.1 below*). It suggests that dependence level in rural Punjab is high.

Table 6.1: Dependence of Households in Rural Punjab

Level of Dependence	Score Range	Percentage
Non-dependent	0	11.1
Slightly Dependent	0.1 to 4.9	7.8
Moderately Dependent	5 to 8.9	37.6
Highly Dependent	9 to 12.9	32.6
Extremely Dependent	13 to 16	10.9

Correlational analysis of composite dependence index with land ownership and monthly income of the households reveals that their correlation is significant and results are statistically significant too. Results suggest that dependence is negatively correlated with land ownership and monthly income. It means that more the land ownership or monthly income of the household less dependent it is (*see table 6.2 below*). It also finds that more the proximity of a village to the tehsil headquarter or main highway less the dependence of the households in the village. Therefore, villages close to tehsil and district

headquarters or main highway have relatively high mobility and less dependence while villages which are far away have less mobility and high dependence.

Table 6.2: Correlation of Dependence with Land Ownership and Monthly Income

Dependence Index	Land Ownership of Household	Monthly Income of Household
Pearson Correlation	-2.06**	-.295**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000
N	396	396

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

There is very small percentage of households in rural Punjab making independent choices; be it access to socio-economic and public resources and services or decision to vote a candidate for member of legislative assembly. A significant majority of households there are dependent in making these choices. Their access to socio-economic and public resources and services is mediated by informal local government institutions (ILGIs) called *dhara* (vote bloc) in the local context. These vote blocs are usually headed by the largest landlord and influential in the village. These informal local government institutions mediate between state and society, voters and political parties or government. Political parties and electoral candidates link with voters through these institutions. In this way these institutions not only mediate households' access to resources and services but also provide linkages between voters and political parties. This is how households or voters in rural Punjab are linked with state institutions and political parties.

These institutions are not inclusive in nature. In these institutions minorities and lower social castes enjoy the least agency. For crucial and strategic decisions these vote bloc leaders consult and take into confidence the rural elite only. These institutions provide

targeted and conditional but not universal access to public resources and services. Generally, households which are not member of a vote bloc are denied access to these resources and services. Occasionally, if they are provided this access, it is based on an explicit or implicit condition to vote as member of that vote bloc in next elections. Therefore, it can be observed that households do not make independent voting choices rather they decide to vote as member of a vote bloc.

These vote blocs organize political action at the village level and make collective decision to vote an electoral candidate. It gives them better bargaining power. They bargain with candidates and vote a candidate on the basis of expectation of access to state resources and services.

On part of the political parties there does not seem to be any effort to establish direct linkages with the rural voters based on programmatic and policy lines. Why are they reluctant to do so? There may be number of reasons for this. Some of these are mentioned below.

First, mainstream political parties in Pakistan are not democratic in their internal organization. Party leaders do not want to lose control in their parties by holding internal party elections and delegating decision making at the grass root level. Therefore, they do not have party organization at the grass root level in the villages. Party leaders do not give party tickets in elections to party workers on merit. Rather ticket is allotted on the basis of personal and clientelistic vote bank and financial contribution to the party. More

the personal and clientelistic vote bank and financial contribution of an individual to the party the more likely he is to get party ticket. These patterns in political parties disappoint party workers and lead to the erosion of support in the parties.

Second, their performance in rural areas on programmatic and policy lines is poor. Their policies and programs have an urban bias. They have less to offer to the rural voters. Therefore, rural voters find it less attractive to vote on these lines. So, keeping in view the socio-economic and political structures and voting patterns in rural areas, political parties find it economical to establish mediated linkages with the rural voters. These linkages are transactional and short term in nature. So, they enjoy the support of these mediating institutions as far as they have the capacity to fulfil clientelistic demands of these institutions. This keeps them winning elections in rural areas no matter how poorly they perform at the national level. Keeping in view the economic principle of economies of scale, they prefer to have mediated and clientelistic linkages rather than direct and programmatic ones with the voters in rural areas.

Third, they may not have the political will or find it costly to confront these informal institutions. This is because political parties are dominated by rural landed elite. These elites have stakes in these institutions as they get elected and exercise their control over society through these institutions. To them, going against these institutions is against their own interest. So, they will resist any such attempt in the political parties and block it.

Fourth, these informal local government institutions and culture of dependence and mediation has its roots in colonial history of the sub-continent. As path dependence theory suggests that human behaviour has limits, both cognitive and institutional, which have profound implications for the way governance operates. Institutional path dependence suggests that structural properties of institutions constrain actors within them so that they are unable to act in particular ways. In this way, institutional choices made at a point in history constrain and lock the normal behaviour in organizational life. They set the institutional trajectory and lock the institutions into those choices. Application of this theory provides useful insights in this case. Most of the Pakistani Punjab consisted of proprietary villages. Unlike crown villages, they were not under the direct colonial administration. For colonial administration, it was difficult and not viable to rule, extract surplus and collect taxes directly from these villages. Any attempts of direct rule were already met with resistance and opposition. So, during conquest of Pakistani Punjab of today, they adopted different mode of governance. They produced new or supported existing class of loyal rural elite in Punjab. They established informal local government institutions, headed by the class of rural elite loyal to their colonial masters. These institutions were operating under state patronage by colonial administration. Colonial administration, supported, protected and empowered these institutions for extractive purposes. These institutions were set to be extractive for colonial masters and they continue to perform this function for post-colonial masters. Post-colonial state found itself too weak to confront these extractive informal institutions of local governance. Attempts to reform these institutions through land reforms or populist voter mobilization were met with resistance and opposition. These institutions were able reassert

themselves. Therefore, later on hardly any effort was made to abolish or reform these institutions. Post-colonial state found it convenient to rely on these institutions rather than to confront them. Military dictators heavily relied upon these institutions to seek legitimacy and bring stability in the country. They provided them state patronage to serve their interests. This made them more powerful and relevant in the post-colonial context.

#### **6.4. Clientelistic Voting Behaviour in a Rural Context**

Findings presented in section 5.1.6 suggest that significant majority of the households in rural Punjab are bloc voters. They participate in and vote as member of a vote bloc on clientelistic basis. They expect and consider it the responsibility of their vote bloc leaders to provide them clientelistic goods and services. The detailed account of reasons for which they opt this pathway and are not able to make independent voting choices on programmatic and policy lines has already been presented in section 6.3.

On the other hand bloc leaders make clientelistic appeals to recruit members into their vote blocs. They also align with a candidate and support him in a given general election on the basis of expectation from him to deliver clientelistic goods and services such as patronage or targeted provision of access to state resources and services to the vote bloc. Electoral candidates and political parties mobilize their electoral support and link with the rural voters through these mediating informal local government institutions by promising them provision of clientelistic goods and services (*see section 6.3 for detailed account of reasons for which electoral candidates and political parties do not develop direct linkages with rural voters based on programmatic and policy lines rather link with them through mediating informal local government institutions on clientelistic lines*).

To explain the degree of clientelistic voting behaviour and its variation across households and villages in rural Punjab, I have developed a composite measure which I call “clientelistic voting choices index”. It provides scale data with clientelistic voting choices score range between 0 and 14. 0 on the scale means the household is least or non-clientelistic whereas 14 mean the household is highly clientelistic in its voting choices. It implies that more the score on the scale more clientelistic is the household in its voting choices. I convert this scale data into ordinal to classify households into five categories based on their score on the scale (*see table 6.3*). Following this classification of households, the study finds that only small percentage of households is non-clientelistic in its voting choices. Rest of the households are slightly clientelistic, moderately clientelistic, highly clientelistic, and extremely clientelistic in their voting choices (*see table 6.3 below*). These findings suggest that households in rural Punjab are highly clientelistic in their voting choices.

Table 6.3: Clientelistic Voting Choices of Households in Rural Punjab

Degree of Clientelistic Voting Choices	Score Range	Percentage
Non-clientelistic	0	13.1
Slightly Clientelistic	0.1 to 4.9	5.3
Moderately Clientelistic	5 to 8.9	17.9
Highly Clientelistic	9 to 12.9	36.6
Extremely Clientelistic	13 and Above	27

Correlational analysis of clientelistic voting choices index with land ownership, monthly income and educational level attained by heads of the households reveals that their relationship is negative. It means more the land ownership, monthly income or educational attainment of heads of the household less clientelistic the households will be

in their voting choices. However, results also show that correlation of clientelistic voting choices with these socio-economic variables is insignificant. It implies that these socio-economic variables do not explain much of the variation in clientelistic voting choices of the households. So, these results suggest that households performing better on these socio-economic indicators are also likely to be as clientelistic as households not performing better on these indicators. It also finds that more the proximity of a village to the tehsil headquarter or main highway less clientelistic are the households in their voting choices. Therefore, villages close to the tehsil or district headquarters or main highway are relatively less clientelistic than those situated in remote areas far away from tehsil headquarter or main highway (*see table 6.4 below*).

Table 6.4: Correlation of Clientelistic Voting Choices Index with Socio-economic Variables

Clientelistic Voting Choices Index	Educational Level Attained by Head of Household	Land Ownership of Household	Monthly Income of Household
Pearson Correlation	-.095	-.050	-.078
Sig. (2-tailed)	.060	.322	.119
N	396	396	396

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

### 6.5. Perverse Electoral Accountability in Rural Punjab

Findings presented in section 5.1.7 suggest that significant majority of households in rural Punjab are bloc voters. They expect and consider it the responsibility of their vote bloc leaders to provide them clientelistic goods and services. Vote bloc leaders also make such appeals to households to recruit them into their vote blocs. Thus, domain of accountability of a vote bloc leader in the villages of Punjab is considered to be delivery of clientelistic goods and services to the members of the vote bloc.

On the other hand, vote bloc leaders align with the candidates and assure them the support of their vote bloc in elections on the basis of their promise and expectation from them for provision of clientelistic goods and services to the vote bloc. If a candidate does not deliver on this account they hold them accountable for this by not voting him in next elections.

Findings of the study also suggest that vote bloc leaders have better capacity to hold their favoured electoral candidates accountable whereas the capacity of vote bloc member households remains limited in terms of holding their vote bloc leaders accountable. Why is it so? This may be because these households do not have transactional rather multifaceted and long term ties with the vote bloc leader and as an individual household they have limited bargaining power as compared to the vote bloc leader. It is also important to note that in the rural context they have to take sides which are long term and which they cannot switch between very frequently. They continue to support their vote bloc leader even if he does not fulfil their certain demands and they are dissatisfied with him. They leave the vote bloc only if their dissatisfaction rises above a certain threshold level. While on the other hand majority of vote bloc leaders have transactional ties with the electoral candidates based on provision of clientelistic goods and services. These ties cease to exist if electoral candidates do not make their part of transaction. They also have better capacity because of their better bargaining position. Their bargaining position is based on aggregate votes of their vote blocs.

To explain the electoral accountability capacity and its variation across households and villages in rural Punjab, I have developed a composite measure to which I call “electoral accountability index”. It provides electoral accountability score of households in the form of

scale data. Score of households on this scale is ranged between 0 and 7. Zero on the scale means the household does not have or have the least electoral accountability capacity whereas score of seven on the scale means the household has high electoral accountability capacity. It indicates that higher the score on the scale more is the electoral accountability capacity of the household. I convert this scale data into ordinal to classify households into four categories based on their score on the scale (*see table 6.5*). Following this classification of households, the study finds that majority of the households do not have the capacity required to hold their vote bloc leaders or electoral candidates accountable (*see table 6.5 below*). It implies that electoral accountability in rural Punjab is undermined and has very limited capacity to constrain behaviour of electoral candidates or members of legislative assembly.

Table 6.5: Electoral Accountability Capacity of Households in Rural Punjab

Degree of Accountability Capacity	Score Range	Percentage
No Electoral Accountability Capacity	0	40.2
Slight Electoral Accountability Capacity	0.1 to 2.9	18.9
Moderate Electoral Accountability Capacity	3.0 to 4.9	11.9
High Electoral Accountability Capacity	5 and Above	29

Correlational analysis of electoral accountability index with land ownership, monthly income and educational level attained by heads of the households reveals that their correlation is robust and results are statistically significant. Results suggest that electoral accountability capacity of households is positively correlated with land ownership, monthly income and educational level attained by heads of the household. It means more the land ownership, monthly income or educational attainment of heads of the household more the accountability capacity of the households. It also finds that more the proximity of a village to the tehsil headquarter or main highway more the accountability capacity of

the households in the village. Therefore, villages close to the tehsil or district headquarters or main highway have relatively better or more accountability capacity than those situated in remote areas far away from tehsil headquarter or main highway (*see table 6.6 below*).

Table 6.6: Correlation of Electoral Accountability Index with Socio-economic Variables

Electoral Accountability Index	Educational Level Attained by Head of Household	Land Ownership of Household	Monthly Income of Household
Pearson Correlation	.267**	.361**	.424**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
N	396	396	396

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

These results from the correlations table below illustrate that more (socio-economically and politically) dependent a household the more clientelistic it is in its voting choices and less able to hold its vote bloc leader or member of legislative assembly (MLA) accountable. It illustrates that there is robust positive linear correlation between dependence of a household and its clientelistic voting choices whereas there is a robust negative linear correlation between dependence of a household and its capacity to hold its bloc leader or MLA accountable. Besides robust correlation its results are also statistically significant.

Table 6.7: Correlation between Dependence, Clientelistic Voting Choices and Accountability

		Composite Dependence Index	Client.Vot.Choic.2013. Index	Composite Accountability Index
Composite Dependence Index	Pearson Correlation	1	.633**	-.340**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
	N	396	396	396
Client.Vot.Choic.2013.Index	Pearson Correlation	.633**	1	-.202**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
	N	396	396	396
Composite Accountability Index	Pearson Correlation	-.340**	-.202**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
	N	396	396	396

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Findings presented, analysed and discussed above suggest that vote blocs in rural Punjab vote for a candidate in one election based on their expectation from him to deliver such goods and services. If he fails to deliver these goods and services they hold him accountable for this by denying voting for him in next election. This clientelistic voting behaviour of vote blocs generates electoral incentives and disincentives for members of legislative assemblies. The kind of incentives it generates for them is to focus on and provide patronage, private targeted goods and channel public resources and services through clientelistic networks. It sets disincentives for them to provide public goods, perform their legislative, executive oversight, constituency representation, constituency service functions, and pursue policies of growth and development. This kind of electoral incentives and disincentives distort electoral accountability and urge electoral candidates to keep relying on clientelism. It reciprocates and perpetuates clientelism. This is how perverse electoral accountability persists in rural Punjab.

## **Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **7.1. Introduction**

The prime objective of the study was to examine the modes of citizens-politician linkages in Pakistan. It has particularly sought to examine the clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages and its impact on electoral accountability in rural Punjab. Literature on the modes of citizen-politician linkages in rural Punjab has been inconclusive and offers various explanations in this regard. Nonetheless, recent psephology literature seems to have established that electoral politics in rural Punjab is dominated by clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages. The literature available on electoral accountability in Punjab examines the accountability structures and government responsiveness in terms of service delivery but it does not explore how different modes of citizen-politician linkages affect the accountability relationship between electors and the electorates. Given this context, the study has examined the clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages and its impact on electoral accountability in rural Punjab. The specific objectives of the study were:

1. To assess the extent to which electoral politics in rural Punjab is dominated by clientelism.
2. To examine the accountability pressures candidates for legislative assemblies (CLAs) face in rural Punjab.
3. To examine the strategies the CLAs employ to respond to accountability pressures that they face.

4. To assess the accountability capacity of rural electorates in Punjab.
5. To measure the impact of clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages on electoral accountability in rural Punjab.

The findings of the study support the view held by recent psephology literature that electoral politics in rural Punjab is dominated by clientelism and electorates there exchange their votes for targeted access to public resources and services. Findings suggest that electoral politics in rural Punjab is dominated by clientelism. The society is woven into patron-client relationships whereby targeted goods and services are exchanged for electoral support. It is under these institutional constraints that electorates make their voting choices. They vote in reciprocity or expectation of such targeted goods and services. Such voting choices of the electorates generate incentives and disincentives for members of legislative assemblies (MLAs). The kind of incentives it sets for MLAs is to provide patronage and targeted goods and services while in office to get them re-elected. On the other hand it sets disincentives for them to provide public goods and perform their officially expected duties such as constituency representation, legislation, and oversight etc. This on the one hand undermines the accountability relationship between electors and the electorates while on the other hand it urges them to keep relying on clientelistic linkages for re-election, which reinforces and perpetuates clientelism. The study suggests that this vicious cycle needs to be broken to enable the country to make transition from clientelistic or patronage democracy to popular democracy.

The empirical findings with respect to each of the objective are briefly mentioned below.

***1. The extent to which electoral politics in rural Punjab is dominated by clientelism***

Significant majority of the households in rural Punjab are bloc voters. They are dependent on informal local government institutions (vote bloc leaders) for access to social and public resources and services. They participate in and vote as member of a vote bloc on clientelistic basis i.e. they exchange their vote for certain targeted goods and services.

***2. The accountability pressures candidates for legislative assemblies (CLAs) face in rural Punjab***

Results of the study suggest that voters attempt to hold candidates responsible for the provision of targeted goods and services such as: jobs for their children, settlement of their disputes, getting them released from police station, getting an FIR registered against someone, to get their inflated bills corrected, and helping them in other problems at WAPDA office, revenue office, or any other government organization. Voters quit supporting those candidates who do not or are no more able to provide such targeted goods and services.

***3. The strategies CLAs employ to respond to accountability pressures that they face***

Findings of the study suggest that the electoral promises which CLAs make and the kind of benefits they deliver to gain or retain their electoral support are in response to the demands they face and for which they are held accountable. The study also find that the focus of CLAs in response to the accountability pressures they face is more upon delivering targeted goods and services as they have high rate of return in terms of getting elected.

***4. The accountability capacity of rural electorates in Punjab***

Analysis of the electoral accountability index suggests that majority of the households do not have the capacity required to hold their vote bloc leaders or electoral candidates accountable. It implies that electoral accountability in rural Punjab has very limited capacity to constrain the behaviour of electoral candidates or members of legislative assembly.

***5. The impact of clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages on electoral accountability in rural Punjab***

Findings from the correlation analysis suggest that in rural Punjab the more dependent a household the more clientelistic it is in its voting choices and is less able to hold its vote bloc leader or member of legislative assembly (MLA) accountable. This suggests that clientelistic mode of citizen politician linkages undermines electoral accountability in rural Punjab.

## **7.2. Theoretical Implications**

The theoretical cases of electoral accountability in rural Punjab need to be revisited and looked from the perspective of modes of citizen-politician linkages and their impact on the accountability relationship between electors and the electorates to further understand the dynamics of electoral accountability and democratic good governance in the country.

Recent Psephology literature establishes the view that electoral politics in rural Punjab is dominated by clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages. The findings of this study are consistent and support this view with empirical evidence from another district of the Punjab province. The study not only validates this view but also enhances the understanding of the dynamics of electoral politics and modes of citizen-politician linkages in rural Punjab.

The literature available on electoral accountability in rural Punjab examines accountability structures and government responsiveness in terms of service delivery but it does not explore how different modes of citizen-politician linkages affect the accountability relationship between electors and the electorates. Given this context, the study has examined the clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages and its impact on electoral accountability in rural Punjab. In this way, the study presents another theoretical approach to study the subject and deepens our understanding of the dynamics of electoral accountability in rural Punjab. It also develops a theoretical framework which is useful to analyse and explain the relationship between clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages and electoral accountability. Thus, it provides useful insights and grounds for further studies in the field.

### **7.3. Policy Implications**

In Pakistan, rigging in general elections of 2013 has been alleged. Electoral reforms are being debated to make the electoral process free, fair and transparent. The demand for reforms is meant to ensure that will of the people is not defeated and that they can hold the members of legislative assemblies or political parties accountable through their vote. Nonetheless, the reforms being debated tend to concentrate on the formal institution of elections, its rules and procedures. These reform efforts ignore the informal institutions of clientelism and patrimonialism, which are key contributors to stifling popular participation, subversion of the rule of law, distorting the delivery of public services, discouraging investment and undermining economic progress. If electoral reform efforts do not address these informal institutions the ideals of popular participation, free expression of the will of the people, accountability of the electors and democratic good governance in the country cannot be realized. Reforming these informal institutions will serve as the key contributor in enabling the country to make transition from clientelistic or patronage democracy to the popular democracy. It will set the country on the path to democratization and good governance.

### **7.4. Policy Recommendations**

Based on the findings of the study I make following recommendations for the policy makers to deal with the issue.

1. State needs to focus on the provision of basic services on universal basis to minimize dependence of the electorates for such resources and services. If this happens, the electorates will not have to exchange their vote for such resources

and services. This will reduce their dependence, make them less clientelistic and increase their accountability capacity to hold their members of legislative assemblies accountable.

2. Campaigns meant to make the voter better aware need to be undertaken.
3. Political parties need to develop their organizational structure at the grass root level to establish direct linkages with the electorates instead of through vote bloc leaders.
4. A ban should be imposed on allocation of constituency development funds to the members of legislative assemblies. These funds are discretionary and targeted for political bargains. It promotes politics of exclusion and the kind of development which is not inclusive in nature.
5. Local government system should be in place and the development funds currently being allocated to members of legislative assemblies should instead be routed through the local governments. Their allocation and spending should be subject to the rule of law. This will minimize the abuse of such funds for political gains.
6. A ban should also be imposed on discretionary allocation of offices such as chairman *Zakat* committee, and chairman market committee etc. Such discretionary allocation of offices is used as bargaining chip by political parties and candidates for political deals.
7. Transfers of public sector employees should be subject to the rule of Law. Politics of transfers is also used to buy political favours. Public servants who supported the candidate or political party in the power get postings of their choice while opponents are punished with non-desired postings.

## **7.5. The Way Forward**

The scope of debate on clientelism is very wide and multifaceted. To generate a pragmatic policy aimed at reducing clientelism and promoting electoral accountability in the country, there is need for more case studies at the local level to allow further assessment of local dimensions of the subject. Exploring the following would help:

1. The theoretical model suggested by the study may be used to examine other rural settings across the country.
2. A comprehensive study with the sample representative of the entire province would prove useful.
3. There is also need to investigate the impact of clientelistic mode of citizen-politician linkages on service delivery in the villages.
4. Examining the role of public finance of political parties in reducing clientelism may also be useful in this regard.

## References

- Adsera, A., Boix, C., & Payne, M. (2003). Are you being served? Political accountability and quality of government. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 19(2), 445-490.
- Ahmad, S. (1973). Peasant classes in Pakistan. *Imperialism and revolution in South Asia*, 203-221.
- Ahmad, S. (1977). *Class and power in a Punjabi village*: Monthly Review Pr.
- Ahmed, A., Fatima, Z., Hussain, S., & Farooq, H. (2014). Gender and Voting Behavior: A Study of Biradari Based Politics of Punjab. *European Academic Research*, II(8).
- Ahmed, M. (2007). Role of Biradari in Punjab Politics. *The Journal of Research (Humanities)*, 27, 15-22.
- Ahmed, M. (2008). Voting Behaviour in Rural and Urban Areas of Punjab. *Journal of Political Studies*, 14(1).
- Ahmed, M. (2009). Local-Bodies or Local Biradari System: An Analysis of the Role of Biradarries in the Local Bodies System of the Punjab. *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, 30(1).
- Ahmed, M., & Naseem, F. (2011). Social system influences Political System-A comparative study of sub-continent. *Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences*, 1(1), 1-10.
- Alavi, H. (1971). The politics of dependence: a village in West Punjab. *South Asian Review*, 4(2), 111-128.
- Alavi, H. (1972). Kinship in west Punjab villages. *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 6(1), 1-27.
- Alavi, H. (1973). Peasant classes and primordial loyalties. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 1(1), 23-62.
- Alavi, H. (1983). Class and state. *Pakistan: The roots of dictatorship*, 40-93.
- Anello, E. (2008). A framework for good governance in the public pharmaceutical sector. *World Health Organization, Department of Medicines Policy and Standards, Geneva*.
- Antunes, R. (2010). Theoretical models of voting behaviour. *Exedra*, 4, 145-170.
- Ashworth, S. (2012). Electoral accountability: recent theoretical and empirical work. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15, 183-201.
- Asim, M. (2012). Voting Behavior of People Towards Different Political Parties in District Faisalabad, Pakistan. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 85.
- Bamberger, M. (2000). *Integrating quantitative and qualitative research in development projects*: World Bank Publications.

- Bank, A. D. (2004). *Governance: sound development management*: Asian Development Bank.
- Bank, W. (1992). *Governance and development*. Washington DC: The World Bank.
- Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Goldsmith, A. A. (2002). Clientelism, patrimonialism and democratic governance: An overview and framework for assessment and programming. *Abt Associates prepared for USAID (Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates, 2002)*. [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/Pnacr426.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacr426.pdf).
- Bruso, V., Nazareno, M., & Stokes, S. (2001). *Clientelism and Democracy: An Analysis of Ecological Data from Argentina*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, occurred at San Francisco, in September.
- Callen, M. J., Gulzar, S., Hasanain, A., & Khan, M. Y. (2013). The Political Economy of Public Employee Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan. *Available at SSRN 2316245*.
- Chaudhry, A. G., Ahmed, A., Khan, S. E., & Hussain, S. (2014). Perception of Local Community and Biradari on Panchayat: an Exploratory Anthropological Study of Biradari in Village Saroki, District Gujranwala, Pakistan. *Advances in Anthropology, 2014*.
- Cheema, A., & Mohmand, S. K. (2006). Bringing electoral politics to the doorstep: Who gains who loses. *Lahore University of Management Sciences*.(Mimeographed).
- CIDA. (2008). Guide to Key Concepts in Governance and Development: Canadian International Development Agency, Canada.
- Dalton, R. J., & Klingemann, H.-D. (2007). *Oxford handbook of political behavior*: Oxford Handbooks Online.
- Easterly, W. (2003). The political economy of growth without development. *In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*, 439.
- Fatton, R. (1986). Clientelism and patronage in Senegal. *African Studies Review*, 29(4), 61-78.
- Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2009). Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from the audits of local governments: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Gazdar, H. (2000). State, community, and universal education: A political economy of public schooling in rural Pakistan. *Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics*.
- Gulzar, S. (2014). Ruling Parties, Bureaucratic Performance and Service Delivery in Democracies. *Unpublished manuscript*, New York University.
- Hasnain, Z. (2008). The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 129-151.
- Hasnain, Z. (2010). Devolution, Accountability, and Service Delivery in Pakistan. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 129-152.

- Hopkin, J. (2006). *Conceptualizing political clientelism: Political exchange and democratic theory*. Paper presented at the APSA annual meeting, Philadelphia.
- Husain, I. (1999). *Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State*: Oxford University Press.
- IFAD. (1999). Good Governance: An Overview. Retrieved from International Fund for Agricultural Development website: <http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/67/e/EB-99-67-INF-4.pdf>
- Inayatullah. (1963). Perspectives in the rural power structure in West Pakistan *People and Society Series*. Karachi: USAID Development Research and Evaluation Group.
- Javaid, U., & Elahi, U. (2014). Patterns of Political Perceptions, Attitudes and Voting Behaviour: Influence of Media. *South Asian Studies*, 29, 2.
- Jones, D. S. (2007). Elections and Voting. In N. O. M. Sekiguchi (Ed.), *Government and Politics, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems* (Vol. 1, pp. 308-326): United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
- Joy, L. (2000). Governance for sustainable growth and equity, Report of the International Conference, United Nations, New York, 28–30 July 1997. *Public Administration and Development*, 20(1), 78-79.
- Keefer, P., Narayan, A., & Vishwanath, T. (2003). The Political Economy of Decentralization in Pakistan. *Development Research Group, World Bank, Washington, DC Processed*.
- Keefer, P. E., Narayan, A., & Vishwanath, T. (2005). Decentralization in Pakistan: Are Local Politicians Likely to Be More Accountable: Working Paper.
- Keefer, P. E., Narayan, A., & Vishwanath, T. (2006). Decentralization in Pakistan: are local governments likely to be more accountable than the central government. *Decentralization and local governance in developing countries: a comparative perspective*, 285-303.
- Khan, F. K., & Musarrat, R. (2014). Electoral Politics in Pakistan (Elections 2013): A Case Study of District Muzaffar Garh. *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, 4(4), Pages 79-99.
- Khan, S. (2012). *The Un-official Performance of Official Business in Pakistan: The Interface with State Bureaucracy and Citizens*. (PhD), University of Bath.
- Khan, S., Yasin, F., Kakakhel, S., & Sohaib, M. (2013). The Dynamics of Access: Implications of ‘Voice’, ‘Exit’ and Accountability in the Provision of Public Goods. *Working Paper, Sustainable Development Policy Institute*.
- Kitschelt, H. (2010). Democratic Accountability Relations: Exploring Global Patterns. *Unpublished manuscript, Duke University*.
- Kitschelt, H., Freeze, K., Kolev, K., & Wang, Y.-T. (2009). Measuring democratic accountability: an initial report on an emerging data set. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 29(3), 741-773.

- Kitschelt, H., & Palmer, D. (2009). Expert Survey on Citizen-Politician Linkages Initial Findings for Pakistan in Comparative Context. *Durham, Duke University*.
- Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. I. (2007). *Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*: Cambridge University Press.
- Lindberg, S. I. (2009). Accountability: the core concept and its subtypes. *Africa Power and Politics Programme Working Paper, 1*.
- Mohmand, S. K. (2011). *Patrons, brothers and landlords: Competing for the vote in Rural Pakistan*. University of Sussex.
- Mohmand, S. K. (2014). Losing the connection: party-voter linkages in Pakistan. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 52*(1), 7-31.
- Mohmand, S. K., & Cheema, A. (2007). Accountability failures and the decentralisation of service delivery in Pakistan. *IDS Bulletin, 38*(1), 45-59.
- Patnam, M. (2009). Power, Politics and Public Good Provision: Understanding Institutional Persistence in Rural Punjab: Working Paper, Cambridge University.
- Robinson, J. B. (2008). *Measuring Political Clientelism: The Systematic Qualitative Method*. Rice University.
- Sarlamanov, D. D. K., & Jovanoski, D. D. A. (2014). MODELS OF VOTING. *Journal of Arts, Science & Commerce, V*(I).
- Schedler, A. (1999). Conceptualizing accountability. *The self-restraining state: Power and accountability in new democracies, 13-28*.
- Schedler, A., & Plattner, M. F. (1999). *The self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies*: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Shami, M. (2010). *The road to development: market access and varieties of clientelism in rural Punjab, Pakistan*. The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
- Tariq, S., & Alamgir, M. (2013). Impacts of Biradarism on the Politics of Punjab: A Case Study of District Khanewal. *Pakistan Vision, 14*(2).
- Toka, G. (2008). Citizen information, election outcomes and good governance. *Electoral Studies, 27*(1), 31-44.
- Turska-Kawa, A., & Wojtasik, W. (2013). Communication function of elections. *Communication Today, 1*(2013), 36-47.
- UNDP. (1997). *Governance for Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document*: United Nations Development Programme.
- UNESCAP. (2006). What is Good Governance? Retrieved from United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific website: <http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf>
- Unsworth, S. (2010). *An Upside Down View of Governance*: Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex.

- Volintiru, C. (2010). *Clientelism and Democratic Accountability*. Paper presented at the Political Studies Association Graduate Network Conference.
- Warwick, D. P., & Lininger, C. A. (1975). *The sample survey: Theory and practice*: McGraw-Hill.
- Waseem, M. (1994). *The 1993 elections in Pakistan*: Vanguard.
- Waseem, M. (2006). *Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections*: Oxford University Press, USA.
- Wilder, A. (1999). *The Pakistani voter: Electoral politics and voting behaviour in the Punjab*: Oxford University Press.
- Zaidi, S. A. (2005). State, military and social transition: Improbable future of democracy in Pakistan. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 5173-5181.

## ANNEXTURES

### ANNEXTURE-I: INDICES CONSTRUCTION METHODOLOGY

The detailed methodology through which I developed indices for correlational analysis is discussed as under.

#### Composite Dependence Index

Composite dependence index (CDI) is the aggregate socio-economic and political dependence score of the households. I construct this index based on the responses of the households against following questions.

Following five questions were taken as measures of socio-economic dependence. These were Q1, Q3, Q6, Q7 and Q8. Moreover the following three questions were taken as measures of political dependence (mediated access to state resources and services). These were Q21, Q22 and Q23.

The responses of these eight questions were assigned weighted values. The weights were assigned based on the principal that more the degree of socio-economic or political dependence the more the weight it should enjoy. The values assigned to the responses of each question are indicated below.

**Q1.** What property rights does your household have on land of your house?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Proprietor/owner	0
Rentee/tenant	1
Living at a landlord's/relative's land without paying any rent	2
Other	0

**Q3.** What is the primary source of livelihood of your household?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Agricultural Land	0
Tenant Farming	1
Artisan Labour (off-farm skilled manual labour in the village e.g. Kammi: barber, blacksmith, cobbler etc.)	2
Domestic/Agricultural Labour (on and off farm unskilled manual labour e.g. Musalli: Muslim Sheikhs etc.)	3
Govt. Job	0
Private Job (non-agriculture related job at some private organization or enterprise)	0
Self-employment (e.g. hawker, vendor, shop keeper, house based small enterprise)	0
Business	0
Other	0

**Q6.** In time of some trouble whom do you ask for financial help or loan?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Someone from you biradari	1
Friend	1
Some zamindar from village	2
Vote bloc leader	2
Chaudhry/influential/head of the village	2
Politician/MP/electoral candidate	2
Private institution	0
Government institution	0
None	0

**Q7.** In case of any dispute, clash or social problem whom do you ask for resolution?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Village panchayat	1
Someone from your biradari	1
Friend	2
Some zamindar from village	2
Vote bloc leader	2
Chaudhry/influential/head of the village	2
Politician/MP/electoral candidate	0
Government institution	0
None	0

**Q8.** In case of theft, robbery, or deception in transaction whom do you ask for help or settlement?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Village panchayat	1
Someone from your biradari	1
Friend	2
Some zamindar from village	2
Vote bloc leader	2
Chaudhry/influential/head of the village	2
Politician/MP/electoral candidate	0
Government institution	0
None	0

**Q21.** If you have any problem or case in a court or a police station, whom do you ask for help?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Someone from your biradri	1
Friend	1
Some zamindar from village	2
Vote bloc leader	2
Chaudhry/influential/head of the village	2
Politician/MP/electoral candidate	2
Directly go to police station or court without seeking help from anyone	0
Other	0

**Q22.** If you need to get your work done in any other government organization, whom do you ask for help?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Someone from your biradri	1
Friend	1
Some zamindar from village	2
Vote bloc leader	2
Chaudhry/influential/head of the village	2
Politician/MP/electoral candidate	2
Self	0
Other	0

**Q23.** To whom do you ask for help to get public goods (e.g. jobs, loans, subsidies, medicines, and food)?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Someone from your biradri	1
Friend	1
Some zamindar from village	2
Vote bloc leader	2
Chaudhry/influential/head of the village	2
Politician/MP/electoral candidate	2
Self	0
Other	0

After assigning weighted values the score of the households against each question is obtained. Next the score of the households against all eight questions is aggregated, as indicated above, to get a composite score of the households which I call the Composite Dependence Index (CDI). It is demonstrated in the following:

$$CDI = \text{SUM} (Q1, Q3, Q6, Q7, Q8, Q21, Q22, Q23)$$

## Clientelistic Voting Choices Index

To develop the clientelistic voting choices index (CVCI), first of all I develop the following four indices.

1. MPA.2008.CVCI
2. MNA.2008.CVCI
3. MPA.2013.CVCI
4. MNA.2013.CVCI

MPA.2008.CVCI and MNA.2008.CVCI are developed based on the responses of the households for questions related to their voting choices in general elections of 2008 for the candidates of provincial and national assembly respectively. MPA.2013.CVCI and MNA.2013.CVCI are developed based on the responses of the households for questions related to their voting choices in general elections of 2013 for the candidates of provincial and national assembly respectively.

Each of the four above mentioned indices have been developed based on the following questions.

### MPA.2008.CVCI

Q11.MPA, Q30.2008, Q35.MPA, Q42.2008, Q44.MPA, Q49,  
Q50.MPA, Q51, Q53, Q56

### MNA.2008.CVCI

Q11.MNA, Q30.2008, Q35.MNA, Q42.2008, Q44.MNA, Q49,  
Q50.MNA, Q51, Q53, Q56

### MPA.2013.CVCI

Q15.MPA, Q30.2013, Q37.MPA, Q42.2013, Q46.MPA, Q49,  
Q50.MPA, Q52, Q54, Q59

### MNA.2013.CVCI

Q15.MNA, Q30.2013, Q37.MNA, Q42.2013, Q46.MNA, Q49,  
Q50.MNA, Q52, Q54, Q59

The responses of the above mentioned questions were assigned weighted values for construction of the indices mentioned earlier. The weights were assigned based on the degree to which voting choices of the households are clientelistic in nature (meaning thereby that their voting choices reflect the exchange of electoral support for private targeted goods and services). More the degree of clientelistic voting choices a response

represents more the weight it is assigned. The values assigned to the responses of each question are indicated below. As methodology for the construction of the four indices, questions included and weights assigned are similar therefore I explain below the construction of only one of the four indices viz. MPA.2008.CVCI. The questions included and weights assigned in construction of MPA.2008.CVCI are indicated below.

**Q11.** At whose wish did your household vote these candidates in 2008 general elections?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Someone from your biradari	1
Friend	1
Some zamindar from village	2
Vote bloc leader	2
Chaudhry/influential/head of the village	2
Candidate	2
None	0
Don't know	0
Other	0
Due to fear of sanctions from candidate, VBL, influential person or some zamindar of the village	2
Because he was ally of our favoured candidate	2
Due to socio-economic dependence of the household on the candidate/VBL/zamindar	2

**Q30.** On what basis did your household participated in or voted as members of a vote block in general elections?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Access to certain benefits (owned by the patron/vote block leader)	3
Access to state resources (e.g. access to police and court, subsidies, jobs, cash transfers etc.)	3
Biradari	0
Biradari led alliance	2
Extended family	0
Religion (including peeri-mureedi)	0
Dependence on landlord	2
Fear of violence or sanctions from village head	2
Neighbourhood	0
Political party	0
Occupational group	0
Don't know	0
Other	0
Option 1 & option 2	3

**Q35.** On what basis did your block vote to these candidates in 2008 general elections?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Access to certain benefits	3
Access to state resources	3
Biradari	0
Biradari led alliance	2
Political party	0
Don't know	0
Other	0
Voted this candidate because he had alliance with the candidate that you supported	1

**Q42.** Why did your household not vote as member of a vote block?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Did not want to become part of any alliance	0
Vote buying (directly voted to the candidate in reciprocity of pay-offs received from him)	2
Patronage (directly voted to the candidate in reciprocity or expectation of benefits and favours received from him)	2
Tribute/Traditional clientelism (directly voted to the candidate because household is socio-economically dependent on the candidate)	3
Political party (voted on the basis of a political party instead of as members of a vote block)	0
Family terms/friendship with the candidate	0
Same biradari/ethnicity/sectarian group	0
Don't know	0
Other	0
Due to fear of sanctions from the candidate or his agents	3
Proximity (candidate resides in or close to your village)	1
Voted to the candidate due to his promise to improve public services in the village	0

**Q44.** On what basis did your household vote for these candidates in 2008 general elections?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Access to certain benefits	3
Access to state resources	3
Biradari	0
Biradari led alliance	2
Political party	0
Don't know	0
Other	0
Voted this candidate because he had alliance with the candidate you supported	1
Due to fear of sanctions from the candidate or his agents	3
Good relations/friendship with the candidate	0

**Q49.** What are your expectations from your block leader?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Help you in time of need (e.g. financial help, loan, settlement of dispute and other social problems etc.)	3
Help you in matters of police station and court	2
Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (e.g. subsidies, loans, access to government schemes, cash transfers, jobs, housing, health etc.)	2
Improve public services in the village (e.g. health, education, roads, water and sanitation etc.)	0
None (vote at the wish of the block leader without any expectations from him)	0
Don't know	0
Other	0
Option 1 & option 2	3
Option 1 & option 4	3
Option 1, option 2 & option 4	3

**Q50.** What are your expectations from your MLAs/electoral candidates?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Help you in time of need (financial help, loan, settlement of disputes)	3
Help you in matters of police station and court	2
Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (state resources and services)	2
Improve public services in the constituency	0
Delivery of development projects in the constituency	0
Good performance	0
Pursue policies of the party	0
None (voted candidate without any expectations from him)	0
Don't know	0
Other	0
Option 1 & option 2	3
Option 1 & option 4	3

**Q51.** What electoral promises were made by your vote block leader in 2008 general elections?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Help you in time of need (financial help, loan, settlement of disputes)	3
Help you in matters of police station and court	2
Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (state resources and services)	2
All of the above (1 to 3)	3
Delivery of development projects in the village	0
Improve public services in the village	0
Pursue policies of the party and deliver as per manifesto of the party	0
Don't know	0
Other	0
Option 1 & option 2	3
Option 1 & option 4	3

**Q53.** What electoral promises were made by your electoral candidate in 2008 general elections?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Help you in time of need (financial help, loan, settlement of disputes)	3
Help you in matters of police station and court	2
Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (state resources and services)	2
All of the above (1 to 3)	3
Delivery of development projects in the village	0
Improve public services in the village	0
Pursue policies of the party and deliver as per manifesto of the party	0
Don't know	0
Other	0
Option 1 & option 4	3
Option 2 & option 4	3
Option 3 & option 4	3

**Q56.** If yes then how did it impact your vote choice?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Wanted to vote some other candidate but voted this candidate	3
Were already supporters of this candidate but perhaps we might not go to polling station to cast our vote	3
Handed over your CNIC to agents/supporters of this candidate (or wanted to vote someone else but did not vote due to it)	3
We were not interested to vote anyone but voted this candidate due it	3
We must have voted to this candidate even without getting all this	3
After getting this voted someone else	0
Don't know	0

After assigning the weighted values the score of the households against each question is obtained. Next the score of the households against all the indicators or questions is aggregated which constitute each index. I demonstrate this in the following:

$$\text{MPA.2008.CVCI} = \text{SUM} (\text{Q11.MPA}, \text{Q30.2008}, \text{Q35.MPA}, \text{Q42.2008}, \text{Q44.MPA}, \\ \text{Q49}, \text{Q50.MPA}, \text{Q51}, \text{Q53}, \text{Q56})$$

After developing the aforementioned four indices, I calculate the mean score of the households on all these four indices. This generates a new variable to which I name as Clientelistic Voting Choices Index (CVCI). It is demonstrated in the following:

$$\text{CVCI} = \text{Mean} (\text{MPA.2008.CVCI}, \text{MNA.2008.CVCI}, \text{MPA.2013.CVCI}, \\ \text{MNA.2013.CVCI})$$

## Electoral Accountability Index

I develop electoral accountability index based on the responses to the following ten questions. Five of these are questions asked from bloc voters whereas the rest of the five questions were asked from non-bloc voters. Bloc voter questions are: Q65, Q67, Q69, Q71, and Q73. Non-bloc voter questions are: Q66, Q68, Q70, Q72, and Q74.

The responses of these ten questions were assigned weighted values for construction of the electoral accountability index. The weights were assigned to questions ranging from Q65 to Q72 based on the degree of capacity of the households to hold their vote bloc leaders/electoral candidates/members of legislative assembly accountable by requiring them to inform and justify their actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability and sanction them in case of failure to do so, eventual misconduct or poor performance. If they can require them to inform and justify with it I assign their each 'yes' response the weighted value of 1. If it is otherwise, I assign them weighted value of 0. The values assigned to the responses of each question were as indicated under.

However, weights were assigned to the questions Q73 and Q74 based on the principal that in case of failure of vote bloc leaders or electoral candidates to justify their actions and decisions with regard to their domain of accountability, weather households can sanction them or not. In such cases households' ability to sanction them determines the weight of the response. More the ability of the households to sanction their vote bloc leader/electoral candidate more the score assigned.

**Q65.** Do you require your vote block leader to inform you about his past or future actions and decisions with regard to his promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Yes	1
No	0
Don't know	Missing value

**Q66.** Do you require your MLAs/electoral candidates to inform you about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Yes	1
No	0
Don't know	Missing value

**Q67.** Does your vote block leader inform you about his past or future actions and decisions with regard to his promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Yes	1
No	0
Don't know	Missing value

**Q68.** Do your MPs/electoral candidates inform you about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Yes	1
No	0
Don't know	Missing value

**Q69.** Do you require your vote block leader to justify his past or future actions and decisions with regard to his promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Yes	1
No	0
Don't know	Missing value

See footnote of Table-AC

**Q70.** Do you require your MPs/electoral candidates to justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Yes	1
No	0
Don't know	Missing value

**Q71.** Does your vote block leader justify his past or future actions and decisions with regard to his promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Yes	1
No	0
Don't know	Missing value

**Q72.** Do your MPs/electoral candidates justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Yes	1
No	0
Don't know	Missing value

**Q73.** What do you (if voted as block member) do if your vote block leader does not fulfill his promises or your demands, violates his duties or fails to inform or justify his decisions with regard to his responsibility?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Quit that vote block and join other vote block	2
Quit that vote block and form a new vote block	2
Deny voting to or at the will of that vote block leader	2
Mobilize block members to change block leader	2
Express dissatisfaction or register your protest against VBL in front of other block members	1
Have no choice except to follow that vote block leader	0
Do nothing	0
Don't know	Missing value

**Q74.** What do you (if not voted as block member) do if your MP/electoral candidate does not fulfill his promises or your demands, violates his duties or fails to inform or justify his decisions with regard to his responsibility?

Response Description	Assigned Value
Quit supporting him	2
Do not vote him in next elections	2
Express your dissatisfaction or register your protest with him	1
Keep supporting him even in next elections	0
Do nothing	0
Don't know	Missing value

After assigning weighted values the score of the households for each question is obtained. Next I summed up the score against all questions to develop an aggregate score of the households for all the ten indicators or questions mentioned above. I call this aggregate value the 'electoral accountability index' (EAI). It is demonstrated in the following:

$$EAI = \text{SUM} (Q65, Q66, Q67, Q68, Q69, Q70, Q71, Q72, Q73, Q74)$$

## Questionnaire for Household Survey

Questionnaire # \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Tehsil		Code	
Union Council		Code	
Village		Code	

Did any of your household members vote?	
1. Yes, voted both in 2008 and 2013 general elections	Proceed the interview with next questions by asking questions related to 2008 as well as 2013 general elections
2. Yes, voted only in 2008 general elections	Proceed the interview with next questions but do not ask questions related to 2013 general elections
3. Yes, voted only in 2013 general elections	Proceed the interview with next questions but do not ask questions related to 2008 general elections
4. No, neither voted in 2008 nor in 2013 general elections	Do not proceed interview with this household and move to the household next to it to fill this questionnaire.

Name of the respondent: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Optional)Gender: \_\_\_\_\_  
(1=Male, 2=Female)Age of the respondent: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Years)Relationship with HHH: \_\_\_\_\_  
(See codes below)Name of the HHH: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Optional)Gender of HHH: \_\_\_\_\_  
(1=Male, 2=Female)Age of the HHH: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Years)Educational level of HHH: \_\_\_\_\_  
(See codes below)

Total number of household members: \_\_\_\_\_

Land ownership of HH: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Number of Acres)Caste/Biraderi: \_\_\_\_\_  
(See codes below)Phone # \_\_\_\_\_  
(Optional)

Codes for Castes or Biraderis	Codes for Educational Level	Codes for Relationship with HHH
1= Jatt      8= Taili      15= Julaha    22= Other (specify)	1= < Primary Class    7= Graduate	1= Head (self)      7= Sister/brother
2= Rajput    9= Naae      16= Lohar	2= Primary Class      8= Postgraduate	2= Wife/husband    8= Son/daughter in law
3= Arain    10= Cheemba    17= Tarkhan	3= Middle Class      9= Doctorate	3= Son/daughter    9= Brother/sister in law
4= Kambo    11= Dogar      18= Sunar	4= Matric              10= Post doctorate	4= Grandchild      10= Grandfather/mother
5= Kumhar    12= Shaikh    19= Malik	5= Intermediate	5= Niece/nephew    11= Father/mother in law
6= Mochi    13= Syed      20= Bhatti	6= Undergraduate	6= Father/mother    12= Other relative
7= Miwati    14= Ansari    21= Rana		

**Q1.** What property rights does your household have on land of your house?

1. Proprietor/Owner
2. Rentee/Tenant
3. Living at a landlord's/Relative's land without paying any rent
4. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q2.** What is the type of the housing structure of the household?

1. Brick house
2. Mud house

**Q3.** What is the primary source of livelihood of your household?

1. Agricultural Land (household's livelihood mainly come through rent and or farming on their own land)
2. Tenant Farming (household's livelihood mainly come through raising crops on land rented from a landlord)
3. Artisan Labour (off-farm skilled manual labour in the village e.g. Kammi: barber, blacksmith, cobbler etc.)
4. Domestic/Agricultural Labour (on and off farm unskilled manual labour e.g. Musalli: Muslim Sheikhs etc.)
5. Govt. Job
6. Private Job (non-agriculture related job at some private organization or enterprise)
7. Self-employment (e.g. hawker, vendor, shop keeper, house based small enterprise)
8. Business
9. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q4.** How much is the monthly income of your household?

1. Less than or equal to 8,000 Rupees
2. More than 8,000 but less than 15,000 Rupees
3. 15,000 to 30,000 Rupees
4. More than 30,000 Rupees

**Q5.** What is your occupational Qoum?

1. Zamindar (farmer)
2. Kammi (artisan labour)
3. Musalli (unskilled domestic or agricultural labour)

**Q6.** In time of some trouble whom do you ask for financial help or loan?

1. Someone from your Biradri
2. Friend
3. Some Zamindar from village
4. Vote block leader
5. Chaudhry/influential/head of village
6. Politician/MP/electoral candidate
7. Private Institution
8. Government Institution
9. None
10. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q7.** In case of any dispute, clash or social problem whom do you ask for resolution?

1. Village Panchayat
2. Someone from your Biradri
3. Friend
4. Some Zamindar from village
5. Vote block leader
6. Chaudhry/influential/head of village
7. Politician/MP/electoral candidate
8. Government Institution
9. None
10. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q8.** In case of theft, robbery, or deception in transaction whom do you ask for help or settlement?

1. Village Panchayat
2. Someone from your Biradri
3. Friend
4. Some Zamindar from village
5. Vote block leader
6. Chaudhry/influential/head of village
7. Politician/MP/electoral candidate
8. Government Institution
9. None
10. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q9.** In the last ten years, how often did you or any of your household members contacted the above mentioned person or institution for financial help or loan, resolution of dispute or social problem, and settlement of matters like theft, robbery or deception in transaction?

1. Never
2. Once
3. Sometimes
4. Often
5. Don't know

**Q10.** To whom did your household vote in 2008 general elections?

**GQ.2008**

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_ MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q11.** At whose wish did your household vote these candidates in 2008 general elections?

**GQ.2008**

1. Someone from your Biradri
2. Friend
3. Some Zamindar from village
4. Vote block leader
5. Chaudhry/influential/head of village
6. Candidate
7. None
8. Don't know
9. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q12.** Did all of your household members vote to the same set of candidates in 2008 general elections? **GQ.2008**

1. Yes
2. No

**Q13.** Why some members of your household voted to different set of candidates in 2008 general elections? **GQ.2008**

1. Annoyance between household members
2. Household had family terms or friendship with more than one candidate contesting for the same seat
3. Household was supporter of one candidate but some household members voted to another candidate in reciprocity or expectation of benefits or favours received from him
4. To maximize the chances of provision of benefits and favours to the household
5. Don't know
6. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q14.** To whom did your household vote in 2013 general elections? **GQ.2013**

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_ MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q15.** At whose wish did your household vote these candidates in 2013 general elections? **GQ.2013**

1. Someone from your Biradri
2. Friend
3. Some Zamindar from village
4. Vote block leader
5. Chaudhry/influential/head of village
6. Candidate
7. None
8. Don't know
9. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q16.** Did all of your household members vote to the same set of candidates in 2013 general elections? **GQ.2013**

1. Yes
2. No

**Q17.** Why some members of your household voted to different set of candidates in 2013 general elections? **GQ.2013**

1. Annoyance between household members
2. Household had family terms or friendship with more than one candidate contesting for the same seat
3. Household was supporter of one candidate but some household members voted to another candidate in reciprocity or expectation of benefits or favours received from him
4. To maximize the chances of provision of benefits and favours to the household
5. Don't know
6. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q18.** In case if your household does not vote an electoral candidate or at the wish of a vote block leader/zamindar/chaudhry/influential of the village, in time of need, does he help you in aforementioned matters (e.g. financial help, loan, or settlements)?

1. Always
2. Sometimes
3. Very rare
4. Never
5. Don't know

**Q19.** If yes, then on what conditions do they help opponent voters?

1. Unconditionally help in such matters on humanitarian grounds
2. Unconditionally help in such matters but with implicit intention to get their loyalties and votes
3. Help in such matters with explicit condition to support and vote them or their favoured candidates in next elections
4. Don't know
5. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q20.** Do voters and supporters receive preferential treatment in provision of these benefits as compared to the opponents?

1. Always
2. Sometimes
3. Very rare
4. Never
5. Don't know

**Q21.** If you have any problem or case in a court or a police station, whom do you ask for help?

1. Someone from your Biradri
2. Friend
3. Some Zamindar from village
4. Vote block leader
5. Chaudhry/influential/head of village
6. Politician/MP/electoral candidate
7. Directly go to police station or court without seeking help from anyone
8. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q22.** If you need to get your work done in any other government organization, whom do you ask for help?

1. Someone from your Biradri
2. Friend
3. Some Zamindar from village
4. Vote block leader
5. Chaudhry/influential/head of village
6. Politician/MP/electoral candidate
7. Self
8. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q23.** To whom do you ask for help to get public goods (e.g. jobs, loans, subsidies, medicines, and food)?

1. Someone from your Biradri
2. Friend
3. Some Zamindar from village
4. Vote block leader
5. Chaudhry/influential/head of village
6. Politician/MP/electoral candidate
7. Self
8. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q24.** In the last ten years, how often did you or any of your household members contacted the above mentioned person for help in a case in court or police station?

1. Never
2. Once
3. Sometimes
4. Often
5. Don't know

**Q25.** In the last ten years, how often did you or any of your household members contact the above mentioned person for help to get the work done in a government organization or to get public goods (e.g. jobs, loans, subsidies, medicines, and food)?

1. Never
2. Once
3. Sometimes
4. Often
5. Don't know

**Q26.** In case if you do not vote an electoral candidate or at the wish of a vote block leader/zamindar/chaudhry/influential of the village, in time of need, does he provide or help you to get state resources and services (e.g. subsidies, jobs, loans, cash transfers, medicines, food, housing, access to police and court etc.)?

1. Always
2. Sometimes
3. Very rare
4. Never
5. Don't know

**Q27.** If yes, then on what conditions do they help opponent voters?

1. Unconditionally help in such matters on humanitarian grounds
2. Unconditionally help in such matters but with implicit intention to get their loyalties and votes
3. Help in such matters with explicit condition to support and vote them or their favoured candidates in next elections
4. Don't know
5. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q28.** Do voters and supporters receive preferential treatment in provision of these benefits as compared to the opponents?

1. Always
2. Sometimes
3. Very rare
4. Never
5. Don't know

**Q29.** Did your household vote as member of a vote block?

1. Yes, in 2008
2. Yes, in 2013
3. Yes, in 2008 and 2013
4. Neither in 2008 nor in 2013
5. Don't Know

**Q30.** On what basis did your household participated in or voted as members of a vote block in general elections? **BV**

1. Access to certain benefits (owned by the patron/vote block leader)
2. Access to state resources (e.g. access to police and court, subsidies, jobs, cash transfers etc.)
3. Biradri
4. Biradri led Alliance
5. Extended family
6. Religion (including peeri-mureedi)
7. Dependence on landlord
8. Fear of violence or sanctions from village head
9. Neighbourhood
10. Political party
11. Occupational group
12. Don't know
13. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

2008: \_\_\_\_\_

2013: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q31.** Name of your block leader: \_\_\_\_\_ **BV**

**Q32.** Why a particular person is head of your vote block? **BV**

1. Chaudhry
2. Head of the village
3. Largest landlord
4. Lambardar in the village
5. Local government officer
6. Family
7. Biraderi
8. Politically active and dynamic politician-candidate
9. Don't know
10. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**Q33.** Name, if any, of your vote block: \_\_\_\_\_

**BV**

**Q34.** To whom did your block vote in 2008 general elections?

**BV.2008**

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q35.** On what basis did your block vote to these candidates in 2008 general elections?

**BV.2008**

1. Access to certain benefits
2. Access to state resources
3. Biradri
4. Biradri led Alliance
5. Political party
6. Don't know
7. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q36.** To whom did your block vote in 2013 general elections?

**BV.2013**

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q37.** On what basis did your block vote to these candidates in 2013 general elections?

1. Access to certain benefits
2. Access to state resources
3. Biradri
4. Biradri led Alliance
5. Political party
6. Don't know
7. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q38.** On what basis your block leader is connected to these candidates?

**BV**

1. Election time strategic alliance (access to state resources)
2. Friends/classmates
3. Political party
4. Traditional cleintelism (block leader is socio-economically dependent on the candidate)
5. Same family
6. Vote block leader is the candidate himself
7. Religious devotion (sectarian voting, voting based on peeri-mureedi—saint-disciple relationship etc.)
8. Same occupational group
9. Same biraderi
10. Same ethnicity
11. Don't know
12. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

MPA (2008): \_\_\_\_\_

MNA (2008): \_\_\_\_\_

MPA (2013): \_\_\_\_\_

MNA (2013): \_\_\_\_\_

**Q39. Why did your block vote to the same candidates in 2008 and 2013 general elections? BV.2008+2013**

1. Candidate fulfilled his previous electoral promises with the block
2. Candidate came up to the expectations of the vote block
3. Election time strategic alliance (access to state resources)
4. Friends/classmates
5. Political party
6. Traditional clientelism (block leader is socio-economically dependent on the candidate)
7. Same family
8. Both times vote block leader was the candidate himself
9. Religious devotion (sectarian voting, voting based on peeri-mureedi— saint-disciple relationship etc.)
10. Same occupational group
11. Same biraderi
12. Same ethnicity
13. Don't know
14. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately. (Only write code of candidate which was found same for both elections while skip which was found different in two elections.)

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q40. Why did your block not vote to the same candidates in 2008 and 2013 general elections? BV.2008+2013**

1. Candidate did not fulfil his electoral promises
2. Candidate did not come up to the expectations of vote block
3. Some other candidate presented better offer of benefits
4. Candidate changed his political party affiliation
5. Political party gave ticket to another candidate
6. Election time strategic alliance changed
7. A new candidate contested in 2013 general elections with whom block leader had better relations
8. Poor performance of political party
9. Don't know
10. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately. (Only write code of candidate which was found same for both elections while skip which was found different in two elections.)

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q41. Can members participate in decisions of the vote block? BV**

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q42. Why did your household not vote as member of a vote block? NBV**

1. Did not want to become part of any alliance
2. Vote buying (directly voted to the candidate in reciprocity of pay-offs received from him)
3. Patronage (directly voted to the candidate in reciprocity or expectation of benefits and favours received from him)
4. Tribute/Traditional clientelism (directly voted to the candidate because household is socio-economically dependent on the candidate)
5. Political party (voted on the basis of a political party instead of as members of a vote block)
6. Family terms/friendship with the candidate
7. Same biraderi/ethnic/sectarian group
8. Don't know
9. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

2008: \_\_\_\_\_

2013: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q43.** To whom did your household vote in 2008 general elections?

**NBV.2008**

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q44.** On what basis did your household vote to these candidates in 2008 general elections?

**NBV.2008**

1. Access to certain benefits
2. Access to state resources
3. Biradri
4. Biradri led Alliance
5. Political party
6. Don't know
7. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q45.** To whom did your household vote in 2013 general elections?

**NBV.2013**

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q46.** On what basis did your household vote to these candidates in 2013 general elections?

**NBV.2013**

1. Access to certain benefits
2. Access to state resources
3. Biradri
4. Biradri led Alliance
5. Political party
6. Don't know
7. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q47.** Why did your household vote to the same candidates in 2008 and 2013 general elections? **NBV.2008+2013**

1. Candidate fulfilled his previous electoral promises
2. Candidate came up to the expectations of the household
3. Provision of access to state resources by the candidate was satisfactory
4. Family terms/friendship with the candidate
5. Political party
6. Traditional clientelism (household is socio-economically dependent on the candidate)
7. Religious devotion (sectarian voting, voting based on peeri-mureedi—saint-disciple relationship etc.)
8. Same occupational group
9. Same biraderi
10. Same ethnicity
11. Don't know
12. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately. (Only write code of candidate which was found same for both elections while skip which was found different in two elections.)

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q48. Why did your household not vote to the same candidates in 2008 and 2013 general elections? NBV.2008+2013**

1. Candidate did not fulfil his electoral promises
2. Candidate did not come up to the expectations of the household
3. Some other candidate presented better offer of benefits
4. Candidate changed his political party affiliation
5. Political party gave ticket to another candidate
6. A new candidate contested in 2013 general elections with whom household had better relations
7. Poor performance of political party
8. Don't know
9. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately. (Only write code of candidate which was found same for both elections while skip which was found different in two elections.)

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q49. What are your expectations from your block leader?**

**BV**

1. Help you in time of need (e.g. financial help, loan, settlement of dispute and other social problems etc.)
2. Help you in matters of police station and court
3. Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (e.g. subsidies, loans, access to government schemes, cash transfers, jobs, housing, health etc.)
4. All of the above
5. Improve public services in the village (e.g. health, education, roads, water and sanitation etc.)
6. None (vote at the wish of the block leader without any expectations from him)
7. Don't know
8. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q50. What are your expectations from your MPs/electoral candidates?**

**NBV**

1. Help you in time of need (e.g. financial help, loan, settlement of dispute and other social problems etc.)
2. Help you in matters of police station and court
3. Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (e.g. subsidies, loans, access to government schemes, cash transfers, jobs, housing, health etc.)
4. All of the above (1+2+3)
5. Delivery of development projects in the constituency
6. Improve public services in the constituency (e.g. health, education, roads, water and sanitation etc.)
7. Good performance
8. Pursue policies of the party
9. None (vote the candidate without any expectations from him)
10. Don't know
11. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q51. What electoral promises were made by your vote block leader in 2008 general elections? BV.2008**

1. Help you in time of need (e.g. financial help, loan, settlement of dispute and other social problems etc.)
2. Help you in matters of police station and court
3. Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (e.g. subsidies, loans, access to government schemes, cash transfers, jobs, housing, health etc.)
4. All of the above (1+2+3)
5. Delivery of development projects in the village
6. Improve public services in the village (e.g. health, education, roads, water and sanitation etc.)
7. Pursue policies of the party and deliver as per manifesto of the party
8. Don't know
9. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q52. What electoral promises were made by your vote block leader in 2013 general elections? BV.2013**

1. Help you in time of need (e.g. financial help, loan, settlement of dispute and other social problems etc.)
2. Help you in matters of police station and court
3. Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (e.g. subsidies, loans, access to government schemes, cash transfers, jobs, housing, health etc.)
4. All of the above (1+2+3)
5. Delivery of development projects in the village
6. Improve public services in the village (e.g. health, education, roads, water and sanitation etc.)
7. Pursue policies of the party and deliver as per manifesto of the party
8. Don't know
9. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q53. What electoral promises were made by your electoral candidate in 2008 general elections? NBV.2008**

1. Help you in time of need (e.g. financial help, loan, settlement of dispute and other social problems etc.)
2. Help you in matters of police station and court
3. Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (e.g. subsidies, loans, access to government schemes, cash transfers, jobs, housing, health etc.)
4. All of the above (1+2+3)
5. Delivery of development projects in the constituency
6. Improve public services in the constituency (e.g. health, education, roads, water and sanitation etc.)
7. Pursue policies of the party and deliver as per manifesto of the party
8. Don't know
9. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q54. What electoral promises were made by your electoral candidate in 2013 general elections? NBV.2013**

1. Help you in time of need (e.g. financial help, loan, settlement of dispute and other social problems etc.)
2. Help you in matters of police station and court
3. Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (e.g. subsidies, loans, access to government schemes, cash transfers, jobs, housing, health etc.)
4. All of the above (1+2+3)
5. Delivery of development projects in the constituency
6. Improve public services in the constituency (e.g. health, education, roads, water and sanitation etc.)
7. Pursue policies of the party and deliver as per manifesto of the party
8. Don't know
9. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q55.** Did you or anyone from your household receive drink or eatable goods, medicines, clothes or monetary payment from the candidate or his agents/supporters during election campaign in 2008 general elections?

1. Yes (Go to Q56)
2. No (Go to Q57)
3. Don't know (Go to Q57)

**Q56.** If yes then how did it impact your vote choice?

1. Wanted to vote some other candidate but voted this candidate
2. Were already supporters of this candidate but perhaps we might not go to polling station to cast our vote
3. Handed over your CNICs to agents/supporters of this candidate (or wanted to vote someone else but did not vote due to it)
4. We were not interested to vote anyone but voted this candidate due to it
5. We must have voted to this candidate even without getting all this
6. After getting this voted someone else
7. Don't know
8. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q57.** Did any of your friends, relative or neighbours receive drink or eatable goods, medicines, clothes or monetary payment from the candidate or his agents/supporters during election campaign in 2008 general elections?

1. Yes (Go to Q59)
2. No (Go to Q60)
3. Don't know (Go to Q60)

**Q58.** Did you or anyone from your household receive drink or eatable goods, medicines, clothes or monetary payment from the candidate or his agents/supporters during election campaign in 2013 general elections?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q59.** If yes then how did it impact your vote choice?

1. Wanted to vote some other candidate but voted this candidate
2. Were already supporters of this candidate but perhaps we might not go to polling station to cast our vote
3. Handed over your CNICs to agents/supporters of this candidate (or wanted to vote someone else but did not vote due to it)
4. We were not interested to vote anyone but voted this candidate due to it
5. We must have voted to this candidate even without getting all this
6. After getting this voted someone else
7. Don't know
8. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

**Q60.** Did any of your friends, relative or neighbours receive drink or eatable goods, medicines, clothes or monetary payment from the candidate or his agents/supporters during election campaign in 2013 general elections?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q61.** In your view, what is the responsibility of your vote block leader?

**BV**

1. Help you in time of need (e.g. financial help, loan, settlement of dispute and other social problems etc.)
2. Help you in matters of police station and court
3. Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (e.g. subsidies, loans, access to government schemes, cash transfers, jobs, housing, health etc.)
4. All of the above
5. Improve public services in the village (e.g. health, education, roads, water and sanitation etc.)
6. None (vote at the wish of the block leader without any expectations from him)
7. Don't know
8. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**Q62.** What do you expect from your vote block leader?

**BV**

1. Help you in time of need (e.g. financial help, loan, settlement of dispute and other social problems etc.)
2. Help you in matters of police station and court
3. Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (e.g. subsidies, loans, access to government schemes, cash transfers, jobs, housing, health etc.)
4. All of the above
5. Improve public services in the village (e.g. health, education, roads, water and sanitation etc.)
6. None (vote at the wish of the block leader without any expectations from him)
7. Don't know
8. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**Q63.** In your view, what is the responsibility of your MPs/electoral candidates?

**NBV**

1. Help you in time of need (e.g. financial help, loan, settlement of dispute and other social problems etc.)
2. Help you in matters of police station and court
3. Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (e.g. subsidies, loans, access to government schemes, cash transfers, jobs, housing, health etc.)
4. All of the above (1+2+3)
5. Delivery of development projects in the constituency
6. Improve public services in the constituency (e.g. health, education, roads, water and sanitation etc.)
7. Good performance
8. Pursue policies of the party
9. None (vote the candidate without any expectations from him)
10. Don't know
11. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q64.** What do you expect from your MPs/electoral candidates?

**NBV**

1. Help you in time of need (e.g. financial help, loan, settlement of dispute and other social problems etc.)
2. Help you in matters of police station and court
3. Help you in getting your work done in any other government organization (e.g. subsidies, loans, access to government schemes, cash transfers, jobs, housing, health etc.)
4. All of the above (1+2+3)
5. Delivery of development projects in the constituency
6. Improve public services in the constituency (e.g. health, education, roads, water and sanitation etc.)
7. Good performance
8. Pursue policies of the party
9. None (vote the candidate without any expectations from him)
10. Don't know
11. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

Find appropriate codes from list and write here for each separately.

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q65.** Do you require your vote block leader to inform you about his past or future actions and decisions with regard to his promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

**BV**

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q66.** Do you require your MPs/electoral candidates to inform you about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

**NBV**

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q67.** Does your vote block leader inform you about his past or future actions and decisions with regard to his promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

**BV**

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q68.** Do your MPs/electoral candidates inform you about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

**NBV**

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q69.** Do you require your vote block leader to justify his past or future actions and decisions with regard to his promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

**BV**

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q70.** Do you require your MPs/electoral candidates to justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability? **NBV**

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q71.** Does your vote block leader justify his past or future actions and decisions with regard to his promises/responsibility/domain of accountability? **BV**

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q72.** Do your MPs/electoral candidates justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability? **NBV**

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q73.** What do you (if voted as block member) do if your vote block leader does not fulfil his promises or your demands, violates his duties or fails to inform or justify his decisions with regard to his responsibility? **BV**

1. Quit that vote block and join other vote block
2. Quit that vote block and form a new vote block
3. Deny voting to or at the will of that vote block leader
4. Mobilize block members to change block leader
5. Express dissatisfaction or register your protest against block leader in front of other block members
6. Have no choice except to follow that vote block leader
7. Do nothing
8. Don't know
9. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**Q74.** What do you (if not voted as block member) do if your MP/electoral candidate does not fulfill his promises or your demands, violates his duties or fails to inform or justify his decisions with regard to his responsibility? **NBV**

1. Quit supporting him
2. Do not vote him in next elections
3. Express your dissatisfaction or register your protest with him
4. Keep supporting him even in next elections
5. Do nothing
6. Don't know
7. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**Q75.** Which public service is most needed in your village?

1. Health
2. Education
3. Water
4. Sanitation
5. Pavement of roads and streets
6. Lightening of streets
7. Don't know
8. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

## سوالنامہ برائے گھرانہ سروے

تاریخ \_\_\_\_\_  
 سوالنامہ نمبر \_\_\_\_\_  
 تحصیل \_\_\_\_\_  
 گاؤں \_\_\_\_\_  
 گھر نمبر \_\_\_\_\_  
 یونین کونسل \_\_\_\_\_

کیا 2008 اور 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھرانے کے کسی فرد نے ووٹ دیا؟

1. جی ہاں، 2008 اور 2013 دونوں انتخابات میں ووٹ دیا
2. جی ہاں، صرف 2008 کے انتخابات میں ووٹ دیا
3. جی ہاں، صرف 2013 کے انتخابات میں ووٹ دیا
4. جی نہیں، 2008 اور 2013 دونوں انتخابات میں ووٹ نہیں دیا

جواب کنندہ کا نام \_\_\_\_\_

مرد=1 عورت=2

جواب کنندہ کی عمر \_\_\_\_\_

گھر کے سربراہ کا نام \_\_\_\_\_

مرد=1 عورت=2

گھر کے سربراہ کی عمر \_\_\_\_\_

گھر کے افراد کی کل تعداد \_\_\_\_\_

برادری / ذات \_\_\_\_\_

گھرانے کی زمینی ملکیت \_\_\_\_\_ (ایکڑے)

فون نمبر \_\_\_\_\_

Q1 گھر کی زمین پر آپ کو کس قسم کے حقوق حاصل ہیں؟

1. ذاتی زمین
2. کرائے دار
3. بغیر کرائے کے کسی زمیندار یا رشتہ دار کی زمین پر رہ رہے ہیں
4. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

Q2 آپ کا گھر کس قسم کا ہے؟

1. پکا
2. کچا

Q3 آپ کے گھرانے کا بنیادی ذریعہ آمدن کیا ہے؟

1. ذاتی ذریعہ زمین کا حصہ، ٹھیکہ یا اس پر زمیندار
2. حصے یا ٹھیکے کی زمین پر زمیندار
3. ہاتھ سے کرنیوالی غیر زرعی گھر مند مزدوری (جیسے: موچی، لوہار، نالی وغیرہ)
4. غیر ہنرمند زرعی اور گھریلو مزدوری یا ملازمت
5. سرکاری ملازمت
6. نجی ملازمت
7. خود برسر روزگار
8. کاروبار
9. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q4)** آپکے گھرانے کی ماہانہ آمدنی کتنی ہے؟

1. آٹھ ہزار یا اس سے کم
2. آٹھ ہزار سے پندرہ ہزار تک
3. پندرہ سے تیس ہزار تک
4. تیس ہزار سے زیادہ

**(Q5)** پیشے کے اعتبار سے آپکی قوم کیا ہے؟

1. زمیندار
2. کئی (ہنرمند مزدور)
3. مصلیٰ (غیر ہنرمند مزدور)

**(Q6)** کسی مشکل وقت میں مالی مدد یا قرضے کے لیے آپ کس سے کہتے ہیں؟

1. برادری میں سے کس کو
2. دوست کو
3. گاؤں میں سے کسی زمیندار کو
4. دھڑے کے سربراہ کو
5. گاؤں کے نمبردار، سربراہ یا با اثر شخص کو
6. سیاستدان یا انتخابی امیدوار کو
7. کسی نجی ادارے کو
8. کسی سرکاری ادارے کو
9. کسی کو بھی نہیں
10. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q7)** کسی لڑائی، جھگڑے یا سماجی کے حل کے لیے آپ کس سے کہتے ہیں؟

1. گاؤں کی پنچائیت کو
2. برادری میں سے کسی کو
3. دوست کو
4. گاؤں کے کسی زمیندار کو
5. اپنے دھڑے کے سربراہ کو
6. گاؤں کے نمبردار، سربراہ یا با اثر شخص کو
7. سیاستدان یا انتخابی امیدوار کو
8. متعلقہ سرکاری ادارے کو
9. کسی کو بھی نہیں
10. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q8)** چوری، ڈکیتی یا لین دین میں دھوکے کی صورت میں مدد یا اس کے حل کے لیے آپ کس سے کہتے ہیں؟

1. گاؤں کی پنچائیت کو
2. برادری میں سے کسی کو
3. دوست کو
4. گاؤں کے کسی زمیندار کو
5. اپنے دھڑے کے سربراہ کو
6. گاؤں کے نمبردار، سربراہ یا با اثر شخص کو
7. سیاستدان یا انتخابی امیدوار کو
8. متعلقہ سرکاری ادارے کو
9. کسی کو بھی نہیں
10. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q9)** پچھلے دس سال میں آپ یا آپ کے گھر والوں میں سے کسی نے مالی مدد یا قرضے، لڑائی جھگڑے یا کسی سماجی مسئلے یا پھر چوری ڈکیتی یا لین

دین جیسے معاملات کے حل کے لیے اوپر ذکر کیے گئے شخص یا ادارے کی طرف رجوع کیا؟

1. کبھی نہیں
2. ایک دفع
3. کچھ دفع
4. اکثر
5. پتہ نہیں

**GQ.2008**

**(Q10)** 2008 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھرانے نے کن امیدواروں کو ووٹ دیا؟

ایم پی اے..... ایم این اے.....

GQ.2008

(Q11) 2008 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھرانے نے ان امیدواروں کو کس کی خواہش یا کہنے پر ووٹ دیا؟

MPA: _____
MNA: _____

1. برادری میں سے کسی کے کہنے پر
2. دوست کے کہنے پر
3. گاؤں کے کسی زمیندار کے کہنے پر
4. اپنے دھڑے کے سربراہ کے فیصلے یا کہنے پر
5. گاؤں کے نمبردار، سربراہ، یا با اثر شخص کے کہنے پر
6. امیدوار کے وعدے یا کہنے پر
7. کسی کے بھی کہنے پر نہیں
8. پتہ نہیں
9. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

GQ.2008

(Q12) کیا 2008 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھر کے تمام افراد نے ایک ہی MPA اور MNA کو ووٹ دیا؟

1. جی ہاں
2. جی نہیں

GQ.2008

(Q13) 2008 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھر کے کچھ افراد نے مختلف MPA اور MNA کو ووٹ کیوں دیا؟

1. گھر کے افراد کے درمیان کوئی اختلاف یا ناراضگی
2. گھرانے کے ایک ہی سیٹ سے انتخاب لڑنے والے ایک سے زیادہ امیدواروں کے ساتھ تعلقات یا رشتہ داری تھی
3. گھرانہ ایک ہی MPA اور MNA کا حمایتی تھا لیکن گھرانے کے کچھ افراد نے کسی دوسرے امیدوار کی طرف سے کوئی فائدہ ملنے کے عوض یا اس کی توقع پر اسے ووٹ دیا
4. فائدے حاصل کرنے کے امکانات کو بڑھانے کے لیے
5. پتہ نہیں
6. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

GQ.2013

(Q14) 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھرانے نے کن امیدواروں کو ووٹ دیا؟

ایم پی اے..... ایم این اے.....

GQ.2013

(Q15) 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھرانے نے ان امیدواروں کو کس کی خواہش یا کہنے پر ووٹ دیا؟

MPA: _____
MNA: _____

1. برادری میں سے کسی کے کہنے پر
2. دوست کے کہنے پر
3. گاؤں کے کسی زمیندار کے کہنے پر
4. اپنے دھڑے کے سربراہ کے فیصلے یا کہنے پر
5. گاؤں کے نمبردار، سربراہ، یا با اثر شخص کے کہنے پر
6. امیدوار کے وعدے یا کہنے پر
7. کسی کے بھی کہنے پر نہیں
8. پتہ نہیں
9. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

GQ.2013

(Q16) کیا 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھر کے تمام افراد نے ایک ہی MPA اور MNA کو ووٹ دیا؟

1. جی ہاں
2. جی نہیں

GQ.2013

(Q17) 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھر کے کچھ افراد نے مختلف MPA اور MNA کو ووٹ کیوں دیا؟

1. گھر کے افراد کے درمیان کوئی اختلاف یا ناراضگی
2. گھرانے کے ایک ہی سیٹ سے انتخاب لڑنے والے ایک سے زیادہ امیدواروں کے ساتھ تعلقات یا رشتہ داری تھی
3. گھرانہ ایک ہی MPA اور MNA کا حمایتی تھا لیکن گھرانے کے کچھ افراد نے کسی دوسرے امیدوار کی طرف سے کوئی فائدہ ملنے کے عوض یا اس کی توقع پر اسے ووٹ دیا
4. فائدے حاصل کرنے کے امکانات کو بڑھانے کے لیے
5. پتہ نہیں
6. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q18)** اگر آپ کا گھرانہ کسی انتخابی امیدوار کو یا پھر کسی دھڑے کے سربراہ، گاؤں کے زمیندار، چوہدری یا با اثر شخص کی خواہش یا کہنے پر ووٹ نہیں دیتا تو کیا ضرورت کے وقت اوپر ذکر کیئے گئے معاملات (جیسے مالی مدد، قرضہ، لڑائی جھگڑے اور چوری ڈکیتی جیسے معاملات) کے حل میں وہ آپ کی مدد کرتا ہے؟

1. ہمیشہ
2. کبھی کبھار
3. بہت کم (شاذ و نادر ہی)
4. کبھی نہیں
5. پتہ نہیں

**(Q19)** اگر ہاں، تو کن شرائط پر وہ مخالف ووٹوں کی مدد کرتے ہیں؟

1. انسانیت کی بنیاد پر غیر مشروط مدد
2. غیر مشروط مدد مگر ان کی ہمدردیاں اور ووٹ حاصل کرنے کی نیت سے
3. اگلے انتخابات میں انہیں یا ان کے حمایت یافتہ امیدوار کو ووٹ دینے کے ساتھ مشروط مدد
4. پتہ نہیں
5. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q20)** کیا ان فوائد کی فراہمی میں ووٹوں اور سپورٹروں کو مخالفین کی نسبت ترجیح دی جاتی ہے؟

1. ہمیشہ
2. کبھی کبھار
3. بہت کم (شاذ و نادر ہی)
4. کبھی نہیں
5. پتہ نہیں

**(Q21)** اگر تھانے، کچھری یا عدالت میں آپ کا کوئی کیس یا مسئلہ ہو تو آپ کس کی مدد حاصل کرتے یا کس سے کہتے ہیں؟

1. برادری میں سے کس کو
2. دوست کو
3. گاؤں میں سے کسی زمیندار کو
4. دھڑے کے سربراہ کو
5. گاؤں کے نمبردار، سربراہ یا با اثر شخص کو
6. سیاستدان یا انتخابی امیدوار کو
7. کسی کو بھی نہیں (خود تھانے، کچھری یا عدالت جاتے ہیں)
8. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q22)** اگر آپ کو اس کے علاوہ کسی دوسرے سرکاری ادارے میں اپنا کوئی کام کروانا ہو تو آپ کس کی مدد حاصل کرتے یا کس سے کہتے ہیں؟

1. برادری میں سے کس کو
2. دوست کو
3. گاؤں میں سے کسی زمیندار کو
4. دھڑے کے سربراہ کو
5. گاؤں کے نمبردار، سربراہ یا با اثر شخص کو
6. سیاستدان یا انتخابی امیدوار کو
7. کسی کو بھی نہیں (خود تھانے، کچھری یا عدالت جاتے ہیں)
8. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q23)** سرکاری نوکری، قرضہ، سبسڈی، ادویات، خوراک، پیسے یا پھر کسی دوسری سرکاری سکیم سے استفادہ حاصل کرنے کے لیے آپ کس سے کہتے ہیں؟

1. برادری میں سے کس کو
2. دوست کو
3. گاؤں میں سے کسی زمیندار کو
4. دھڑے کے سربراہ کو
5. گاؤں کے نمبردار، سربراہ یا با اثر شخص کو
6. سیاستدان یا انتخابی امیدوار کو
7. کسی کو بھی نہیں (خود تھانے، کچھری یا عدالت جاتے ہیں)
8. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q24)** پچھلے دس سال میں کتنی مرتبہ آپ یا آپ کے گھر کے کسی فرد نے اوپر ذکر کیئے گئے شخص سے تھانے، کچھری یا عدالت میں کسی مسئلے یا کیس میں مدد کے لیے کہا؟

1. اکثر
2. کچھ دفع
3. ایک دفع
4. کبھی نہیں
5. پتہ نہیں

**(Q25)** پچھلے دس سال میں کتنی مرتبہ آپ یا آپ کے گھر کے کسی فرد نے اوپر ذکر کیئے گئے شخص سے کسی سرکاری ادارے میں اپنا کوئی کام کروانے یا پھر نوکری، قرضے، سبسڈی، ادویات اور خوراک یا کسی اور سرکاری سکیم سے کچھ حاصل کرنے کے لیے کہا؟

1. اکثر
2. کچھ دفع
3. ایک دفع
4. کبھی نہیں
5. پتہ نہیں

**(Q26)** اگر آپ کا گھرانہ کسی انتخابی امیدوار کو یا پھر کسی دھڑے کے سربراہ، گاؤں کے زمیندار، چوہدری یا با اثر شخص کی خواہش یا کہنے پر ووٹ نہیں دیتا تو کیا ضرورت کے وقت وہ سرکاری وسائل اور خدمات (جیسے تھانہ اور کچھری تک رسائی، نوکری، سبسڈی، قرضے، سرکاری وظیفہ یا پیسے، دوائیاں، خوراک، سرکاری طور پر تقسیم کیئے جانے والے گھر اور پلاٹ) کے حصول میں آپ کی مدد کرتا ہے؟

1. ہمیشہ
2. کبھی کبھار
3. بہت کم (شاذ و نادر ہی)
4. کبھی نہیں
5. پتہ نہیں

**(Q27)** اگر ہاں، تو کن شرائط پر وہ مخالف ووٹروں کی مدد کرتے ہیں؟

1. انسانیت کی بنیاد پر غیر مشروط مدد
2. غیر مشروط مدد مگر ان کی ہمدردیاں اور ووٹ حاصل کرنے کی نیت سے
3. اگلے انتخابات میں انہیں یا ان کے حمایت یافتہ امیدوار کو ووٹ دینے کے ساتھ مشروط مدد
4. پتہ نہیں
5. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q28)** کیا ان فوائد کی فراہمی میں ووٹروں اور سپورٹروں کو مخالفین کی نسبت ترجیح دی جاتی ہے؟

1. ہمیشہ
2. کبھی کبھار
3. بہت کم (شاذ و نادر ہی)
4. کبھی نہیں
5. پتہ نہیں

**(Q29)** کیا آپ کے گھرانے نے 2008 اور 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں دھڑے کے ساتھ، دھڑے کو یا دھڑے کے رکن کے طور پر ووٹ دیا؟

1. جی ہاں، 2008 کے انتخابات میں
2. جی ہاں، 2013 کے انتخابات میں
3. جی ہاں، 2008 اور 2013 دونوں انتخابات میں
4. جی نہیں، 2008 اور 2013 دونوں انتخابات میں نہیں

**Q30** آپ کے گھرانے نے ان انتخابات میں کس بنیاد یا وجہ پر دھڑے میں شمولیت اختیار کی یا دھڑے کے رکن کے طور پر ووٹ دیا؟ **BV**

1. دھڑے کے سربراہ، زمیندار، یا نمبردار کے ذاتی وسائل سے کچھ فائدے حاصل کرنے یا حاصل کیے گئے فائدوں کے بدلے میں (جیسے: مشکل وقت میں وہ آپ کی مدد کرے یا آپ کے جھگڑے اور مسائل حل کروائے)

2008:	_____
2013:	_____

2. سرکاری وسائل اور خدمات تک رسائی کے لیے (جیسے نوکری، سرکاری وظیفہ یا پیسے، سبسڈی، تھانے اور کچھری تک رسائی وغیرہ)

3. برادری

4. برادری کا اکٹھ یا اتحاد

5. رشتہ داری

6. مذہبی عقیدت (بشمول پیری مریدی، فرقہ)

7. زمیندار پر انحصار (جیسے: زمیندار کی زمین پر بیٹھے ہیں، اس کے ملازم ہیں، اس کی زمین پر مزدوری کرتے ہیں، زمیندار کے مزارعے ہیں، معاشی اور سماجی طور پر اس کے ماتحت ہیں اور اس پر ہی انحصار کرتے ہیں)

8. گاؤں کے سربراہ، نمبردار، یا زمیندار کی طرف سے سزا یا پابندیوں کے ڈر کی بنا پر

9. ایک ہی محلہ

10. ایک ہی سیاسی جماعت

11. یکساں پیشہ

12. پتہ نہیں

13. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**Q31** آپ کے دھڑے کے سربراہ کا نام..... **BV**

**Q32** یہ شخص آپ کے دھڑے کا سربراہ کیوں یا کس بنیاد پر ہے؟ **BV**

1. چوہدری

2. گاؤں کا سربراہ

3. بڑا زمیندار

4. گاؤں کا نمبردار

5. مقامی سرکاری افسر

6. رشتہ داری

7. برادری

8. سیاسی طور پر متحرک، سیاسی کارکن یا سیاستدان

9. پتہ نہیں

10. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**Q33** آپ کے دھڑے کا نام..... **BV**

**Q34** 2008 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے دھڑے نے کن امیدواروں کو ووٹ دیا؟ **BV.2008**

ایم پی اے..... ایم این اے.....

**Q35** 2008 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے دھڑے نے ان امیدواروں کو کس بنیاد پر ووٹ دیا؟ **BV.2008**

1. امیدوار کے ذاتی وسائل سے کچھ فائدے حاصل کرنے کے لیے

2. حکومتی وسائل اور خدمات یا سہولیات تک رسائی کے لیے

3. برادری

4. برادری کا اکٹھ یا اتحاد

5. سیاسی جماعت

6. پتہ نہیں

7. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**Q36** 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے دھڑے نے کن امیدواروں کو ووٹ دیا؟ **BV.2013**

ایم پی اے..... ایم این اے.....

**BV.2013**

**(Q37) 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے دھڑے نے ان امیدواروں کو کس بنیاد پر ووٹ دیا؟**

1. امیدوار کے ذاتی وسائل سے کچھ فائدے حاصل کرنے کے لیے
2. حکومتی وسائل اور خدمات یا سہولیات تک رسائی کے لیے
3. برادری
4. برادری کا اکٹھ یا اتحاد
5. سیاسی جماعت
6. پتہ نہیں
7. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

MPA: _____
MNA: _____

**BV**

**(Q38) آپ کے دھڑے کا سربراہ کن بنیادوں پر ان امیدواروں سے منسلک تھا یا ہے؟**

1. سرکاری وسائل اور خدمات یا سہولیات تک رسائی کے لیے انتخابی اتحاد
2. دوست یا کلاس فیلو
3. یکساں سیاسی جماعت
4. دھڑے کا سربراہ معاشی، سماجی اور سیاسی طور پر امیدوار پر انحصار کرتا ہے
5. رشتہ داری
6. دھڑے کا سربراہ خود امیدوار تھا یا ہے
7. مذہبی عقیدت (پیری مریدی اور فرقہ) کی بنیاد پر
8. یکساں پیشہ
9. برادری
10. یکساں زبان یا نسل (جیسے: میواتی،
11. رشتہ داری
12. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....
12. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

MPA (2008): _____
MNA (2008): _____
MPA (2013): _____
MNA (2013): _____

**BV.2008 + 2013**

**(Q39) آپ کے دھڑے نے 2008 اور 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں ایک ہی امیدوار کو کیوں ووٹ دیا؟**

1. امیدوار نے دھڑے کے ساتھ کیے گئے اپنے انتخابی وعدے پورے کیے
2. امیدوار دھڑے کی توقعات پر پورا اترتا
3. سرکاری وسائل اور خدمات یا سہولیات تک رسائی کے لیے انتخابی اتحاد
4. دوست یا کلاس فیلو
5. یکساں سیاسی جماعت
6. دھڑے کا سربراہ معاشی، سماجی اور سیاسی طور پر امیدوار پر انحصار کرتا ہے
7. رشتہ داری
8. دونوں دفعہ دھڑے کا سربراہ ہی انتخابی امیدوار تھا
9. مذہبی عقیدت (پیری مریدی اور فرقہ) کی بنیاد پر
10. یکساں پیشہ
11. برادری
12. یکساں زبان یا نسل (جیسے: میواتی، پنجابی، سرانگی
13. پتہ نہیں
14. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

MPA: _____
MNA: _____

**BV.2008 + 2013**

**(Q40) آپ کے دھڑے نے 2008 اور 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں ایک ہی امیدوار کو ووٹ کیوں نہیں دیا؟**

1. امیدوار نے دھڑے کے ساتھ کیے گئے اپنے انتخابی وعدے پورے نہیں کیے تھے
2. امیدوار دھڑے کی توقعات پر پورا نہیں اترتا
3. کس دوسرے امیدوار نے فائدے دینے کی بہتر پیشکش کی
4. گزشتہ امیدوار نے اپنی جماعتی وابستگی تبدیل کر لی
5. جماعت نے کسی دوسرے امیدوار کو پارٹی ٹکٹ دے دیا
6. دھڑے کا انتخابی اتحاد تبدیل ہو گیا
7. 2013 کے انتخابات میں ایک نئے امیدوار نے الیکشن لڑا جس کے ساتھ دھڑے کے سربراہ کے بہتر تعلقات تھے
8. گزشتہ سیاسی جماعت کی خراب کارکردگی
9. پتہ نہیں
10. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

MPA: _____
MNA: _____

**BV**

**(Q41) کیا دھڑے کے ارکان یا افراد دھڑے کے فیصلوں میں شرکت کر سکتے یا حصہ لے سکتے ہیں؟**

1. جی ہاں
2. جی نہیں
3. پتہ نہیں

**NBV**

**(Q42)** آپ کے گھرانے نے دھڑے کی بنیاد پر، دھڑے کے ساتھ، یا دھڑے کے رکن کے طور پر ووٹ کیوں نہیں دیا؟

1. کسی اتحاد کا حصہ نہیں بننا چاہتے تھے
2. امیدوار کی طرف سے رقم یا اشیاء ملنے کے بدلے میں اسے ووٹ دیا
3. امیدوار کی طرف سے ملنے والے گزشتہ فائدوں کے بدلے نا انکے ملنے کی توقع میں اسے ووٹ دیا
4. گھرانے کا معاشی اور سماجی انحصار امیدوار پر ہونے کی وجہ سے اسے ووٹ دیا
5. دھڑے کی بجائے پارٹی کی بنیاد پر ووٹ دیا
6. امیدوار کے ساتھ دوہتی یا رشتہ داری
7. یکساں برادری، زبان یا فرقہ
8. پتہ نہیں
9. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

2008: \_\_\_\_\_

2013: \_\_\_\_\_

**NBV.2008**

**(Q43)** 2008 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھرانے نے کن امیدواروں کو ووٹ دیا؟

ایم پی اے..... ایم این اے.....

**NBV.2008**

**(Q44)** 2008 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھرانے نے ان امیدواروں کو کس بنیاد پر ووٹ دیا؟

1. امیدوار کے ذاتی وسائل سے کچھ فائدے حاصل کرنے کے لیے
2. حکومتی وسائل اور خدمات یا سہولیات تک رسائی کے لیے
3. برادری
4. برادری کا اکٹھا یا اتحاد
5. سیاسی جماعت
6. پتہ نہیں
7. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**NBV.2013**

**(Q45)** 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھرانے نے کن امیدواروں کو ووٹ دیا؟

ایم پی اے..... ایم این اے.....

**NBV.2013**

**(Q46)** 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے گھرانے نے ان امیدواروں کو کس بنیاد پر ووٹ دیا؟

1. امیدوار کے ذاتی وسائل سے کچھ فائدے حاصل کرنے کے لیے
2. حکومتی وسائل اور خدمات یا سہولیات تک رسائی کے لیے
3. برادری
4. برادری کا اکٹھا یا اتحاد
5. سیاسی جماعت
6. پتہ نہیں
7. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**NBV.2008 + 2013**

**(Q47)** آپ کے گھرانے نے 2008 اور 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں ایک ہی امیدوار کو کیوں ووٹ دیا؟

1. امیدوار نے کیئے گئے اپنے انتخابی وعدے پورے کیئے
2. امیدوار گھرانے کی توقعات پر پورا اترا
3. امیدوار کی طرف سے سرکاری وسائل اور خدمات یا سہولیات کی فراہمی تسلی بخش تھی
4. امیدوار کے ساتھ دوہتی یا رشتہ داری
5. یکساں سیاسی جماعت
6. گھرانہ معاشی اور سماجی طور پر امیدوار پر انحصار کرتا ہے
7. مذہبی عقیدت (پیری مریدی اور فرقہ) کی بنیاد پر
8. یکساں پیشہ
9. برادری
10. پتہ نہیں
11. یکساں زبان یا نسل (جیسے: میواتی، پنجابی، سرانگی وغیرہ)
12. یکساں زبان یا نسل (جیسے: میواتی، پنجابی، سرانگی وغیرہ)
13. پتہ نہیں
14. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_

MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**(Q48)** آپ کے گھرانے نے 2008 اور 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں ایک ہی امیدوار کو ووٹ کیوں نہیں دیا؟ **NBV.2008 + 2013**

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_  
MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

1. امیدوار نے کیئے گئے اپنے انتخابی وعدے پورے نہیں کیئے تھے
2. امیدوار گھرانے کی توقعات پر پورا نہیں اترتا
3. کسی دوسرے امیدوار نے فائدے دینے کی بہتر پیشکش کی
4. گزشتہ امیدوار نے اپنی جماعتی وابستگی تبدیل کر لی
5. جماعت نے کسی دوسرے امیدوار کو پارٹی ٹکٹ دے دیا
6. 2013 کے انتخابات میں ایک نئے امیدوار نے الیکشن لڑا جس کے ساتھ
7. گزشتہ سیاسی جماعت کی خراب کارکردگی
8. پتہ نہیں
9. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**BV**

**(Q49)** اپنے دھڑے کے سربراہ سے آپ کی کیا توقعات ہیں؟

1. ضرورت کے وقت آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: مالی مدد، قرضہ، لڑائی جھگڑے اور سماجی مسئلے کے حل میں مدد)
2. تھانے کچھری کے معاملات میں آپ کی مدد کرے
3. کسی دوسرے سرکاری ادارے میں کام کروانے میں آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: نوکری، ادویات، سرکاری طور پر تقسیم کیئے جانے والے گھر، سرکاری طور پر ملنے والے پیسے، سبسڈی، قرضہ یا دوسری حکومتی سکیمنوں سے کوئی فائدہ حاصل کرنے میں مدد)
4. گاؤں میں سرکاری سروسز یا سہولیات (جیسے: صحت، تعلیم، سڑکیں، پینے کے صاف پانی کی دستیابی، پکی نالیاں، صفائی اور نکاحی آب) کو بہتر بنائے
5. کوئی بھی نہیں (دھڑے کے سربراہ کی ہواہش یا کہنے پر بغیر کسی توقع کے ووٹ ڈالتے ہیں)
6. پتہ نہیں
7. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**NBV**

**(Q50)** اپنے MPA اور MNA یا انتخابی امیدوار سے آپ کی کیا توقعات ہیں؟

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_  
MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

1. ضرورت کے وقت آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: مالی مدد، قرضہ، لڑائی جھگڑے اور سماجی مسئلے کے حل میں مدد)
2. تھانے کچھری کے معاملات میں آپ کی مدد کرے
3. کسی دوسرے سرکاری ادارے میں کام کروانے میں آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: نوکری، ادویات، سرکاری طور پر تقسیم کیئے جانے والے گھر، سرکاری طور پر ملنے والے پیسے، سبسڈی، قرضہ یا دوسری حکومتی سکیمنوں سے کوئی فائدہ حاصل کرنے میں مدد)
4. گاؤں میں سرکاری سروسز یا سہولیات (جیسے: صحت، تعلیم، سڑکیں، پینے کے صاف پانی کی دستیابی، پکی نالیاں، صفائی اور نکاحی آب) کو بہتر بنائے
5. خلتے میں ترقیاتی کام کروائے
6. اچھی کارکردگی
7. پارٹی کی پالیسیوں پر عمل کرے
8. کوئی بھی نہیں (امیدوار کو بغیر کسی توقع کے ووٹ ڈالتے ہیں)
9. پتہ نہیں
10. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**BV.2008**

**(Q51)** 2008 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے دھڑے کے سربراہ نے آپ سے کیا انتخابی وعدے کیئے؟

1. ضرورت کے وقت آپ کی مدد کرے گا (جیسے: مالی مدد، قرضہ، لڑائی جھگڑے اور سماجی مسئلے کے حل میں مدد)
2. تھانے کچھری کے معاملات میں آپ کی مدد کرے گا
3. کسی دوسرے سرکاری ادارے میں کام کروانے میں آپ کی مدد کرے گا (جیسے: نوکری، ادویات، سرکاری طور پر تقسیم کیئے جانے والے گھر، سرکاری طور پر ملنے والے پیسے، سبسڈی، قرضہ یا دوسری حکومتی سکیمنوں سے کوئی فائدہ حاصل کرنے میں مدد)
4. گاؤں میں سرکاری سروسز یا سہولیات (جیسے: صحت، تعلیم، سڑکیں، پینے کے صاف پانی کی دستیابی، پکی نالیاں، صفائی اور نکاحی آب) کو بہتر بنائے گا
5. خلتے میں ترقیاتی کام کروائے گا
6. پارٹی کی پالیسیوں پر عمل کرے گا اور پارٹی کے انتخابی منشور کے مطابق ڈیور کرے گا
7. کوئی بھی نہیں
8. پتہ نہیں
9. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**BV.2013**

**(Q52) 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے دھڑے کے سربراہ نے آپ سے کیا انتخابی وعدے کیئے؟**

1. ضرورت کے وقت آپ کی مدد کرے گا (جیسے: مالی مدد، قرضہ، لڑائی جھگڑے اور سماجی مسئلے کے حل میں مدد)
2. تھانے کچھری کے معاملات میں آپ کی مدد کرے گا
3. کسی دوسرے سرکاری ادارے میں کام کروانے میں آپ کی مدد کرے گا (جیسے: نوکری، ادویات، سرکاری طور پر تقسیم کیئے جانے والے گھر، سرکاری طور پر ملنے والے پیسے، سبسڈی، قرضہ یا دوسری حکومتی سکیموں سے کوئی فائدہ حاصل کرنے میں مدد)
4. گاؤں میں سرکاری سروسز یا سہولیات (جیسے: صحت، تعلیم، سڑکیں، پینے کے صاف پانی کی دستیابی، کچی نالیاں، صفائی اور نکاحی آب) کو بہتر بنائے گا
5. خلتے میں ترقیاتی کام کروائے گا
6. پارٹی کی پالیسیوں پر عمل کرے گا اور پارٹی کے انتخابی منشور کے مطابق ڈیور کرے گا 7. کوئی بھی نہیں
8. پتہ نہیں
9. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**NBV.2008**

**(Q53) 2008 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے انتخابی امیدوار نے آپ سے کیا انتخابی وعدے کیئے؟**

1. ضرورت کے وقت آپ کی مدد کرے گا (جیسے: مالی مدد، قرضہ، لڑائی جھگڑے اور سماجی مسئلے کے حل میں مدد)
2. تھانے کچھری کے معاملات میں آپ کی مدد کرے گا
3. کسی دوسرے سرکاری ادارے میں کام کروانے میں آپ کی مدد کرے گا (جیسے: نوکری، ادویات، سرکاری طور پر تقسیم کیئے جانے والے گھر، سرکاری طور پر ملنے والے پیسے، سبسڈی، قرضہ یا دوسری حکومتی سکیموں سے کوئی فائدہ حاصل کرنے میں مدد)
4. گاؤں میں سرکاری سروسز یا سہولیات (جیسے: صحت، تعلیم، سڑکیں، پینے کے صاف پانی کی دستیابی، کچی نالیاں، صفائی اور نکاحی آب) کو بہتر بنائے گا
5. خلتے میں ترقیاتی کام کروائے گا
6. پارٹی کی پالیسیوں پر عمل کرے گا اور پارٹی کے انتخابی منشور کے مطابق ڈیور کرے گا 7. کوئی بھی نہیں
8. پتہ نہیں
9. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**NBV.2013**

**(Q54) 2013 کے عام انتخابات میں آپ کے انتخابی امیدوار نے آپ سے کیا انتخابی وعدے کیئے؟**

1. ضرورت کے وقت آپ کی مدد کرے گا (جیسے: مالی مدد، قرضہ، لڑائی جھگڑے اور سماجی مسئلے کے حل میں مدد)
2. تھانے کچھری کے معاملات میں آپ کی مدد کرے گا
3. کسی دوسرے سرکاری ادارے میں کام کروانے میں آپ کی مدد کرے گا (جیسے: نوکری، ادویات، سرکاری طور پر تقسیم کیئے جانے والے گھر، سرکاری طور پر ملنے والے پیسے، سبسڈی، قرضہ یا دوسری حکومتی سکیموں سے کوئی فائدہ حاصل کرنے میں مدد)
4. گاؤں میں سرکاری سروسز یا سہولیات (جیسے: صحت، تعلیم، سڑکیں، پینے کے صاف پانی کی دستیابی، کچی نالیاں، صفائی اور نکاحی آب) کو بہتر بنائے گا
5. خلتے میں ترقیاتی کام کروائے گا
6. پارٹی کی پالیسیوں پر عمل کرے گا اور پارٹی کے انتخابی منشور کے مطابق ڈیور کرے گا 7. کوئی بھی نہیں
8. پتہ نہیں
9. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q55) کیا 2008 کے عام انتخابات کی الیکشن کمپین کے دوران امیدوار، اس کے سپورٹروں یا ایجنٹوں کی طرف سے آپ کو یا آپ کے گھر کے**

**کسی فرد کو کھانے پینے کی اشیاء، ادویات، کپڑے یا نقد رقم ملی؟**

1. جی ہاں (Q56) پر جائیں
2. جی نہیں (Q57) پر جائیں
3. پتہ نہیں

**(Q56)** اگر ہاں، تو اس کا آپ کے ووٹ کی چھانٹیں یا انتخاب پر کیا اثر پڑا؟

1. پہلے کسی اور امیدوار کو ووٹ دینے تھے پھر اس امیدوار کو دے دیے
2. پہلے سے ہی اس امیدوار کے حمایتی تھے پھر ہو سکتا تھا کہ ہم ووٹ ڈالنے پونگ سٹیشن نا جاتے
3. کسی دوسرے امیدوار کو ووٹ ڈالنا چاہتے تھے پھر اس کی وجہ سے کسی کو بھی ووٹ نہیں ڈالا یا اپنے شناختی کارڈ امیدوار کے سپورٹروں یا نمائندوں کو دے دیئے
4. ہم کسی کو بھی ووٹ نہیں ڈالنا چاہتے تھے پھر اس کی وجہ سے اس امیدوار کو ووٹ ڈالے
5. یہ سب کچھ نا بھی ملتا تو ہم نے اسی امیدوار کو ووٹ ڈالنے تھے
6. اس امیدوار سے یہ سب کچھ حاصل کرنے کے بعد ووٹ کسی اور امیدوار کو ڈالے
7. پتہ نہیں
8. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q57)** کیا 2008 کے عام انتخابات کی الیکشن کمیٹین کے دوران امیدوار، اس کے سپورٹروں یا ایجنٹوں کی طرف سے آپ کے کسی دوست، رشتہ دار یا ہمسائے کو کھانے پینے کی اشیاء، ادویات، کپڑے یا نقد رقم ملی؟

1. جی ہاں ~~(Q59 پر جائیں)~~
2. جی نہیں ~~(Q60 پر جائیں)~~
3. پتہ نہیں

**(Q58)** کیا 2013 کے عام انتخابات کی الیکشن کمیٹین کے دوران امیدوار، اس کے سپورٹروں یا ایجنٹوں کی طرف سے آپ کو یا آپ کے گھر کے کسی فرد کو کھانے پینے کی اشیاء، ادویات، کپڑے یا نقد رقم ملی؟

1. جی ہاں ~~(Q56 پر جائیں)~~
2. جی نہیں ~~(Q57 پر جائیں)~~
3. پتہ نہیں

**(Q59)** اگر ہاں، تو اس کا آپ کے ووٹ کی چھانٹیں یا انتخاب پر کیا اثر پڑا؟

1. پہلے کسی اور امیدوار کو ووٹ دینے تھے پھر اس امیدوار کو دے دیے
2. پہلے سے ہی اس امیدوار کے حمایتی تھے پھر ہو سکتا تھا کہ ہم ووٹ ڈالنے پونگ سٹیشن نا جاتے
3. کسی دوسرے امیدوار کو ووٹ ڈالنا چاہتے تھے پھر اس کی وجہ سے کسی کو بھی ووٹ نہیں ڈالا یا اپنے شناختی کارڈ امیدوار کے سپورٹروں یا نمائندوں کو دے دیئے
4. ہم کسی کو بھی ووٹ نہیں ڈالنا چاہتے تھے پھر اس کی وجہ سے اس امیدوار کو ووٹ ڈالے
5. یہ سب کچھ نا بھی ملتا تو ہم نے اسی امیدوار کو ووٹ ڈالنے تھے
6. اس امیدوار سے یہ سب کچھ حاصل کرنے کے بعد ووٹ کسی اور امیدوار کو ڈالے
7. پتہ نہیں
8. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q60)** کیا 2013 کے عام انتخابات کی الیکشن کمیٹین کے دوران امیدوار، اس کے سپورٹروں یا ایجنٹوں کی طرف سے آپ کے کسی دوست، رشتہ دار یا ہمسائے کو کھانے پینے کی اشیاء، ادویات، کپڑے یا نقد رقم ملی؟

1. جی ہاں ~~(Q59 پر جائیں)~~
2. جی نہیں ~~(Q60 پر جائیں)~~
3. پتہ نہیں

BV

(Q61) آپ کے خیال میں، آپ کے دھڑے کے سربراہ کی کیا ذمہ داری ہے؟

1. ضرورت کے وقت آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: مالی مدد، قرضہ، لڑائی جھگڑے اور سماجی مسئلے کے حل میں مدد)
2. تھانے کچھری کے معاملات میں آپ کی مدد کرے
3. کسی دوسرے سرکاری ادارے میں کام کروانے میں آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: نوکری، ادویات، سرکاری طور پر تقسیم کیے جانے والے گھر، سرکاری طور پر ملنے والے پیسے، سبسڈی، قرضہ یا دوسری حکومتی سکیموں سے کوئی فائدہ حاصل کرنے میں مدد)
4. گاؤں میں سرکاری سرومز یا سہولیات (جیسے: صحت، تعلیم، سڑکیں، پینے کے صاف پانی کی دستیابی، کچی نالیاں، صفائی اور نقاصی آب) کو بہتر بنائے
5. کوئی بھی نہیں
6. پتہ نہیں
7. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

BV

(Q62) آپ نے دھڑے کے سربراہ سے آپ کیا توقع کرتے ہیں؟

1. ضرورت کے وقت آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: مالی مدد، قرضہ، لڑائی جھگڑے اور سماجی مسئلے کے حل میں مدد)
2. تھانے کچھری کے معاملات میں آپ کی مدد کرے
3. کسی دوسرے سرکاری ادارے میں کام کروانے میں آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: نوکری، ادویات، سرکاری طور پر تقسیم کیے جانے والے گھر، سرکاری طور پر ملنے والے پیسے، سبسڈی، قرضہ یا دوسری حکومتی سکیموں سے کوئی فائدہ حاصل کرنے میں مدد)
4. گاؤں میں سرکاری سرومز یا سہولیات (جیسے: صحت، تعلیم، سڑکیں، پینے کے صاف پانی کی دستیابی، کچی نالیاں، صفائی اور نقاصی آب) کو بہتر بنائے
5. کوئی بھی نہیں
6. پتہ نہیں
7. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

NBV

(Q63) آپ کے خیال میں، آپ کے MPA اور MNA یا انتخابی امیدوار کی کیا ذمہ داری ہے؟

- MPA: \_\_\_\_\_  
MNA: \_\_\_\_\_
1. ضرورت کے وقت آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: مالی مدد، قرضہ، لڑائی جھگڑے اور سماجی مسئلے کے حل میں مدد)
  2. تھانے کچھری کے معاملات میں آپ کی مدد کرے
  3. کسی دوسرے سرکاری ادارے میں کام کروانے میں آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: نوکری، ادویات، سرکاری طور پر تقسیم کیے جانے والے گھر، سرکاری طور پر ملنے والے پیسے، سبسڈی، قرضہ یا دوسری حکومتی سکیموں سے کوئی فائدہ حاصل کرنے میں مدد)
  4. گاؤں میں سرکاری سرومز یا سہولیات (جیسے: صحت، تعلیم، سڑکیں، پینے کے صاف پانی کی دستیابی، کچی نالیاں، صفائی اور نقاصی آب) کو بہتر بنائے
  5. خلتے میں ترقیاتی کام کروانے
  6. اچھی کارکردگی
  7. پارٹی کی پالیسیوں پر عمل کرے
  8. کوئی بھی نہیں
  9. پتہ نہیں
  10. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

NBV

(Q64) آپ اپنے MPA اور MNA یا انتخابی امیدوار سے کیا توقع کرتے ہیں؟

- MPA: \_\_\_\_\_  
MNA: \_\_\_\_\_
1. ضرورت کے وقت آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: مالی مدد، قرضہ، لڑائی جھگڑے اور سماجی مسئلے کے حل میں مدد)
  2. تھانے کچھری کے معاملات میں آپ کی مدد کرے
  3. کسی دوسرے سرکاری ادارے میں کام کروانے میں آپ کی مدد کرے (جیسے: نوکری، ادویات، سرکاری طور پر تقسیم کیے جانے والے گھر، سرکاری طور پر ملنے والے پیسے، سبسڈی، قرضہ یا دوسری حکومتی سکیموں سے کوئی فائدہ حاصل کرنے میں مدد)
  4. گاؤں میں سرکاری سرومز یا سہولیات (جیسے: صحت، تعلیم، سڑکیں، پینے کے صاف پانی کی دستیابی، کچی نالیاں، صفائی اور نقاصی آب) کو بہتر بنائے
  5. خلتے میں ترقیاتی کام کروانے
  6. اچھی کارکردگی
  7. پارٹی کی پالیسیوں پر عمل کرے
  8. کوئی بھی نہیں (امیدوار کو بغیر کسی توقع کے ووٹ ڈالتے ہیں)
  9. پتہ نہیں
  10. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**Q65** کیا آپ اپنے دھڑے کے سربراہ سے یہ مطالبہ کرتے ہیں کہ وہ آپ کو اپنے انتخابی وعدوں، اپنی ذمہ داری یا اپنے اختسابی دائرہ کار کے حوالے سے اپنے ماضی اور مستقبل کے فیصلوں سے آگاہ کرے؟

**BV** 1. جی ہاں 2. جی نہیں 3. پتہ نہیں

**Q66** کیا آپ اپنے MPA اور MNA یا انتخابی امیدوار سے یہ مطالبہ کرتے ہیں کہ وہ آپ کو اپنے انتخابی وعدوں، اپنی ذمہ داری یا اپنے اختسابی دائرہ کار کے حوالے سے اپنے ماضی اور مستقبل کے فیصلوں سے آگاہ کرے؟

**NBV** 1. جی ہاں 2. جی نہیں 3. پتہ نہیں

**Q67** کیا آپ کے دھڑے کا سربراہ آپ کو اپنے انتخابی وعدوں، اپنی ذمہ داری یا اپنے اختسابی دائرہ کار کے حوالے سے اپنے ماضی اور مستقبل کے فیصلوں سے آگاہ کرتا ہے؟

**BV** 1. جی ہاں 2. جی نہیں 3. پتہ نہیں

**Q68** کیا آپ کا MPA اور MNA یا انتخابی امیدوار آپ کو اپنے انتخابی وعدوں، اپنی ذمہ داری یا اپنے اختسابی دائرہ کار کے حوالے سے اپنے ماضی اور مستقبل کے فیصلوں سے آگاہ کرتا ہے؟

**NBV** 1. جی ہاں 2. جی نہیں 3. پتہ نہیں

**Q69** کیا آپ اپنے دھڑے کے سربراہ سے یہ مطالبہ کرتے ہیں کہ وہ اپنے انتخابی وعدوں، اپنی ذمہ داری یا اپنے اختسابی دائرہ کار کے حوالے سے اپنے ماضی اور مستقبل کے فیصلوں کی وضاحت پیش کرے؟

**BV** 1. جی ہاں 2. جی نہیں 3. پتہ نہیں

**Q70** کیا آپ اپنے MPA اور MNA یا انتخابی امیدوار سے یہ مطالبہ کرتے ہیں کہ وہ اپنے انتخابی وعدوں، اپنی ذمہ داری یا اپنے اختسابی دائرہ کار کے حوالے سے اپنے ماضی اور مستقبل کے فیصلوں کی وضاحت پیش کرے؟

**NBV** 1. جی ہاں 2. جی نہیں 3. پتہ نہیں

**Q71** کیا آپ کے دھڑے کا سربراہ اپنے انتخابی وعدوں، اپنی ذمہ داری یا اپنے اختسابی دائرہ کار کے حوالے سے اپنے ماضی اور مستقبل کے فیصلوں کی وضاحت پیش کرتا ہے؟

**BV** 1. جی ہاں 2. جی نہیں 3. پتہ نہیں

**Q72** کیا آپ کا MPA اور MNA یا انتخابی امیدوار اپنے انتخابی وعدوں، اپنی ذمہ داری یا اپنے اختسابی دائرہ کار کے حوالے سے اپنے ماضی اور مستقبل کے فیصلوں کی وضاحت پیش کرتا ہے؟

**NBV** 1. جی ہاں 2. جی نہیں 3. پتہ نہیں

**(Q73)** اگر آپ کے دھڑے کا سربراہ اپنے وعدے یا آپ کے مطالبے پورے نہیں کرتا، اپنی ذمہ داریوں کی خلاف ورزی کرتا ہے، یا پھر اپنی ذمہ داری اور اختسابی دائرہ کار کے حوالے سے کیئے گئے اپنے فیصلوں سے آپ کو آگاہ نہیں کرتا یا پھر ان کی وضاحت دینے میں ناکام رہتا ہے تو آپ کیا کرتے ہیں؟

**BV**

1. اس دھڑے کو چھوڑ کر کسی دوسرے دھڑے میں شامل جاتے ہیں
2. اس دھڑے کو چھوڑ کر نیا دھڑا بنا لیتے ہیں
3. اگلی دفعہ کے انتخابات میں اس دھڑے کو یا اس کے سربراہ کی ہواہمش یا کہنے پر ووٹ دینے سے انکار کر دیتے ہیں
4. دھڑے کے دوسرے افراد کو دھڑے کا سربراہ تبدیل کرنے پر آمادہ کرتے ہیں
5. دھڑے کے دوسرے افراد کے سامنے دھڑے کے سربراہ سے غیر اطمینان کا اظہار کرتے ہیں اور اپنا احتجاج ریکارڈ کرواتے ہیں
6. دھڑے کے سربراہ کی بیروی کرتے رہنے کے سوا دوسرا کوئی آپشن نہیں
7. کچھ بھی نہیں کرتے
8. پتہ نہیں
9. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q74)** اگر آپ کا MPA اور MNA یا انتخابی امیدوار اپنے وعدے یا آپ کے مطالبے پورے نہیں کرتا، اپنی ذمہ داریوں کی خلاف ورزی کرتا ہے، یا پھر اپنی ذمہ داری اور اختسابی دائرہ کار کے حوالے سے کیئے گئے اپنے فیصلوں سے آپ کو آگاہ نہیں کرتا یا پھر ان کی وضاحت دینے میں ناکام رہتا ہے تو آپ کیا کرتے ہیں؟

**NBV**

1. اس کی حمایت کرنا چھوڑ دیتے ہیں
2. اگلے انتخابات میں اس کو ووٹ نہیں دیتے
3. اس سے اپنی غیر اطمینانی کا اظہار کرتے ہیں اور اس کے سامنے اپنا احتجاج ریکارڈ کرواتے ہیں
4. اگلے انتخابات میں بھی اسے سپورٹ کرتے اور ووٹ ڈالتے رہتے ہیں
5. کچھ بھی نہیں کرتے
6. پتہ نہیں
7. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

**(Q75)** آپ کے گاؤں میں کس سرکاری سروس یا سہولت کی سب سے زیادہ ضرورت ہے؟

1. صحت کی اچھی سہولیات
2. معیاری تعلیم
3. پینے کے صاف پانی کی دستیابی
4. صفائی
5. نقاصی آب
6. کچی نالیاں
7. کچی سڑکیں اور گلیاں
8. گلیوں میں بتیاں (لائٹس)
9. پتہ نہیں
10. دوسرا (واضح کریں).....

## Check List for Key Informant Interviews

Questionnaire # \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Tehsil		Code	
Union Council		Code	
Village		Code	

Name of KI: \_\_\_\_\_

Age: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Years)Educational Level: \_\_\_\_\_  
(See codes below)

Profession: \_\_\_\_\_

Caste/Biradri: \_\_\_\_\_  
(See codes blow)Phone # \_\_\_\_\_  
(Optional)

### Codes for Castes or Biradris

1= Jatt	10= Cheemba	19= Malik
2= Rajput	11= Dogar	20= Bhatti
3= Arain	12= Shaikh	21= Rana
4= Kambo	13= Syed	22= Other (specify)
5= Kumhar	14= Ansari	
6= Mochi	15= Julaha	
7= Miwati	16= Lohar	
8= Taili	17= Tarkhan	
9= Naae	18= Sunar	

### Codes for Educational Level

1= < Primary Class
2= Primary Class
3= Middle Class
4= Matric
5= Intermediate
6= Undergraduate
7= Graduate
8= Postgraduate
9= Doctorate
10= Post-Doctorate

**Q1.** Could you please tell me a little bit about historical background of the village?

.....  
.....

**Q2.** What is the type of this village (e.g. proprietary or crown village)?

.....

**Q3.** In your view, what is a vote block?

.....  
.....

**Q4.** What was the number of vote blocks in the village in 2008 general elections?

.....

**Q5.** What was the number of vote blocks in the village in 2013 general elections?

.....

**Q6.** What were the names of vote blocks and their leaders and on average how many votes each block controlled in 2008 general elections? In addition to this, please also mention that to which candidate each block was aligned with?

S. No.	Name of Vote Block in 2008	Name of Vote Block Leader in 2008	Percentage of Votes Controlled by the Block	To Which Candidates the Block was Aligned with?
1				MPA: ..... MNA: .....
2				MPA: ..... MNA: .....
3				MPA: ..... MNA: .....
4				MPA: ..... MNA: .....
5				MPA: ..... MNA: .....

**Q7.** What were the names of vote blocks and their leaders and on average how many votes each block controlled in 2013 general elections? In addition to this, please also mention that to which candidate each block was aligned with?

S. No.	Name of Vote Block in 2008	Name of Vote Block Leader in 2008	Percentage of Votes Controlled by the Block	To Which Candidates the Block was Aligned with?
1				MPA: ..... MNA: .....
2				MPA: ..... MNA: .....
3				MPA: ..... MNA: .....
4				MPA: ..... MNA: .....
5				MPA: ..... MNA: .....

**Q8.** What is the population proportion of the caste and Qoum to which each vote block leader belongs? In addition to this, please also mention landholding of the household of each vote block leader?

S. No.	Name of vote block leader in 2008	Social Caste	Proportion of Village Population	Occupational Qoum	Proportion of Village Population	Landholding of HH of VBL
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						

S. No.	Name of vote block leader in 2013	Social Caste	Proportion of Village Population	Occupational Qoum	Proportion of Village Population	Landholding of HH of VBL
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						

**Q9.** Which are the major social castes in the village and what is their proportion in the village population?

S. No.	Social Caste	Percentage of the Village Population
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

**Q10.** Which are the dominant or powerful castes in the village?

.....

.....

**Q11.** On what basis are they dominant or powerful in the village?

.....

**Q12.** What is the proportion of different occupational Qoums in the village?

S. No.	Occupational Qoum	Percentage of the Village Population
1	Zamindar-1 (middle level and big land owners who own more than 12.5 acres of land)	
2	Zamindar-2 (small land owners or tenants who either own less than 12.5 acres of land or landless)	
3	Kammi (artisan labour)	
4	Musalli (unskilled domestic or agricultural labour)	

**Q13.** How widespread is the land inequality in the village?

.....

.....

**Q14.** How much population of the village is landless?

.....

.....

**Q15.** What proportion of the village population is poor?

.....

.....

**Q16.** How much is the distance of the village from the town?

.....

.....

**Q17.** How the village is politically organized?

.....

.....

**Q18.** What is the process of electoral decision making in the village at the time of each election? (Can members participate in decisions of the vote block?)

.....

.....

**Q19.** Did any block leader ever get blocked some approved scheme of service delivery as a sign of punishment to a certain opponent neighbourhood?

.....

.....

**Q20.** Why there are multiple vote blocks in the same village?

.....

.....

**Q21.** Why do different vote blocks in the village align with different candidates or political parties? (e.g. local animosity, best strategy to ensure delivery of public goods and services to the village, etc.)

.....

.....

**Q22.** Why do some vote blocks change their affiliation with a candidate or a party in next elections while others not?

.....

.....

**Q23.** What is the source of political influence of the vote block leaders in the village? (e.g. land, class based factionalism, clientelism, kinship, etc.)

.....

.....

**Q24.** On what basis do people vote in this village? (Rank the number of voters out 10 for each category of voters)

S. No.	Basis on which people vote in this village	Rank (1-10): out of 10 how many voters vote on this base?
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

**Q25. On what basis are members recruited into vote blocks?**

(Basis of formation of vote block e.g. Qoum, Mohallah, Political party / candidate affiliation, extended family / Khandan, landlord dependent, protection / service delivery, peeri-mureedi, qoum alliance)

S. No.	Basis on which members are recruited into vote blocks in this village	Rank (1-10): out of 10 how many voters vote on this base?
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

**Q26. Why do people vote as members of a vote block?**

.....

.....

**Q27. Why do people not vote as members of a vote block?**

.....

.....

**Q28. What is the condition of basic essential public services in the village?**

**Public Education**

	Boys Primary School	Boys Middle School	Boys High School	Girls Primary School	Girls Middle School	Girls High School
Availability? Y=Yes, N=No						
Is number of room adequate?						
Latrine facility Y=Yes, N=No						
Drinking water facility Y=Yes, N=No						
Is number of teachers adequate or not?						
Teachers attendance record (G=Good, B=Bad)						
Are teachers competent? Y=Yes, N=No						
Rate teachers performance (1-10)						
Rate overall condition of school (1-10)						

## Public Health

	Dispensary	Basic Health Unit (BHU)	Rural Health Unit (RHU)	Hospital
Availability? Y=Yes, N=No				
Rate availability of medical equipment (1-10)				
Rate availability of medicines (1-10)				
Is number of medical staff adequate? Y=Yes, N=No				
Is medical staff competent? Y=Yes, N=No				
Attendance record of medical staff (G=Good, B=Bad)				
Rate Performance of Medical Staff (1-10)				
Rate the Health Unit Overall (1-10)				

## Water and Sanitation

	Not available	Available, but to certain neighbourhoods not others	Available to all
Is clean drinking water available in your village?			
Is tapped water supply facility available in your village?			
What is the major source of drinking water in the village?			
Sewerage facilities available in the village: 1= Piped / underground covered sewerage 2= Paved but uncovered sewerage 3= Un-paved open sewerage			
Where the contaminated water of the village is disposed-off?			
Are there any ponds of contaminated water in the village?			
Where the waste of the village is disposed-off?			
Are there any waste dump sites in the village?			
Rate water and sanitation facilities available in the village (1-10)			

**Public Infrastructure**

	All neighbourhoods	Excluding certain neighbourhoods	Only in certain neighbourhoods
What is the condition of roads in the village? G=Good, A=Average, B=Bad			
What is the condition of pavement of streets in the village? (G=Good, A=Average, B=Bad)			
Is public street lights facility available in the village? (Y=Yes, N=No)			
How do you rate overall public infrastructure in the village? (1-10)			

**Q29. Which public services have been provided in the village in the past ten years?**

Service Name	Year of Provision	1=Public 2=Private	Who made effort for provision of this service?	Provided to whom? 1=To all neighbourhoods 2=Excluding certain neighbourhoods 3=Only in certain neighbourhoods

**Q30. Is there targeted or universalistic public service delivery or exchange in the village (e.g. roads, pavement of streets, water and sanitation, and streets lights available only in certain neighbourhoods while not in others)?**

.....

.....

.....

.....

## Check List for Interviews of Vote Block Leaders

Questionnaire # \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Tehsil		Code	
Union Council		Code	
Village		Code	

Were you Vote Block Leader in general elections?	
1. Yes both in 2008 and 2013 general elections	Proceed the interview with next questions. Ask the questions related to 2008 as well as 2013 general elections.
2. Yes, only in 2008 general elections	Proceed the interview with next questions but do not ask questions related to 2013 general elections.
3. Yes, only in 2013 general elections	Proceed the interview with next questions but do not ask questions related to 2008 general elections.
4. No, neither in 2008 nor in 2013 general elections	Do not proceed the interview with this respondent and move to the respondent next to it to fill this questionnaire.

Name of VB: \_\_\_\_\_  
(If there is any)Name of VBL: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Optional)Gender of VBL: \_\_\_\_\_  
(1= Male, 2= Female)Age of VBL: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Years)Educational level of VBL: \_\_\_\_\_  
(See codes blow)Land ownership of HH.VBL: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Acres)Caste/Biradri: \_\_\_\_\_  
(See codes blow)Phone # \_\_\_\_\_  
(Optional)

Codes for Castes or Biradris	Codes for Educational Level
1= Jatt	1= < Primary Class
2= Rajput	2= Primary Class
3= Arain	3= Middle Class
4= Kambo	4= Matric
5= Kumhar	5= Intermediate
6= Mochi	6= Undergraduate
7= Miwati	7= Graduate
8= Taili	8= Postgraduate
9= Naae	9= Doctorate
10= Cheemba	10= Post-Doctorate
11= Dogar	
12= Shaikh	
13= Syed	
14= Ansari	
15= Julaha	
16= Lohar	
17= Tarkhan	
18= Sunar	
19= Malik	
20= Bhatti	
21= Rana	
22= Other (specify)	

**Q1. What electoral promises did you make before 2008 general elections? VBL.2008**

.....  
.....

**Q2. What electoral promises did you make before 2013 general elections? VBL.2013**

.....  
.....

**Q3. What kind of demands do you face by you vote block members?**

.....  
.....

**Q4. What electoral promises were made by your favoured candidates to you in 2008 general elections? VBL.2008**

.....  
.....

**Q5. What electoral promises were made by your favoured candidates to you in 2013 general elections? VBL.2013**

.....  
.....

**Q6. As a vote block leader, what do you expect from your favoured electoral candidates?**

.....  
.....

**Q7. To whom did your block vote in 2008 general elections? VBL.2008**

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_ MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q8. On what basis did your block vote these candidates in 2008 general elections? VBL.2008**

MPA: .....

MNA: .....

**Q9. To whom did your block vote in 2013 general elections? VBL.2013**

MPA: \_\_\_\_\_ MNA: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q10. On what basis did your block vote these candidates in 2013 general elections?**

**VBL.2013**

MPA: .....

MNA: .....

**Q11. Why did your block vote to the same candidates both in 2008 and 2013 general elections? VBL.2008+2013**

MPA: .....

MNA: .....

**Q12. Why did your block not vote to the same candidates both in 2008 and 2013 general elections? VBL.2008+2013**

MPA: .....

MNA: .....

**Q13. Did your favoured candidates delivered their clientelistic promises (e.g. jobs, subsidies, loans, medicines, food, access to police and court, allocation of public officers) to your vote block members?**

MPA (2008): .....

MNA (2008): .....

MPA (2013): .....

MNA (2013): .....

**Q14. What kind of benefits your favoured candidates delivered to you or your vote block members?**

MPA (2008): .....

MNA (2008): .....

MPA (2013): .....

MNA (2013): .....

**Q15. Do you help your block members in matters of police station and court?**

.....

.....

**Q16. Do you help your block members to get their work done in any other government organization?**

.....

.....

**Q17.** Do your favoured candidates help you in matters of police station and court?

.....

.....

**Q18.** Do your favoured candidates help in getting work done in any other government organization?

.....

.....

**Q19.** Did you or your agents distribute drinks or eatable goods, medicines, clothes or monetary payments to voters during elections campaign of 2008 general elections? **VBL.2008**

.....

.....

**Q20.** If yes then did it increase votes of your vote block? **VBL.2008**

.....

.....

**Q21.** Did you or your agents distribute drinks or eatable goods, medicines, clothes or monetary payments to voters during elections campaign of 2013 general elections? **VBL.2013**

.....

.....

**Q22.** If yes then did it increase votes of your vote block? **VBL.2013**

.....

.....

**Q23.** As a vote block leader, in your view, what is the responsibility of your patrons/MPs/electoral candidates?

.....

.....

**Q24.** As a vote block leader, what do you expect from your patrons/MPs/electoral candidates?

.....

.....

**Q25.** Do you require your patrons/MPs/electoral candidates to inform you about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

.....  
.....

**Q26.** Do you inform your block members about your past or future actions and decisions with regard to your promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

.....  
.....

**Q27.** Do your patrons/MPs/electoral candidates inform you about their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

.....  
.....

**Q28.** Do you require your patrons/MPs/electoral candidates to justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

.....  
.....

**Q29.** Do you justify to your block members your past or future actions and decisions with regard to your promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

.....  
.....

**Q30.** Do your patrons/MPs/electoral candidates justify their past or future actions and decisions with regard to their promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

.....  
.....

**Q31.** What do you do if your patron/MP/electoral candidate does not fulfil his promises or your demands, violates his duties or fails to inform or justify his actions and decisions with regard to his responsibility?

1. Quit supporting him
2. Do not give him collective vote of your vote block in next elections
3. Express your dissatisfaction or register your protest with him
4. Keep supporting him even in next elections
5. Do nothing
6. Other (specify): .....

**Q32.** Whom do you provide or help to get state resources and services (e.g. subsidies, jobs, loans, cash transfers, medicines, food, housing, access to police and court etc.)?

1. Your supporters/block members only
2. Everyone regardless of their voting choices
3. Don't know
4. Other (specify): .....

**Q33.** How often do you help your opponent block members or voters to get aforementioned state resources and services?

1. Always
2. Sometimes
3. Very rare
4. Never
5. Don't know

**Q34.** On what conditions do you help your opponent block members or voters?

.....  
.....

**Q35.** Do your block members or voters receive preferential treatment in provision of these state resources and services as compared to the opponents or non-block members?

.....  
.....

**Q36.** If an individual or group of voters promises to vote for you or your favoured candidates but they do not deliver on their promises then how do you know it?

.....  
.....

**Q37.** In such case what sanctions do you impose on such individual or group?

.....  
.....

**Q38.** What sort of connections do you have with state institutions (e.g. police station, court, government organizations/offices etc.)?

.....  
.....

**Q39. On what basis do you recruit members into your vote block?**

.....

.....

**Q40. On what basis were you or are connected to the following candidates?**

MPA (2008): .....

MNA (2008): .....

MPA (2013): .....

MNA (2013): .....

**List of acronyms and instructions for each of these to be followed in Block Leader interviews**

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>What does this acronym stands for?</b>	<b>Whom the questions containing these acronyms to be asked?</b>
VB	Vote Block	All vote block leaders
VBL	Vote Block Leader	All voter block leaders
HH.VBL	Household of the Vote Block Leader	All vote block leaders
VBL.2008	Vote Block Leader of 2008	These questions are only to be asked to those who were vote block leaders in 2008 general elections.
VBL.2013	Vote Block Leader of 2013	These questions are only to be asked to those who were vote block leaders in 2013 general elections.
VBL.2008+2013	Vote Block Leader of both 2008 and 2013	These questions are only to be asked to those who were vote block leaders in both 2008 and 2013 general elections.

### Check List for Interviews of MLAs

Questionnaire # \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Tehsil		Code	
Constituency		Code	

#### Were you candidate for provincial or national assembly in general elections?

1. Yes, both in 2008 and 2013 general elections	Proceed the interview with next questions by asking questions related to 2008 as well as 2013 general elections
2. Yes, only in 2008 general elections	Proceed the interview with next questions but do not ask questions related to 2013 general elections
3. Yes, only in 2013 general elections	Proceed the interview with next questions but do not ask questions related to 2008 general elections
4. No, neither in 2008 nor in 2013 general elections	Do not proceed interview with this respondent and move to the respondent next to it to fill this questionnaire.

Name of MP: \_\_\_\_\_

Candidate for: \_\_\_\_\_  
(1=MPA, 2=MNA)Caste/Biraderi: \_\_\_\_\_  
(See codes below)Phone # \_\_\_\_\_  
(Optional)

#### Codes for Castes or Biraderis

1= Jatt	8= Taili	15= Julaha	22= Other (specify)
2= Rajput	9= Naae	16= Lohar	
3= Arain	10= Cheemba	17= Tarkhan	
4= Kambo	11= Dogar	18= Sunar	
5= Kumhar	12= Shaikh	19= Malik	
6= Mochi	13= Syed	20= Bhatti	
7= Miwati	14= Ansari	21= Rana	

**Q1.** What electoral promises did you make to vote block leaders in 2008 general elections? **MLA.2008**

.....  
.....

**Q2.** What electoral promises did you make to vote block leaders in 2013 general elections? **MLA.2013**

.....  
.....

**Q3.** What electoral promises did you make to non-block voters in 2008 general elections? **MLA.2008**

.....  
.....

**Q4.** What electoral promises did you make to non-block voters in 2013 general elections? **MLA.2013**

.....  
.....

**Q5.** What kind of demands do you face by vote block leaders/brokers?

.....  
.....

**Q6.** What kind of demands do you face by non-block voters?

.....  
.....

**Q7.** What kind of benefits do you deliver to vote block leaders or their block members to retain their electoral support?

.....  
.....

**Q8.** What kind of benefits do you deliver to non-block voters to retain their electoral support?

.....  
.....

**Q9.** On what basis vote block leaders keep on supporting you in next elections?

.....

.....

**Q10.** On what basis vote block leaders quit their electoral support in next elections?

.....

.....

**Q11.** On what basis non-block voters keep on supporting in next elections?

.....

.....

**Q12.** On what basis non-block voters quit their electoral support in next elections?

.....

.....

**Q13.** To whom do you allocate public offices (e.g. discretionary allocation of public offices like chairman Zakat Committee etc.)?

.....

.....

**Q14.** On what basis do you allocate such public offices to them?

.....

.....

**Q15.** Did you or your agents distribute drink or eatable goods, medicines, clothes, or monetary payments to voters during election campaign of 2008 general elections? **MLA.2008**

.....

.....

**Q16.** If yes then did it increase your votes? **MLA.2008**

.....

.....

**Q17.** Did you or your agents distribute drink or eatable goods, medicines, clothes, or monetary payments to voters during election campaign of 2013 general elections? **MLA.2013**

.....  
.....

**Q18.** If yes then did it increase your votes? **MLA.2013**

.....  
.....

**Q19.** Do you inform vote block leaders/brokers about your past or future actions and decisions with regard to your promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

.....  
.....

**Q20.** Do you inform your non-block voters about your past or future actions and decisions with regard to your promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

.....  
.....

**Q21.** Do you justify to the block leaders/brokers your past or future actions and decisions with regard to your promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

.....  
.....

**Q22.** Do you justify to your non-block voters your past or future actions and decisions with regard to your promises/responsibility/domain of accountability?

.....  
.....

**Q23.** Whom do you provide or help to get state resources and services (e.g. subsidies, jobs, loans, cash transfers, medicines, food, housing, access to police and court etc.)?

1. Your voters and supporter block leaders only
2. Every one regardless of their voting choices
3. Don't know

.....  
.....

**Q24.** How often do you help your opponent voters or block leaders to get aforementioned state resources and services?

1. Always
2. Sometimes
3. Very rare
4. Never
5. Don't know

**Q25.** On what conditions do you help your opponent voters or block leaders?

.....

.....

**Q26.** Do your voters or supporter block leaders receive preferential treatment in provision of these state resources and services as compared to opponent voters and block leaders?

.....

.....

**Q27.** Whom do you rely on to select the recipients and deliver benefits to the targeted constituencies?

.....

**Q28.** If an individual or group of voters promises to vote for you but does not deliver on their promises, how do you know it?

.....

.....

**Q29.** In such case what sanctions do you impose on such individual or group?

.....

.....

<b>Acronyms</b>	<b>What do these Acronyms Stand for?</b>	<b>Whom the Questions containing these Acronyms to be Asked?</b>
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly	All respondents
MPA	Member of Provincial Assembly	Only provincial assembly candidates
MNA	Member of National Assembly	Only national assembly candidates
MLA.2008	Member of Legislative Assembly of 2008	Only those MPs who contested in 2008 general elections
MLA.2013	Member of Legislative Assembly of 2013	Only those MPs who contested in 2013 general elections