

Review Article

Pakistan Revisited: Notes of A Sentimental Arm-Chair Journey

by

RONALD EGGER*

Hardly more than a decade ago a student of the Pakistani administrative system and civil service was compelled to feel his way very much in the dark. There was no Constitution, and the Government of India Act of 1935, as amended, illuminated somewhat imperfectly the powers of government. The Rules of Business, the Book of Financial Powers, and the Secretariat Instructions were little more than irrelevant collections, hastily cobbled together, of regulations prevailing in the government of undivided India. A few reports on Pakistani public administration were available. Some of these were very bad, such as the *Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission* of 1949. Some of them were very good, such as the Jeffries Report on the *Development of Organization and Methods Work in the Pakistan Government* of 1952. Some of them were good within the limits they set for themselves, such as Creagh Coen's *Report of the Administrative Enquiry Committee* of 1953. But in the main they were confined to essentially myopic investigations, they were informed primarily by the past, they drew their inspiration from gazing raptly in the mirror of the Indian Civil Service, and they were altogether unconscious of the extraordinary requirements of a new Nation to which the Past was but Prologue.

Ten years later the Editor of *The Pakistan Development Review* finds himself in need of an essay reviewing no less than six important books on the civil service and administrative system of Pakistan that have appeared almost contemporaneously¹. Written by both Pakistanis and foreigners, these books are

*The author is Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

¹Ahmad, Munir, *The Civil Servant in Pakistan*. (Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xi + 288). Anisuzzaman, Md., *The Circle Officer*. (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1963. Pp. v + 97).

Chaudhuri, M.A., *The Civil Service in Pakistan*. (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1963. Pp. xiii + 428).

Goodnow, Henry Frank, *The Civil Service of Pakistan*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. viii + 328).

Inayatullah (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan*. (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1964. Pp. vi + 453).

Inayatullah (ed.), *District Administration in West Pakistan: Its Problems and Challenges*. (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1964).

intrinsically important for what they add to our knowledge of Pakistani government and administration. They are symbolically important for what they demonstrate with respect to the possibilities of administrative and political modernization within a very short time-span. They are institutionally important for what they represent in terms of ongoing organizations and facilities for administrative and political modernization, since all of the books are institutional products—Ahmad's of the Social Sciences Research Centre of the University of the Panjab, Anisuzzaman's and Chaudhuri's of the National Institute of Public Administration in Dacca, Goodnow's of the Institute of Public and Business Administration of the University of Karachi, and Inayatullah's of the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development in Peshawar. And they are diplomatically important for what they demonstrate with respect to the utility of technical assistance in accelerating administrative and political modernization.

The books fall into three categories. Ahmad, Chaudhuri and Goodnow have addressed themselves to the attitudes and values of public administration, and the mode of organization of the civil service cadres. Anisuzzaman and Inayatullah, in his *District Administration in West Pakistan*, on the other hand, direct their attention to administration at the local level, although the institutions with which they deal are quite disparate. In the third category is Inayatullah's *Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan*, which is concerned with the most important, and so far unresolved, problems in developing countries generally—how to integrate a traditional bureaucracy into the mainstream of social modernization, and how to develop a public service capable of responding effectively to the revolution of rising expectations.

I

While the books by Ahmad, Chaudhuri and Goodnow share the central theme of the civil service, they cover highly diverse bodies of subject matter in quite different ways. Ahmad's is a sociological study of civil servants of the Province of West Pakistan posted in Lahore. Chaudhuri's volume, which was a doctoral dissertation at the London School of Economics, is an historical-institutional survey of the several all-Pakistan Services with, not unexpectedly, frequent references to imagined British origins and parallels. Goodnow's book, likewise based in large part upon a doctoral dissertation at Columbia, concentrates on the Civil Service of Pakistan—the small, generalist elite corps the members of which regard themselves as the sole heirs and executors in Pakistan of the pre-Partition Indian Civil Service and as such the natural and rightful rulers of the country.

There are 924 civil servants performing essentially executive as contrasted with judicial duties in Lahore. Ahmad's *The Civil Servant in Pakistan* provides

us with a highly sophisticated sociological analysis based upon 432 interviews in depth, of the civil servants' images of themselves and of each other and of the determinants from which these images are derived. Since Ahmad's universe is a professional-spatial one, he has looked not only at the totality of the CSP cadre in Lahore—of which there were 39—but likewise at samples of the cadres of the other Central and all-Pakistan Services assigned to Lahore as well as the several Provincial services. This study of the background and attitudes of civil servants in Pakistan is a part of a comprehensive inquiry undertaken by the Social Sciences Research Centre of the University of the Panjab into the important groups in Pakistani society which are playing influential roles in the processes of social and political modernization. It was initiated with a seminar in Lahore in 1960 at which a substantial number of civil servants met to consider some fairly fundamental questions about their place in the social order of which the following are typical. What specific changes need be brought about in the attitude of the public servants in order to meet the needs of today? In what respects should the public change its own attitude so that the public servants are able to perform their tasks smoothly and effectively? Does status-consciousness exist in the civil service and how can it be removed?

The success of the seminar in loosening up the channels of communication led the Centre to develop a fairly elaborate questionnaire to guide the interviewing process. The interviewing project was subsequently approved, under appropriate safeguards, by the Secretaries to the Government of West Pakistan and a letter of authorization, giving the interviewers access to the civil servants in Lahore, was issued by the Chief Secretary. The statistical techniques by which the sample was determined were in accordance with modern sampling principles, and there is every reason to think that Mr. Ahmad's data are fully representative.

The author and his interviewers, moreover, were by no means inhibited in their inquiries into civil servants' attitudes, values and vital statistics. The median age of the sample, for example, was 42 years. Approximately 45 per cent of the sample were educated to the level of the M.A. or its equivalent, or further, 90 per cent of the civil servants in the Health Department were so qualified, 77 per cent of the CSP officers, and 52 per cent of the sample in animal husbandry. Pakistani public servants appear to breed Pakistani public servants; 64 per cent of the sample were born to fathers in public or semi-public employment, and 51 per cent were the children of gazetted or non-gazetted Government servants. It is also interesting to note that of the 640 employed brothers reported by the sample, 527 were in public or semi-public employment. The sires of the sample, in short, provide almost a thousand Pakistani civil servants. The popular conviction on the subcontinent is that the civil service is the playground of rich men's

sons; actually the median income of the fathers of the sample was 289 rupees per month, the mode was 198 rupees, and the mean 533. There are a very few very rich men's sons in the civil service, but it is made up predominantly of the offspring of moderately circumstanced fathers. Of course, by Pakistani per capita income standards 289 rupees per month is not subsistence-level living. The fathers of over two-thirds of the sample had not been educated beyond secondary school, and most of these had terminated with a primary school education; of the mothers 62 per cent were illiterate, 14 per cent literate, 22 per cent had some schooling, and only 2 per cent had B.A. or M.A. degrees or their equivalents. The civil service wives were somewhat better educated; 14 per cent were illiterate, 12 per cent literate, 49 per cent had some public schooling, 13 per cent had attended college, and 12 per cent had B.A. or M.A. degrees or their equivalents.

But Ahmad's comparisons go even further. He tells us that the five cadres with high public esteem in Pakistan are the CSP, the Police Service of Pakistan, the Provincial Civil Service, the Health Service and the Engineering Service. At the other end of the scale, with low public esteem, are the Provincial Police Service, the Secretariat Service, the Co-operative Service, the Prison Service, the Animal Husbandry Service, and employment in the Public Relations Department. The prestige colleges for the Pakistanis, we are told, are Government College and Forman Christian College in Lahore, Islamia College in Peshawar, Gordon College in Rawalpindi, Aligarh University in India, St. Stephens College in Delhi, and European Universities in general. In the grey area of the prestige scale are Murray College in Sialkot, Edwards College in Peshawar, and D.J. Sind College in Karachi. At the bottom of the scale, without prestige are M.A.O. College, Dyal Singh College and Islamia College in Lahore, and other colleges in West Pakistan. Professional schools constitute a separate category. When the cadres and the colleges are matched up, there appears to be a substantial correlation between prestigious cadres and prestigious colleges: 71 per cent of the CSP is from the Pakistani Ivy League, 62 per cent of the Pakistan Police Service, 65 per cent of the Provincial Civil Service, and so on. The Health and Engineering services are, of course, trained in their upper reaches in the professional colleges. The low prestige cadres came in the main from the low prestige colleges—47 per cent as against 22 per cent from high prestige institutions. Clearly, a young man with a degree from South Texas State Teachers' College at San Marcos would have a difficult time in this machine.

One of the questions in Mr. Ahmad's schedule dealt with the degree of "Westernization" of civil servants, inquiring into whether they liked to go dancing, imbibe or serve alcoholic beverages, keep their women in *pardah*, are

willing to allow their sons to choose their own wives, prefer Western-type schools for their children, speak English with friends who speak both English and Urdu, read foreign newspapers or magazines in English, prefer foreign films, are willing to let their daughters choose their own husbands, and are willing to allow their daughters to attend co-educational colleges and universities. To interpret these data he has constructed a Westernization index, which, when applied to the data reveals that only 9 per cent of the sample was highly Westernized in its day-to-day life, 33 per cent were semi-Westernized, and 58 per cent were not Westernized at all. Within the sample there was, understandably, a very high correlation between the level of education and the degree of Westernization; there was a substantial correlation between the socio-economic level of the respondents and the degree of Westernization, but a rather limited correlation between the level in the hierarchy and the degree of Westernization.

The inquiry attempted to analyze the motives which led Pakistanis into government service and the extent to which it provided an acceptable career opportunity. With regard to reasons for entering public service, three major categories of responses emerged. Negatively, the dominant reason was the lack of alternative opportunity. Positively, prestige, status, power and security were the major attractions. In a neutral, but highly important place, was the tradition of government service in many Pakistani families. Like their American counterparts, government service has not been without its disillusionments for the Pakistanis. The first preference of 89 per cent of the respondents was for government service at the time of seeking their first employment; by the time the interviews were undertaken it remained the first preference of 79 per cent, but only 53 per cent hoped their children would enter the civil service. Service in a foreign private concern, interestingly enough, was preferred for their children by 30 per cent of the sample. Amongst the cadres the occupations preferred for their children varied enormously: 78 per cent of the Health Service preferred that their children enter government employment, 61 per cent of the CSP, 54 per cent of the Civil Secretariat, down to 16 per cent of Animal Husbandry. But in all the more numerous categories employment in a foreign private concern rated high.

The findings of the inquiry with respect to the attitudes of civil servants toward democratic self-government are of the first order of importance. Only 20 per cent of the civil servants thought the people of Pakistan were qualified and ready to participate in a democratic form of government. In the opinion of 35 per cent more sustained experience and maturity was required before representative institutions could become viable. It was the job of the civil service to run the government until democratic institutions were feasible in the opinion

of 34 per cent. Thus, 89 per cent of the civil servants appear to have some sort of moral commitment to the eventual achievement of representative institutions, albeit for the most part with notable gradualistic reservations. Permanent authoritarianism is the choice of 5 per cent, another 5 per cent did not wish to go on record on the matter, and 1 per cent couldn't understand the question. A heavy majority of the civil servants committed to representative institutions—78 per cent—were in favour of the Basic Democracies, which have the possibility of exercising some degree of restraint upon the otherwise popularly unchecked discretion of the civil service. Significantly, there is no correlation between the degree of the civil servant's Westernization and his attitude toward democratic self-government.

Relations between civil servants and politicians has been a troublesome issue ever since Partition and is alleged to have been an important factor in the suspension of constitutional government. The inquiry put a hypothetical case in its interviews involving pressure by a minister on a civil servant to ignore certain illegal acts of the minister's supporters and to actively assist the minister's political campaign. In this contingency 21 per cent of the civil servants would yield, 4 per cent would apply for transfer, 23 per cent would appear to yield but in practice perform their duty, 5 per cent would express an inability to do anything unlawful, 41 per cent would refuse the request, 4 per cent would insist upon orders in writing or report the event to their superiors, and 2 per cent refused to answer the question. The Police took the strongest line against ministerial pressure, the professionals—Health and Engineering—were next, and CSP and PCS in a cautious third category. It is interesting to note that 81 per cent of the civil servants anticipated that victimization or harassment would result from resistance.

The preoccupation of Pakistani civil servants with status has been a frequent target of criticism by both Pakistanis and foreign consultants. The inquiry sought to throw light on this problem by putting to the civil servants a series of questions and hypothetical cases dealing with human relations amongst public servants and developing a scale for rating reactions. Civil servants are classified with respect to their attitudes toward subordinates in social relations as status-conscious, pedantic, and non-status-conscious. Roughly, a status-conscious superior is one who refuses to attend a farewell party for a transferred or retired subordinate, a pedantic superior is one who attends as a matter of form and leaves early, and a non-status-conscious superior is one who stays and has a good time. Overall, 15 per cent of the civil servants are status-conscious,

30 per cent are pedantic, and 55 per cent are non-status-conscious. But the cadres tell a different story. In the CSP 23 per cent were status-conscious, 55 per cent were pedantic, and only 22 per cent believed in fraternizing. In the Police Department 33 per cent were status-conscious, 24 per cent were pedantic, and 33 per cent were non-status-conscious. Moreover, both status-consciousness and pedanticism appear to increase in relation to the civil servant's place in the chain of command. Status-consciousness is 50 per cent higher amongst officers first in the chain of command than amongst those last in the hierarchy, while pedanticism is more than double at the top of the chain of command. Amongst those last in the hierarchy 62 per cent are non-status-conscious, but only 29 per cent of those first in the chain of command entertain such views.

Attitudes toward the involvement of subordinates in the decision-making process are likewise revealing. Overall 5 per cent of the civil servants thought no subordinates should be involved in policy making, 32 per cent thought only senior subordinates should be consulted, and 63 per cent were willing to associate subordinates of all ranks directly concerned with the policy issue. Attitudes on decisions implementing policy exhibited about the same distribution. But attitudes on other sorts of issues varied considerably from this relatively liberal norm. On decisions relating to internal departmental administration 16 per cent felt that no subordinates should be involved, 40 per cent thought senior subordinates might be associated, 27 per cent were willing to involve all subordinates down to clerical ranks, and 16 per cent supported unlimited togetherness. On staff welfare decisions 3 per cent thought no subordinates should be associated, 14 per cent felt only senior subordinates need be involved, 25 per cent were willing to bring in all subordinates except those of the lowest rank, and 58 per cent favoured total involvement. In this matter the CSP was the least authoritarian of the cadres and the Pakistan Police Service the most authoritarian. Internally, of course, the CSP has always been fairly democratic.

The civil servant's conception of his own public image throws important light on the attitude of the Pakistani public service. The survey posed four alternatives to its respondents with respect to their appraisal of the attitudes toward civil servants: (1) the Government employee is regarded as a ruler; (2) he is a servant of the State whose main job is to protect the interests of the State; (3) he is a servant of the public whose main job is to protect the interests of the public; and (4) he is a leader of the people whose main job is to guide and educate the people. The predominant opinion of the sample—57 per cent—is that the people regard civil servants as rulers. Only 2 per cent thought the civil

servant was regarded as a friend and a guide. About 19 per cent felt that Government employees were regarded as servants of the public, and 21 per cent thought they were viewed as servants of the State.

Ahmad's investigation also dealt with a number of special issues in Pakistani administration, involving primarily the generalist-specialist relationship in the civil service and, collaterally, the problem of recruitment to the generalist cadres. The interposition of generalist officers, usually CSP, between specialist department heads and ministers has generated no small amount of friction and resentment in the technical services. The issue, in practical terms, is presented in its clearest terms in the question of the introduction of personnel from non-CSP cadres into the Civil Service of Pakistan. Overall, 75 per cent of the respondents supported lateral recruitment, 13 per cent opposed it, 4 per cent were indifferent, 3 per cent thought only PCS officers should be promoted to the CSP, and 5 per cent favoured a single administrative service. But only 45 per cent of the CSP officers supported lateral recruitment, 36 per cent opposed, 13 per cent were willing to admit PCS officers, 3 per cent were indifferent, and 3 per cent did not reply. A major factor in the maintenance of the generalist cadres as men of "breadth without depth" is frequency of transfer. Of the 321 Class I and Class II officers in the sample, 3 per cent had been transferred in less than one, 26 per cent had been transferred in less than two years, 48 per cent had been transferred in less than three years, and 54 per cent had been transferred within three years. These are the statistics of an itinerant, but not an expert, civil service.

II

Chaudhuri's *The Civil Service in Pakistan* is a painstaking, thorough, pedestrian, and occasionally relevant account of the history and present status of the All-Pakistan and Central Superior Services, with frequent references and comparisons, sometimes apt, to British experience. The first part of the book is involved in a reiteration of the history of the ICS from its beginnings in the Mercantile Service of the East India Company in 1601 to Partition in 1947. The story has been better told in a dozen different books, but ponderous historical introductions seem to be as much a part of the doctoral tradition at LSE as elsewhere, and Dr. Chaudhuri need not be faulted for his conformity. Actually, the only significantly British characteristic of the civil services on the subcontinent is the accent in which business is conducted by the better educated members, and the tempo of political and administrative modernization would be greatly

accelerated if Pakistanis would concentrate on the problems of the Republic rather than dwelling on their tenuous affiliations with British feudalism.

When Chaudhuri gets around to Pakistan, which he eventually does, the book achieves a high order of reference value. His chapter on the organization and composition of the civil service is a highly useful description of the various cadres and their lack of relationship with each other. It points up the elements in the bureaucratic power structure that make organic change within an evolutionary context virtually impossible. And with a non-sequitur to end all non-sequiturs, it proposes the establishment of a "competent" Commission to explore the possibility of unifying the civil service.

A discussion of recruitment is in large part an analysis of the massive competitive examination processes of the Federal Public Service Commission, to which so many are called and by which so few are chosen. Considerable attention is given to so-called "Method II" recruitment and examination processes in the United Kingdom, which emphasizes qualities appropriate to effective careers in the civil service rather than the mere re-examination of candidates in academic subjects. However, the best Mr. Chaudhuri can suggest is the establishment of a Research Unit in the office of the Public Service Commission which would help the Commission to bring and keep its recruitment methods up to date.

With only occasional side excursions to Henley-on-Thames and the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, Chaudhuri's chapter on training is a highly enlightening review of the practices, procedures and problems of the Government of Pakistan in the post-entry improvement of the quality of its civil servants. Traditionally, of course, the precocious heirs to administrative empires recruited into the CSP have been the most carefully tended of the budding mandarins, although latterly the Foreign Service cadre, with its Fletcher School liaison, may conduct an even more exotic and certainly more expensive nursery. The Civil Service Academy at Lahore gives the CSP recruits a year of rigorous training in preparation for a final examination carrying 500 marks of which, in the finest tradition of the CSP, 50 are for horsemanship and 40 for the Constitution of Pakistan. Thereafter follows five months' apprenticeship in East Pakistan and then a year, currently suspended, at Oxbridge. At this point they go to work for a living. The Finance Services Academy, the Police Training College, and the Central Secretariat Training Institute are described briefly and extensive hortatory consideration is given to the role of the universities in in-service training,

courses of study, diversification of work experience, sabbatical leave for public servants, and even research as a training device.

Dr. Chaudhuri's chapter on general conditions of employment is directed primarily to the analysis of the pay structure and its evolution since the report of the Pakistan Pay Commission, to retirement benefits, and to promotion. At no point does he challenge any of the prevailing assumptions regarding status, including pay status, in the person rather than in the job, and his arguments on pay structure and retirement benefits are essentially normative and prudential. On promotion, however, he is solidly on the side of the angels; he believes in promotion on merit rather than seniority, utilizing existing procedures, only better.

The final substantive chapter of the book is addressed to professional standards of conduct, in which the author deals with extra-curricular financial activities of public servants and corruption, with disciplinary methods and procedures, with security, and with political activity. In general he is against corruption, for discipline (provided adequate appeal procedures are available), in favour of the orderly and judicious endorsement of security measures, and for a code to regulate the political activities of civil servants.

III

Professor Goodnow's *The Civil Service of Pakistan* is a study of a civil service cadre of some 400 persons, and their role in governing a country of 100 million people. The pre-Partition Indian Civil Service was frequently called, and undoubtedly thought of itself, as "the steel frame" of the subcontinent. The CSP regards itself as the inheritor of that tradition. In a very real sense the Government of Pakistan was the creation of civil servants—although it is worth noting the chief amongst them were not ICS but Audits and Accounts men. How did the CSP grow so great, and what are the prospects of its leading Pakistan into the twentieth century?

After an essentially philosophical introduction discussing the relationship of bureaucracy and political power in the new states, Goodnow traces the events and influences which led the CSP to a position of dominance in the Government of Pakistan during the years immediately succeeding Partition. A major factor in the ascendancy of the CSP has been the relationship it has maintained with the Governors-General and subsequently with the Presidents of Pakistan. Jinnah and Nazimuddin, the first two Governors-General, who led

Pakistan during the first four years of its existence, were politicians, and both left the establishment of the machinery of government to experienced civil servants such as Ghulam Mohammad and Chaudhri Mohammed Ali. Ghulam Mohammed succeeded Nazimuddin in 1951; he was an old Audits and Accounts officer in undivided India, and relied heavily upon the civil service which he, as Minister of Finance, and Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, as Chief Secretary, had set up. Ghulam Mohammed was succeeded by Iskander Mirza, an old Indian Political Service officer and long-time Secretary of Defense in Pakistan. Mirza likewise leaned heavily on the civil service. Mirza was succeeded by Ayub Khan, commander-in-chief of the Army, and although Ayub's anticorruption campaign caught 12 CSP officers in its net, he also continued, and continues, to repose large confidence in the civil service. The CSP, moreover, especially in West Pakistan and to a smaller degree in East Pakistan, enjoys an ascendancy over the politicians in both public policy and popular opinion. Traditionally, of course, the CSP has been regarded as the most elite of the cadres, and by the judicious occupation of reserved posts has maintained substantial hegemony in the government service. Finally, the structure of the government itself gives the CSP a substantial advantage. The extent to which the secretariat is in control of departments (and the CSP is in control of secretariats), CSP control of local and provincial administration through reserved posts, CSP control of government organization, and CSP control of development planning, as well as its virtual monopoly of important external contacts—all these factors have helped to strengthen and consolidate the dominance of the CSP in the Government of Pakistan.

Goodnow traverses some of the ground covered by Chaudhuri in respect of the selection and training of CSP recruits and of assignments, pay and privileges, but the focus of his analysis is the effectiveness of these establishment operations in the maintenance of unity and competence within the CSP. The old school tie coherence of the CSP is no accident, and the functions of the Civil Service Academy run far beyond the mere dispensation of expertise required by a Deputy Collector. Nor is the privileged position of CSP officers with respect to pay and prerogatives a purely individual matter. The stakes of the CSP in maintaining its unity and its control of Pakistani administration are enormous.

Like most foreigners who have dealt with the CSP at close quarters, Goodnow, regards it with more respect for its capacity for survival than

confidence in its ultimate utility for the development of Pakistan. He sums up the institutional inadequacies of the CSP in these words:

The dilemma confronting the CSP is in many ways similar to the dilemma with which the British were faced in India. If it is to be successful in implementing a programme of national development it must strengthen the country's educational, commercial and political institutions. In so doing, however, it creates or strengthens the very institutions that will eventually challenge its monopoly of administrative power . . .

Another basic weakness in the CSP as an institution is that it depends for its successful functioning on a nonexistent group of selfless supermen. These "Platonic Guardians" do not exist in any country—least of all in underdeveloped countries with their inadequate educational institutions. The development of a modern state requires a multitude of technicians, specialists, elected representatives, and others—all of whom must be empowered to make decisions within their respective areas of competence . . .

The CSP is also insulated from public opinion or, perhaps more accurately, from public sentiment. Its traditions, superior status, training programmes, and the constant shifting of its personnel contribute to its isolation . . .

As an institution the CSP has also failed to develop dynamic leadership within itself. In order to minimize internal dissension the element of competitive striving for advancement has been virtually eliminated . . .

The conclusion is clear that the three hundred CSP officers will not bring about the peaceful revolution that Pakistan requires. These officers are certainly not incompetent, but the task is overwhelming and their traditions are those of an elite group of foreign administrators forced by circumstances to emphasize precedent and control . . .

IV

Inayatullah's *District Administration in West Pakistan* is a collection of papers prepared for a symposium on district administration sponsored by the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development at Peshawar. There are approximately 68 districts and political agencies in Pakistan, of which 51 are in West Pakistan and 17 in East Pakistan. These districts, and the political agencies in the tribal areas, are the cutting edge of Pakistani public administration. Policies are made at the Centre and in the regions, but they are implemented in the districts, and to the average Pakistani the district commissioner *is* the government.

The first section of the book is devoted to the historical development of the district system, to the organization of political agencies, and to the characteristics of the districts. Richard W. Gable's essay traces the development of the districts from the Mughals, through the period of the British Raj, to modern times, and relates the problems of district administration to the functioning of the Basic

Democracies. Kunwer Idris deals with the political agencies which operate in the tribal areas, and the problems of integrating the tribes into the social and political order. Minhajuddin analyzes critically the difficulties of effective district administration created by their heterogeneity, by the inadequate number and inequitable distribution of CSP officers to the districts, and by the discontinuity produced by frequent transfers. The CSP officers, moreover, seem to wind up with extraordinary frequency at divisional headquarters. If the district commissioner is the government to the average Pakistani, his image must be one of an unusually transient public authority.

The second section of the symposium consists of six papers devoted to the structure of district administration. C. M. Shafqat, in an admirably objective survey of judicial administration in the districts, comes to the conclusion that the judicial system, despite its separation from the executive, still falls short of guaranteeing fair trials. M. R. Khalid's essay on district revenue organization is in the same critical vein, and although he is fully aware of the deficiencies of existing revenue machinery he points out that the mere elimination of the patwari, without extensive antecedent improvements, is no panacea. Police administration in the districts is described by Habibur Rehman, who makes two very important points: first, the relationship between the superintendents of police and the district commissioners makes for highly ambiguous situations of administrative responsibility; second, the great body of the law which the police are responsible for enforcing is the jurisprudence of a law and order colonial government, ill suited to the realities of Pakistani social and political conditions. Anwar Tehmasap directs his attention to the problems of the nation building, as contrasted with the regulatory departments at the district level. He finds that the major impediments to effective social and economic development work derive from the "ruler" image of the public service elicited by the police and revenue departments and the magistracy, which is antithetical to the "friend and counselor" image in which the developmental agencies must work, from the inferior prestige of officers in the developmental departments, from inadequate coordination of development activities, and from disparities in the boundaries of civil tehsils and civil districts on the one hand and of development areas on the other. The administrative organization of the Basic Democracies with special reference to the functions of the Assistant Directors is the subject of an essay by F. A. M. Tirmizi. The Assistant Directors are the mediators between the Basic Democracies and the district bureaucracy. The major obstacles to effective assistance to the Basic Democracies seems to be the internecine warfare between the Assistant Director and the revenue officers for the superior position with the district commissioner in relations with the Basic Democracies each time the district commissioner changes, inadequacies in the quality of the

secretaries of the Union Councils, the inadequate prestige of the Assistant Directors and their difficulty in securing cooperation from the departments, and the discontinuity produced by frequent transfers—the average tour of duty of an Assistant Director in a district is 17.5 months. Ahmad Maqsood Hameedee writes about sub-divisional administration in Pakistan, which has been an almost extra-legal level of administrative coordination. There are now about 86 sub-divisions in West Pakistan, and during the next ten years it is planned to convert all the tehsils into sub-divisions. The sub-divisions, of course, live off the powers delegated by the district commissioners, and are the training ground of Civil Service Academy graduates. The expansion of sub-divisional organization appears likely to increase geometrically most of the still unsolved problems of horizontal coordination at the district level.

Part III of the volume comprises five essays devoted to the problems and trends in district administration. Inayatullah contributes an essay on the changing character of district administration, in which he makes the important point that community development and the growth of the Basic Democracies are beginning to exert pressures making inexorably for fundamental change in the character of traditionally personal and authoritarian district administration. Salim Abbas Jilani argues adroitly, but in my opinion somewhat inconclusively, that the district commissioners are themselves undergoing a metamorphosis from which they will emerge as spiritual leaders and effective instrumentalities of the Basic Democracies. I find this extrapolation difficult to reconcile with the CSP and PCS officers I know personally. Rural communities, district administration and the civil service is the subject of Mrs. Salma Omer's essay, who argues cogently and with telling examples that although the responsibilities and roles of civil servants has altered drastically since Independence, the human material has in large measure failed to respond to its changed environment. Sarshar Amad Khan and Muzaffar M. Qureshi discuss the relationships of voluntary organizations to district administration. The argument of the essay is essentially a plea for bureaucratic assistance in the building of capacities for voluntary cooperation in dealing with certain welfare problems, and in transforming the essentially individualistic and subjective character of Islamic socialism into group effort and group responsibility. It may be that Messrs. Amad and Qureshi are knocking at the wrong door. Mir Naseem Mahmood contributes a spirited case study of his experiences in Kamalpur at the outset of his brief tenure there as deputy commissioner. It is a very human account of the problems, tensions, and frictions instinct in the production of administrative and social change.

The fourth section of the symposium is addressed to the reorganization of district administration. Raja Mohammad Afzal Khan's essay is an eloquent

argument for an eclectic and experimental approach to reorganization, and for intellectual fearlessness in dealing with the administrative implications of political change. Masihuzzaman's paper on Basic Democracies and district administration is a forthright delineation of the inherent conflicts—the deputy commissioner versus the chairman of the district council, the public versus the public servant, the district council versus the district administration. He believes the resolution of these difficulties lies in the democratization of the Basic Democracies and in freeing them from the leading strings of district administration. Coordination of governmental activities at the district level is the topic of an essay by S. A. W. Moini; it is a telling indictment of the inadequacy of existing facilities for coordination, and a warning that continued internal failure may well produce external coordination by influences of political precedent. Nasim Hassan Shah's paper on the separation of the judiciary from the executive is a sharp criticism of the *Jirgas*, or special tribunals, authorized by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, which may admit hearsay evidence, make *ex parte* investigations, and utilize other methods of getting at the truth not countenanced by civilized societies. Bashir A. Khan writes on the separation of powers in the district. He argues against the separation of executive and judicial powers on the prudential grounds that it might weaken the executive in maintaining law and order, but favours separating the revenue organization from general district administration. His argument would be well understood by some corporation lawyers with whom I am acquainted.

The concluding section of the book is composed of mainly descriptive essays on local government and district administration in other countries. Haridawar Rai contributes an interesting historical essay on the developing role of the district officer in India from 1860 to 1960. D. M. Connolly writes on district administration in Southern Rhodesia. M. Rafique has a piece on local administration in France, and P. A. Tobin a companion essay on local government in the United Kingdom. James S. Roberts provides a summary of important aspects of Scandinavian local government. Three essays deal with American county government; David A. Macuk and his wife Ute write on history, functions and reform of county government; Don R. Larson attempts an institutional comparison of American counties and Pakistani districts; and Harry J. Friedman undertakes a comparative assessment of their administrative impact. His thesis that administrative impact is inversely related to political participation is of dubious derivation from American experience, and in view of the lack of political participation can hardly be argued at this stage on the basis of Pakistani experience.

Md. Anisuzzaman's *The Circle Officer* is a brief study of local administration at the bottom-most level in East Pakistan. There are 413 circles or thanas (the

word means police station) in East Pakistan, each served by a circle officer who is a junior member of the Provincial Civil Service. Although circles were established as local government supervisory areas under the Bengal Local Self-Government Act of 1919, they were of relatively large area and population, and in their modern form they date from 1962 when the Provincial Government reorganized the circle system and increased their number from 127 to 413. In a series of transformation the circle officer has acquired a central position in thana development and while he is not the development officer for the basic democracies most of his time and attention are directed to development matters. As the only gazetted public official of the thana, however he is also responsible for investigating local needs and requirements of all sorts, holding preliminary inquiries in civil and criminal cases settling local disputes, and handling many other miscellaneous local matters. He reports to the sub-divisional officer and in turn to the deputy commissioner, commissioner and chief secretary.

Because the circle officer is, in effect, a post-office, he must rely almost altogether on his powers of persuasion. He may report unsatisfactory conditions to the SDO, but may not act with respect to them except under orders. The fact that most circle officers enjoy considerable popularity with thana and union councils is a tribute to their powers of persuasion and leadership. Anisuzzaman is convinced that the circle officer's role is a viable one that it corresponds to the realities of social organization in East Pakistan that his influence is expanding and that he is destined to play an important role in development. But he has a long way to go in securing the diverse skills which his job as "friend and leader" implies.

VI

Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan, edited by Inayatullah, is an outgrowth of a seminar on public administration sponsored by the Academy for Rural Development in Peshawar. To the original papers prepared for the seminar have been added various relevant essays drawn from other sources.

Part I comprises five essays dealing with the topic of bureaucracy in a developing state, which review in general and theoretical terms the major organizing ideas which experience in development administration have produced. Especially notable are Mashihuzzaman's essay on the administrative obstacles to voluntary organizations in Pakistan and Ralph Braibanti's highly stimulating pieces on the philosophical foundation of bureaucratic change and reflections on bureaucratic corruption.

Part II is directed to administrative structure in Pakistan. G. Ahmad contributes a notable essay on changes in the administrative organization of the Government of Pakistan since 1953, and the classic statement on public administration contained in The Second Five-Year Plan is printed as an accompanying document.

Part III considers the structure of the Pakistani bureaucracy. The stage is set in a penetrating essay by Braibanti which offers a theoretical analysis of the CSP, and examines the factors which have contributed to its special outlook. Chaudhuri's paper on the organization and composition of the central civil services in Pakistan is a chapter from his dissertation, which has been reviewed above. The final paper in this section by Masihuzzaman is a hard-hitting argument for revisionism in the traditions of the public service in Pakistan.

Part IV is concerned with bureaucracy, local government and rural development. Richard Niehoff contributes a solid general essay on Basic Democracies and rural development, and A. T. Rafiq Rahman considers the special problems of the Basic Democracies and rural development in East Pakistan. Mohammad Afzal Khan offers a highly discerning analysis of the problems of rural development administration based upon a case study in his own village. Aquila Kiani reports on a study of the people's image of the bureaucracy based on a sample of 102 interviews in Peshawar. The essay is a highly interesting complement to the study of the other side in the coin in Ahmad's *The Civil servant in Pakistan*.

Part V is concerned with reorientation of the bureaucracy. Rafiq Inayat offers a careful and well-reasoned essay in the improvement of the Civil Service Academy, and Abdul Qayyum follows with a description of the Pakistan Administrative Staff College. Inayat Ullah provides a note on the National Institute of Public Administration in Lahore, and Inayatullah concludes the section, and the volume, with an essay on the Academy for Village Development in Peshawar.

VII

What are the criteria appropriate to the evaluation of these books? Is *The Civil Servant in Pakistan* to be compared with respect to the elaborateness of its analyses and the sophistication of its statistical techniques with *The Image of the Federal Service* and its *Source Book*? If so it probably must be accorded a lower rank. But the more important point is that Ahmad's methodology was altogether adequate to the kinds of analyses his problem called for, and it is doubtful that the more complex processes of the Brookings Institution study would have yielded any better conclusions concerning the self-image of the Pakistan civil services. In the same way Chaudhuri and even Goodnow might be criticized if our vantage point were that of, let us say, some of the more exotic projections of the Comparative Administration Group.

A more profitable line of criticism is to judge the books in the light of the tasks they set for themselves, and their relevance to the intellectual needs of Pakistan at this time. From this point of view their significance appears quite different. All of them contribute significantly to the expansion of what Pakistan knows about itself. It is not likely that they will reform the power urges of various sectors of the bureaucracy. If it is true, as has been said, that no nice girl has ever been seduced by a book, it is equally true that no civil servant has ever had his fundamental values changed by a book. But we may be sure that the premises of the Great Debates will be measurably altered in the future. Prevailing attitudes may continue to be defended, but they will have to be defended for quite different reasons and argued on quite different grounds in future confrontations.

Perhaps the most important value of these books is the clear evidence they bear that there are no longer closed subjects in Pakistani administration. Pakistanis are saying openly about themselves things that I and other foreign critics forebore to say a decade ago, and they are saying them on the basis of reasoned inquiry and solid research. Like Indians, Frenchmen and Americans, Pakistanis have for some time been well versed in the arts of political invective. But now the arguments are being served cold. Most people don't like arguments served cold. They are too convincing.